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Abstract 
 
The bilateral relationship between the US and Pakistan has been highly 
significant for the foreign policies of both countries. Since 1947 Pakistan has 
sought US support in its quest for regional security and the US repeatedly turned 
to Pakistan as an irreplaceable strategic ally in its quest for global power and 
security. Despite this the relationship became fractious and increasingly 
distrustful. Many accounts describe the relationship and analyse events which 
have shaped it but fail to satisfactorily understand why it became so difficult, 
particularly from the Pakistani perspective. 
This thesis seeks to bring a fresh perspective by analysing the whole of the 
relationship as a cumulative process shaped not just by events but by reciprocal 
behaviour and expectation. It is a diplomatic history examining episodes of the 
relationship since 1947 through existing primary and secondary sources but also 
contributing new material from 20 field-work interviews conducted in Pakistan 
with military, government, media and academic actors. 
The study finds an underlying contradiction in the relationship in which 
fundamental national interests have never converged sufficiently for sustained co-
operation. As such relations have relied on transactional opportunism. Co-
operation has depended on temporary wilful blindness by the US which cannot be 
maintained beyond episodes of crisis. Pakistan uses its geostrategic assets as a 
reverse influence on the US but consistently hedges its strategies against 
anticipated abandonment when the crisis episode has passed. Through this has 
evolved a cumulative legacy of mutual negative expectation and mistrust which 
has become deeply ingrained in the relationship. The study also finds that the 
strategic utility of the relationship has favoured the US but that Pakistan’s reverse 
influence has grown, making it more difficult for Washington to abandon the 
relationship it finds so frustrating.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The bilateral relationship between Pakistan and the US has always been 
full of contradictions. In 1962, Hans J. Morgenthau, a leading American scholar 
on international politics, approved of the relationship as an “alliance serving 
complementary interests.”1 Yet, just two years later, he condemned it as, “useless 
and counterproductive”, and declared it, “a diplomatic act against nature.”2 Fifty 
years on, Hillary Clinton apologised for the US killing of Pakistani soldiers, but 
went on to describe the US-Pakistan relationship as “challenging but essential”.3 
One interviewee for this thesis dismissed her apology as insufficient. The West 
says sorry “a hundred times a day”, he said. “Even if they sneeze they say sorry.”4 
Another interviewee summed up the contradictory nature of the relationship by 
arguing that neither US friendship nor animosity was “beneficial for Pakistan”.5  
This research aims to explore the history of US-Pakistan relations to 
improve understanding of why, over 65 years, it has proved to be so problematic 
whilst still perceived as essential and compelling by both parties. The research 
surveys the relationship’s history since Pakistan emerged from independence in 
1947 through to 2012 to establish trends and cycles and to examine their causes 
and legacies. It aims to combine material from the existing literature alongside 
archival and biographical sources with fresh perspectives from a range of 
Pakistani sources. 
The thesis will seek to demonstrate that the relationship has been poor 
because, throughout, the interests of the two states have never fully converged and 
that, instead, it has been based on opportunism, wilful blindness and what is 
called, “reverse influence”. To set this in context there follows a short summary of 
the key events and turning points in the relationship. 
                                   
1
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Restoration of American Politics, 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 178 
2
 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Senator Fulbright’s New Foreign Policy”, Commentary, Vol. 37, No. 5, 
May 1964, p. 70. 
3
 Hillary Clinton, cited in P. J. Crowley, “Viewpoint: US and Pakistan Alliance is for Good”, 
BBC, 10 July 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18788452?print=true> 
[Accessed 11 July 2012] 
4
 Interview with Hafiz Hamdullah, Quetta, 18 August 2012. 
5
 Interview with Ainullah Shams, Quetta, 25 August 2012. 
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Historical Summary 
Pakistan came into being as an independent state in 1947 in the violence of 
partition making India its most immediate and powerful threat. This insecurity 
drove Pakistan’s search for allies and a position in world politics which were 
dominated by the emerging Cold War. These influences compelled Pakistan to 
abandon its original ideals of neutrality and Muslim solidarity, and to seek 
security through alignment with the US. 
US interest in South Asia came from its strategy of containing the USSR 
to prevent communist expansion towards the Middle East and, later, to also 
contain China. After being rejected by India in 1949, which chose a non-aligned 
policy, it took another five years for the US to turn to Pakistan as its regional 
partner. Under the 1954 Mutual Defence Pact, Pakistan joined the US alliance 
system, receiving military aid in return for access to bases and military co-
operation. However, the primary aims of the two states did not align. Whilst the 
US was arming Pakistan against the USSR, Pakistan’s prime concern was India 
and a resolution of the Kashmir issue. This thesis argues that these misaligned 
aims underlay the relationship from the start and contributed to its brittle and 
fluctuating quality. 
Despite this, the alignment was stable up to the early 1960s. Pakistan 
joined other US-led regional alliances, SEATO and CENTO, and was recognised 
as a key US ally. It received large amounts of military aid in return and the US 
turned a blind eye when the military ousted the elected civilian government in 
October 1959. Differences surfaced, however, when the US armed India in its 
1962 border dispute with China and they came to a head when Pakistan’s military 
aid was withdrawn in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. Bitterly disappointed that the 
US had not supported it against India, Pakistan turned to China for alternative 
arms supplies, but remained a member of the US-led alliances.  
By 1970, Pakistan’s connection with Beijing was used by Washington as 
part of its triangular diplomacy which involved improving relations with China 
and deliberately worrying the USSR in the process. At the same time, East 
Pakistan was breaking away from West Pakistan resulting in brutal repression, to 
which the US again turned a blind eye. However, the US did not intervene to 
prevent East Pakistan’s secession, which was won with Indian military help, 
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though it did deter India from threatening West Pakistan. Pakistan again felt 
betrayed and diversified its foreign policy towards Islamic states and China, 
without again breaking off its relations with Washington.  
India’s 1974 nuclear test prompted Pakistan to accelerate its own nuclear 
programme, against the non-proliferation aims of the US. This created severe 
tension culminating in suspension of aid and Pakistan’s withdrawal from CENTO. 
In contrast to America’s response to the earlier military take-over, General Zia’s 
coup in July 1977 and the subsequent repression drew severe human rights 
criticism from the Carter administration. With US-Pakistan relations at a low ebb, 
the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and these concerns were put to one side as 
the US attempted to regain Pakistan as a close ally. Initially refusing Carter’s 
offer, Zia used his country’s geo-strategic value to negotiate a better aid package 
from the Reagan administration and then helped to arm the Mujahidin in a proxy 
war against the USSR. In this, the US aim was to weaken and expel the USSR 
from Afghanistan. Pakistan shared this latter aim, but also wanted a sympathetic 
successor regime in Kabul which would allow military strategic depth against 
India and not incite nationalist sentiment in the border regions. The US was not 
particularly interested in these concerns of Pakistan. 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme continued throughout this period without 
noticeably affecting relations with Washington. However, when the USSR 
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989 this concern over nuclear proliferation led to 
the US suspending aid once more, despite Pakistan’s reversion to democratic 
government. Islamic terrorism was another issue between the two countries when 
the US accused Pakistan of sponsoring terrorists in Kashmir and Bosnia. In the 
Afghan civil wars, which followed the Soviet collapse, Islamabad sponsored the 
pro-Pakistan Taliban. Eager for access to new gas fields in Central Asia, and to 
contain Iranian influence, the US initially joined Saudi Arabia in financing 
Taliban support. However, deteriorating human rights, drug trafficking and 
support for al-Qaeda made the US distance itself from the Taliban and criticise 
Pakistan over its sponsorship of them. In 1998, Pakistan responded to India’s 
nuclear tests with tests of its own, resulting in another US aid embargo. 
Musharraf’s 1999 military coup drew additional sanctions. 
It was in this period that the 9/11 incident occurred. Embargos and 
sanctions were once again lifted and the US gave Pakistan a $2.64bn aid package 
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in return for joining Washington in clearing al-Qaeda and the Taliban from 
Afghanistan. In 2004, Pakistan was declared a major non-NATO ally of the US 
but, here also, aims were not aligned. The US wanted to destroy al-Qaeda and 
their Taliban hosts but still did not share Islamabad’s hope for a pro-Pakistan 
regime in their place. Pakistan was pressured by the US to abandon the Taliban, 
and India-friendly factions took Kabul and became prominent in government.  
To escape the US military, the Taliban and other militant groups moved to 
the Pakistan border areas from where they attacked NATO in Afghanistan and 
created potential for instability in Pakistan itself. Under US pressure, the Pakistan 
military attacked those groups and this caused resentment and violence inside the 
country. Frustrated with the lack of progress, and suspicious of Pakistani 
collusion, the US also attacked those areas with drones, adding anti-American 
feeling to the existing resentment of the Pakistan military. Trust had broken down 
to such an extent that when the US found Osama bin Laden on Pakistani territory 
in 2011 they mounted a military operation to kill him without even consulting 
Islamabad. Later the same year, NATO destroyed a military base at Salala killing 
24 Pakistani soldiers. In retaliation Pakistan blocked NATO access to Afghanistan 
which was not reopened until 2012 when Hillary Clinton issued her rather half-
hearted apology which was referred to earlier. Despite all these problems, 
relations never broke down completely and the US continued to give aid to the 
Pakistan military. 
 
Literature Review 
In the literature on the history of Pakistan-US relations there is broad 
agreement that the relationship has fluctuated. Rahshree Jetley refers to frequent 
ups and downs, attributable to the changing relevance of Pakistan to US security 
interests and priorities,6 while Rais Ahmed Khan describes relations as both co-
operative and conflicting, ranging from intimacy to indifference to hostility.7 
Bruce Riedel describes the US alliance with Pakistan as having always been 
                                   
6
 Rahshree Jetley, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics (New Delhi: Routledge, 2009). 
7
 Rais Ahmed Khan, “Pakistan-US Relations: Divergences and Convergences of Perceptions”, in 
Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Hussain, (eds.), United States-Pakistan Forum: Relations with the Major 
Powers, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1987), p. 34. 
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turbulent and destructive.8 This thesis is a contribution to the study of the reasons 
for these fluctuations and explores why relations between the two states have not 
just fluctuated but have generally been so poor. 
National interests are a major factor in forming and maintaining inter-state 
relationships so most writers examine these to understand the bilateral relationship 
between the US and Pakistan. There are no claims that there has been any 
consistent unity of interest, in the way that there has been in NATO or between 
the US and Japan, for example, but there is a range of opinion about the extent to 
which the national interests of the two states have converged or diverged.  
Despite the fluctuations in the relationship, Jetley, for example, argues that 
relations have been generally marked by a broad strategic convergence on 
regional and global security issues: Pakistan sought close relations with the 
United States as a countervailing power to Indian pre-eminence in South Asia; the 
United States, for its part, found Pakistan a valuable ally in its wider regional and 
global security agenda. It is not clear, however, that the strategic issues he 
describes necessarily converged as national interests or that Pakistan shared the 
US’s overriding concern about containing communism.9 
Examining the formation of Pakistan after independence, Hassan Abbas 
supports the shared interests argument by citing the anti-communist bias of the 
Pakistani leadership as an important factor in the initial formation of the Cold War 
alliances with the US.10 Syed Hussain Soherwardi also suggests that both Pakistan 
and the US formed SEATO and CENTO as a result of their common clash of 
interests with the USSR and that they were staunch allies during the Cold War as 
a result.11 These claims are brought into question, though, by Pakistan’s 
accommodating relationship with China which suggests that concerns over India 
were more important to Islamabad than concerns about communism. 
Qadar Baksh Baloch argues that mutual relations between the two 
countries were based on a convergence of common interests from time to time. 
When the US required U2 surveillance flight facilities and an intelligence base 
                                   
8
 Bruce O. Riedel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, American and the Future of the Global Jihad 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2011), pp. 117-118. 
9
 Jetly, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics, p. xvi. 
10
 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror, 
(New York: East Gate Book, 2005), p. 25. 
11
 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwardi, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Interaction with the US Foreign 
Policy Making Bodies (1947-2010): An Analysis”, IPRI Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2010, p. 24. 
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against the Soviets (1959-1968), backdoor diplomacy with the Chinese (1970-72), 
covert operations against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan (1980-89) and recently 
the war against terrorism (2001), it extended its best hand forward in terms of 
military and economic aid as well as support for military dictators. US-Pakistan 
relations flourished in the periods of international tension, such as in the fifties, 
again in the eighties, and post 9/11, but deteriorated in conditions of détente, as in 
the sixties and seventies and again in the nineties. Thus, their spells of close ties 
have been single-issue engagements of limited or uncertain duration.12 Richard 
Post supports this view and adds that when there has been a convergence of 
interests, the relationship has amounted to an alliance but, when there has been a 
divergence of interests, the very closeness of the previous ties has intensified the 
resultant estrangement, causing exaggerated peaks and troughs in the 
relationship.13 Marvin Weinbaum describes the relationship as a limited 
engagement. He also goes further in arguing that, despite all the agreements on 
military equipment, training, and personnel exchanges, and economic assistance, 
neither party has been restrained from pursuing an independent foreign policy, not 
necessarily to the liking of the other partner. He adds that objectives of the two 
countries have been at times dissimilar and that, even while offering mutual 
benefits, the relationship has been asymmetrical and not usually equally 
advantageous.14 Dennis Kux appears to go further, noting that ties have lacked a 
solid base of shared national interests and that the US never shared Pakistan’s 
perception of India as an enemy, but he confuses this by also claiming that 
interests and security policies have been in phase almost as often as they have 
been at odds.15 Devin Hagerty concludes that the two countries have been closest 
when faced with mutual threats, which he sees as a negative, reactive incentive for 
cooperation. He argues there is little that links Pakistan and the US in any 
positive, proactive way since post-industrial, liberal Western democracies have 
                                   
12
 Qadar Baksh Baloch, “Engagement and Estrangement in US-Pakistan Relations”, The Dialogue, 
Volume 1, Number 4, 2006, pp. 28-55, <http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/The%20Dialogue 
/1_4/2_US%20Pak_Major.pdf> [Accessed 2 August 2012].  
13
 Richard St. F. Post, “US Investment in Pakistan”, in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Hussain (eds.), 
United States-Pakistan Forum: Relations with the Major Powers (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 
1987), p. 70. 
14
 Marvin Weinbaum, “Pakistan and the United States: A Partnership of Necessity”, in Daniel 
Benjamin (ed.), America and the World in the Age of Terror: A New Landscape in International 
Relations, (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), p. 106. 
15
 Dennis Kux, Disenchanted Allies: The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000 (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), p. 360. 
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little in common with pre-industrial Islamic “militocracies”. In his view, without a 
third party threat such as the Soviet Union or al-Qaeda, the best that such 
disparate countries can expect over the long term is to have a number of shared 
interests and generally warm, but unremarkable, relations.16 Aazar Tamana finds 
there is an inherent contradiction between the global reach of US interests, on the 
one hand, and Pakistan’s more limited regional concerns on the other.17 Howard 
Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer observe that the gap between the strategic 
objectives of the two sides is the most significant theme in bilateral ties.18 
These analyses suggest a more limited role for the idea of converging 
national interests in explaining the dynamics of US-Pakistan relations and that 
other factors have been at play. Rais Ahmed Khan cites geo-political realities and 
strategic compulsions as the factors which bring the two countries together.19 
More specifically, Peter Blood argues that it is the strategic utility of Pakistan 
which always affected its status and eminence in Washington and that what drove 
this dependant relationship was the US view of its own strategic needs together 
with Pakistan’s ability to adjust and adapt to it. His study demonstrates that the 
Cold War was the main factor which developed the relationship and that its 
strategic location made Pakistan the most important partner of the western 
alliance against the spread of communism in the region.20 Daniel Markey agrees 
there is some truth in Pakistan’s claims that America has used the country when it 
suited the superpower’s agenda and then tossed it away when inconvenient. He 
argues that Washington has viewed the country as a means to other ends, whether 
that meant fighting communism or terrorism. When Pakistan was helpful, it 
enjoyed generous US assistance and attention, but when it was not helpful the 
spigot was turned off.21  
These analyses suggest a more instrumental view of the relationship in 
which the driving force is intermittent US need for access to Pakistan’s geo-
                                   
16
 Devin T. Hagerty, “The United States-Pakistan Entente: Third Time’s Charm?” in Craig Baxter, 
Pakistan on the Brink: Politics, Economics, and Society (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), p. 1-2. 
17
 Aazar Tamana, United States-Pakistan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: The Pressler 
Amendment and Pakistan’s National Security Concerns, (Perth: Curtin, 2004). 
18
 Howard B. Schaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: 
Riding the Roller Coaster, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2011), p. 3. 
19
 Khan “Pakistan-US Relations: Divergences and Convergences of Perceptions”, p. 34. 
20
 Peter R. Blood, Pakistan: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1995), p. 250. 
21
 Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 2. 
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political location, in relation to its own security interests, rather than converging 
national interests between the two states. Rajshree Jetley acknowledges that 
frequent ups and downs in relations between the two countries became a function 
of Pakistan’s relevance in the United States’ security interests and priorities.22 
Aazar Tamana supports this view and concludes that the relationship is only 
formed when US national interests allow it.23 This thesis will examine these issues 
in detail and explore the extent to which the relationship is more the result of 
opportunism than of converging interests. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is presented as an occasion when 
interests genuinely did converge. Leon Hadar argues that, at this time, both 
Pakistan and the US had the same common interest: they were aware of the 
danger that the Soviet occupation posed to neighbouring countries and of Soviet 
strategy to take advantage of an unstable Iran to gain access to the Arabian Sea in 
order to control oil resources of the Middle East. Thus the US and Pakistan co-
operated to stop the menace of communism in South Asia and the Middle East. 
This included covert cooperation between the American CIA and Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI).24 Muhammad Amir Rana examines this alliance 
between the CIA and ISI through which a US and Saudi-funded jihad 
infrastructure was created in Pakistan to fight Soviet forces. He explains that after 
the Soviet withdrawal some of these jihadi militants adopted a new agenda to free 
Muslims from their perceived American, Israeli and Indian oppressors elsewhere 
in the world and argues that the Taliban was created by the ISI.25  
That these outcomes resulted in a fundamental security threat to the US 
suggests that national interests may not have converged as closely as is often 
assumed, and this question will also be explored in this thesis. 
There is a range of opinion about the convergence of interests in the post-
9/11 era. Sohail Mahmood claims Pakistan and the US had a convergence of 
interests to rid the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of al-Qaeda and Taliban 
elements since Pakistan was threatened from within by the Islamic radicals.26 
                                   
22
 Jetley, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics, p. xvi. 
23
 Tamana, United States-Pakistan Relations in the Post-Cold war Era 
24
 Leon T. Hadar, “Pakistan in America’s War against Terrorism: Strategic Ally or Unreliable 
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According to Syed Husain Soherwardi, however, the CIA and US policymakers 
clashed with the ISI over their main concerns towards Afghanistan and Pakistan’s 
tribal belt and that this divergence, along with the US’s casual response to 
Pakistan’s security in relation to India, aggravated tension between the US and the 
Pakistan Army.27 On the other hand, Marvin Weinbaum argues that important 
areas of convergence exist between the West and Pakistan in their perceptions of 
the dangers presented by extremist groups. He claims that Pakistani officials have 
become acutely conscious that attacks on Western soil traceable to Pakistan could 
present a security threat in the form of possible retaliation from targeted states. He 
also explains that, despite disagreements over targeting groups which Islamabad 
sees as helpful to its cause, the Pakistani and American intelligence services do 
co-operate on dealing with other groups and that this has weakened al-Qaeda and 
disrupted those elements of the Pakistani Taliban which attack the Pakistan State. 
One of the worst-kept secrets was the tacit approval from Pakistani officials for 
the launching of American drone missiles against these groups.28 
In order to understand the post-9/11 era and the extent to which national 
interests converge here, this thesis will examine the period between the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US led invasion as well as the 
circumstances of Musharraf’s decision to side with the West and participate in the 
War on Terror. 
The idea of misperceptions features in the literature. Richard Post claims 
the US-Pakistan relationship has been dominated by misperceptions in each 
country concerning the extent to which the national interests of the two countries 
converged or diverged.29 Rais Ahmed Khan argues that it is divergences of 
perceptions and policies over a number of bilateral and international issues that 
tend to pull the states apart. He points out that Pakistan sees a lack of durability 
and credibility in Washington’s policies and that the Americans, for their part, 
have found the relationship exasperating.30  
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Daniel Markey argues that Pakistanis and Americans tell conflicting 
versions of their shared history. His assessment is that the US has been the more 
fickle partner, with its approach to Pakistan shifting dramatically across the 
decades, but Pakistan has been guilty of greater misrepresentation, claiming 
support for US aims while turning the partnership to other ends.31 Bruce Riedel 
also concludes that Pakistanis and Americans have entirely different narratives 
about their bilateral relationship: Pakistan speaks of America’s continual betrayal 
and of promising much but delivering little; while America finds Pakistan 
duplicitous, saying one thing and doing another.32 
However, it is not clear that conflicting narratives and distrust are the 
result of misperceptions. For example, Raziullah Azmi points out that the nuclear 
issue was a major irritant in the relationship before 1979 but after the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, US relations with Pakistan took a U-turn. The US put the 
nuclear issue aside and provided two long-term aid packages for Pakistan. Despite 
Congressional concerns and often sensational revelations about Pakistan’s nuclear 
drive, these were not allowed to disrupt the alliance at this particular time. 
Pakistan was elevated to the status of a “frontline state” and became the recipient 
of American military and economic largesse.33  
In addition, despite promoting liberal democratic values, the US has 
endorsed or had some link with every Pakistani military dictator, though they 
started wars with India and supported jihadist militants,34 and the Pakistan army 
has been the major recipient of US financial aid.35 This behaviour suggests that 
the idea of wilful blindness, or turning a blind eye, may be more of a feature in 
understanding the relationship than misperception. This thesis will examine and 
assess this issue in relation to other incidents and developments in the history of 
the relationship. In particular it will examine the extent to which wilful blindness 
and opportunism have contributed to the on-off nature of the relationship and, in 
turn, how this has been responsible for the lack of trust which Butt and Schofield 
note as a fundamental flaw in the relationship.36 
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There is also a suggestion that, despite the asymmetric power relationship, 
Pakistani client regimes have exerted influence over their US patron to meet 
objectives of their own which may be at odds with US interests. Tom Roger refers 
to this as “reverse influence” and claims it was exerted by Pakistan on the US 
during and after the Cold War. He explains that whilst it is generally assumed that 
small states are weak, there are situations in which such a state can influence a 
greater power’s actions and policies to serve its immediate interests. While the 
greater power’s status relies upon its military and economic base, the small state 
tends to derive influence from its critical geo-strategic position, which may either 
be a permanent characteristic or a temporary phase reflecting global politics of the 
time. Thus, reverse influence means influence exerted by a weaker state over the 
policies and actions of a superpower to the extent that the superpower foregoes 
some of its interests in favour of the weaker power.37 This is a theme which is 
missing in many accounts. Dennis Kux, for example, notes the sometime inability 
of the US to influence Pakistan but fails to note how and why Pakistan effectively 
influences US policy.38 Most writers such as, Annapurna Nautiyal and Kanishkan 
Satsivam identify strategic location as an important reason for the US to co-opt 
Pakistan to its cause39 but other factors appear to have contributed to reverse 
influence. A. Z. Hilali notes that the US was dependant on Pakistan’s intelligence 
and logistical support against both the USSR and the Taliban,40 and both Malik 
and Schaffer and Schaffer point out that once Pakistan had its nuclear bomb the 
US needed to remain engaged to ensure the safety of those weapons.41 This thesis 
will examine how far reverse influence remains a feature of the bilateral 
relationship between Pakistan and the US and how it developed beyond Roger’s 
original concept related to geo-strategic location. 
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Another feature of the literature is that it tends to be West-centric.42 This 
thesis attempts to help address this imbalance by bringing to the debate new 
material from primary political, military and academic sources in Pakistan.  
 
The Central Argument  
Thus, this thesis argues that the history of US-Pakistan relations is one of 
opportunism in which interests did not converge sufficiently for sustained co-
operation on the basis of shared aims. Instead, periods of co-operation depended 
on short-term wilful blindness by the US and on Pakistan’s ability to use its geo-
strategic location as reverse influence in the otherwise unequal relationship 
between the two countries.  The legacy of this is a mutual mistrust, but neither 
side has seen any advantage in breaking off the relationship altogether.  
 
Research Design and Methodology 
The methodology and design for this research are based on historical 
enquiry into the circumstances, events and decisions which have shaped the 
evolution of US-Pakistan relations. Evidence and data has been collected from 
both secondary and primary sources. A survey of the literature on the topic has 
been augmented by additional sources from the media, speeches, autobiographies 
and official archives. The main focus has been on obtaining Pakistani sources in 
order to redress the predominantly Western and US perspective on the subject. 
Primary data was collected from political, military and academic figures in 
Pakistan. Fieldwork consisted of 20 semi-structured interviews with former 
Pakistani diplomats, army officials, scholars, politicians, journalists, and 
academics with expertise and insight into Pakistan-US relations. The list of 
interviewees together with brief biographies is available in the appendix 1. Field-
work was conducted over a seven month period in Pakistan in 2012. Because of 
the security situation and environment of suspicion in the country, it was more 
difficult than expected to conduct the interviews. Perseverance was needed to 
make effective contact with interviewees and to gain their confidence. There were 
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also surveillance and personal security challenges for the author. Each interview 
lasted between one and two hours and was recorded on location in English, Pashtu 
or Urdu depending on the interviewee. Those in languages other than English 
have been translated by the author. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis traces and analyses the evolution of the relationship through 
five fluctuating stages and concludes with an assessment of the factors and 
decisions which shaped it. 
 Introduction 
Chapter 1: Forging the Cold War Partnership, 1947-1961 
This chapter describes the formation of the relationship in the early Cold 
War era. It explores Pakistan’s security needs at the time in relation to America’s 
emerging containment strategy and analyses the reasons for forming an alliance. 
The U2 incident in May 1960 was a high-point of co-operation but mismatched 
aims and interests underlay the relationship from the start and the US was already 
turning a blind eye to military dictatorship in Pakistan. 
Chapter 2: Decline and Disappointment: India, China, Islam and the Bomb, 
1962-1979 
This chapter describes a period of steady decline in the relationship from 
the Sino-India border dispute to the mob attack on the US embassy in Islamabad. 
It explores Pakistan’s disappointments with the US regarding its wars with India 
and the secession of East Pakistan, and this can explain Bhutto’s subsequent 
diversification of foreign policy and the commencement of a nuclear programme. 
It also contrasts Nixon’s rapprochement with China and US sanctions on Pakistan 
because of its nuclear programme and poor human rights record. The question of 
US involvement with the death of Bhutto is given special attention. Divergent 
interests are exposed and the legacy of mistrust from this period is examined. 
Chapter 3: Afghanistan: Cold War Partners Again, 1979-1989 
The sudden revival of relations brought on by the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan is examined through to the Soviet withdrawal ten years later. The 
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chapter assesses the extent to which this was as a result of shared interests and 
strategic goals or of US opportunism and Pakistani reverse influence. It also 
examines how the mistrust and expectation of abandonment established from past 
encounters shaped behaviour in this period. The legacy of this period is also 
assessed in terms of approaches to future relations and trust. 
Chapter 4: Embargos and Sanctions: The Bomb, the Taliban and Human 
Rights, 1989-2001 
The period from the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan to the eve of 
9/11 saw another deterioration in US-Pakistan relations. The power vacuum in 
Afghanistan, Central Asian pipeline politics, nuclear proliferation and rising 
terrorism are explored in relation to the decisions taken by Pakistan and the US to 
protect their diverse interests. The chapter will suggest that, in the absence of an 
overriding regional crisis, the US could afford to revert to concerns over human 
rights and nuclear proliferation in Pakistan and not be wilfully blind to them. It 
will also suggest that, at the same time, the US colluded with Pakistan in support 
of the emerging Taliban 
Chapter 5: Afghanistan Re-Makes and Re-Breaks the Relationship, 2001-
2011 
As in 1979, relations were suddenly transformed with the 9/11 incident 
and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, but they deteriorated again as the war 
against the Taliban moved into Pakistan and divergent interests once again 
became apparent. This chapter examines the process of decline and the mutually 
exclusive goals this created for the two states. It contrasts Musharraf’s decision to 
join the US in an alliance on this occasion with that of General Zia in 1979. It also 
explores how mutual frustration and suspicion led to US operations in Pakistan 
itself including the bin Laden killing and the Salala attack. 
Conclusions 
The thesis ends with conclusions about the extent to which the data and 
evidence collected supports the argument that there was never any real 
coincidence of interests between Pakistan and the US and that the poor 
relationship between them is based instead on opportunism, wilful blindness and 
reverse influence.
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CHAPTER 1: FORGING THE COLD WAR PARTNERSHIP,   
                         1947 -1961 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947 in two non-contiguous parts, 
East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. 
Geographical separation was then less important than the common bond of Islam 
which united the new nation in opposition to Hindu-dominated India. With 70 
million people, Pakistan became the fifth most populous country in the world and 
the most populous country in the Muslim world. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the 
first Governor-General of Pakistan, who was given the title of Quaid-i-Azam 
(Great Leader), and Liaquat Ali Khan became the country’s first Prime Minister.1 
Relations with India dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy from the outset, 
in large part, because of the violence between the Muslim and Hindu communities 
which accompanied independence and partition. America’s foreign policy priority 
at that time, however, was the Soviet Union and the communist threat. In 1946, 
George Kennan drafted his “long telegram” which led to Washington embarking 
on its post-war policy of the containment of the Soviet Union.2 After Mao’s 
victory in China in 1949, American containment policy extended to Communist 
China too. Therefore, it was as a result of independence and partition on the one 
hand, and the containment of communism, on the other, that the Pakistan-US 
relationship was first forged. Ambassador Tariq Fatemi, a seasoned diplomat and 
current adviser to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, observed that the reasons for the 
formation of the relationship were also a source of mutual recrimination and 
claimed that, “the very basis on which the two countries came together 
contain[ed] within it the seeds of future turmoil that envelop[ed] this 
relationship”.3  
This chapter examines this claim of Ambassador Tariq Fatemi and 
explores the notion that misaligned aims underlay the relationship from the start 
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and contributed to its brittle and fluctuating quality. It describes the new country’s 
foreign policy ideals which were soon abandoned because of Pakistan’s 
immediate regional security needs and the impending Cold War. It also examines 
Pakistan’s search for allies and the process through which US-Pakistan alliances 
were formed to reveal the extent of mismatched aims and how opportunism, 
reverse influence and wilful blindness were already at work. 
 
1.2 The Security Challenges of Independence and Partition 
At independence, Pakistan’s Governor-General Jinnah wanted to pursue a 
policy of non-alignment in the Cold War and friendship with Muslim countries 
which, he thought, would bring flexibility to the otherwise rigid bipolar 
international order and would also help to assert the independent identities of the 
new post-colonial states.4 On only the fourth day after Pakistan’s creation, Prime 
Minister Liaquat confirmed to the New York Times that Pakistan would not take 
sides with either of the two world blocs that were forming at the time.5 Liaquat 
continued with this non-aligned policy when he increased his power and influence 
after Jinnah’s death in 1948.6  However, Pakistan was unable to remain outside 
the inter-bloc struggle for much longer in the face of unresolved issues stemming 
from partition and the global geo-political strategies of the Cold War. The most 
immediate of these were the problems caused by partition. 
India and Pakistan held very different views about the permanence of 
partition. Pakistan saw it as permanent and Jinnah summed up this view with his 
proclamation that “Pakistan has come to stay”.7  To him it was an enduring 
solution through which “… inter-communal strife would subside and Hindustan 
and Pakistan would be able to come together and work out the details of joint 
defence”.8   Indian leaders, however, saw partition as a temporary solution. The 
Congress Party was divided on the issue of partition, it ultimately agreed to it 
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when it became clear the only alternative would be civil war.9 Indians expected 
the newly-born state of Pakistan to be short-lived and that it would soon have to 
re-join a united India. Therefore, on 15 June 1947, in accepting partition, 
Congress cautioned that: “economic circumstances and the insistent demands of 
international affairs make the unity of India still more necessary. The picture of 
India we have learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and hearts”.10  
Indian Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel, was convinced that the new 
State of Pakistan was not viable and its imminent collapse would teach the 
Muslim League a bitter lesson.11 Acharya Kripalani, President of the Indian 
National Congress, claimed that “neither the Congress nor the nation has given up 
its claim of a united India”.12  Gandhi believed that Pakistan would wish to return 
to India. “We Muslim and Hindus are interdependent on one another; we cannot 
get along without each other. The Muslim League will ask to come back to 
Hindustan. They will ask Jawaharlal Nehru to come back, and he will take them 
back”.13  From the outset, therefore, Pakistan had cause to look anxiously at India 
in regard to its security and territorial integrity.  
These anxieties quickly became realities as partition led to Pakistan facing 
a daunting catalogue of crises. Independence quickly turned to bloodshed in 
reciprocal mass killings and resulted in the movement of millions of refugees 
across borders. Agreement on dividing the assets of the former Raj collapsed. 
Water supplies to millions of acres of Pakistan’s prime agricultural land were cut 
off and conflicting claims to Kashmir escalated into war. Partition also led to 
Pakistan being militarily far weaker than India which accounted for Pakistan 
always seeking external aid and security guarantees. These security issues are 
examined in more detail later in the chapter.  
Partition was intended to be a solution to the potential for civil strife that 
existed between the religious communities on the sub-continent, but the policy 
failed from the outset. Once the Boundary Commission demarcated the borders 
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splitting Punjab and Bengal, inter-religious violence erupted on a large scale and 
quickly escalated into reciprocal mass murder and migration throughout 1947-8. 
There is evidence to suggest that the atrocities were planned by the Hindus and 
Sikhs to systematically drive out the Muslims from their areas.14 The Muslims 
responded with atrocities of their own. Estimates of the slaughter and upheaval 
vary greatly. Iftikhar Malik estimates that around eight million Muslims left India 
to become refugees in Pakistan,15 and Golam Wahed Choudhury argues that 
500,000 were killed in the carnage.16 Therefore, the new Pakistani government 
was faced with the immediate and difficult problem of resettling all these refugees 
as well as trying to deal with the long-term legacy of resentment amongst them.  
In addition to these humanitarian problems, the process of partition 
yielded further economic and military disputes leaving Pakistan significantly and 
disproportionately weaker than India at a time when armed confrontation between 
the two new states looked highly likely. In the lead-up to independence, Congress 
and the Muslim League negotiated the division of assets of the former British 
Administration.17 The division of the military assets proved to be a particular 
problem. India was initially slow to implement the agreement and then refused to 
implement it in full.18  The British tried to enforce the agreement, but, in the 
words of the writer John Connell, became the subject of “deceitful and underhand 
interference which amounted in the end, to complete sabotage” by India.19  Field 
Marshal Auchinleck reported to the British Prime Minister on 28 September 1947 
that “The Indian Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to 
prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis.”20 
Pakistan’s share of the military stores should have been 163,000 tons but 
only 4,703 tons were delivered by 31 March 1948, amounting to only 3% of the 
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agreed allocation.21  The Pakistan newspaper, Dawn, reported that out of 249 
tanks allotted to Pakistan, not one was delivered, and out of 40-60,000 tons of 
ammunitions allocated, nothing at all was delivered.22 The newspaper went on to 
report that even the military equipment which was delivered by India was often 
damaged or unusable. Such was the inadequacy of Pakistan’s military capability 
at the time that General Muhammad Ayub Khan, the future Chief of Army Staff 
and later President of the country, said, “we could hardly allow our soldiers even 
five rounds for their general practice to keep their weapons in order.”23  Brigadier 
Agha Ahmed Gul recalled that Pakistan inherited just one squadron of propeller 
aircraft and one squadron of petrol-engine boats and the country had barely 
50,000 troops. Summing up the spirit of that time he said in an interview that “the 
only strength we had was a conviction that we will not stay as subjects of the 
Indians”.24  
Water was also the subject of another dispute with India. The Indus Basin 
is the source for irrigating agricultural land in the region and for West Pakistan in 
particular. The vast majority of the Indus Basin was located in Pakistan with 74.8 
million acres of the Basin in Pakistan and only 7.6 million in India.25 Of thirteen 
canal systems, ten were in Pakistan, two in India and one was divided between 
them. The Boundary Commission recommended joint control of the Basin, but as 
tensions increased between the two countries, this compromise was rejected by 
both Jinnah and Nehru. A temporary Standstill Agreement maintained pre-
partition arrangements until 31 March 1948.26 But after its expiry, India stopped 
the flow of water into two canals which irrigated about 1.7 million acres in 
Pakistan. This had serious consequences for Pakistan’s economy which was 
highly dependent on agriculture. A leading water expert and the former chairman 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the US, David Lilienthal, said, “No army 
with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land as thoroughly as [West] Pakistan 
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could be devastated by the simple expedient of India’s permanently shutting off 
the sources of water that keep the fields and the people of [West] Pakistan 
alive.”27 
This loss of water was just one of many problems to affect Pakistan’s 
economy as a result of partition. Pakistan produced grain and other agricultural 
products, such as sugarcane, cotton, and hides and skins which, before partition, 
were shipped to India for processing. After partition, this trade was lost and the 
industries badly hit as Pakistan did not have its own processing facilities. 
As stated earlier, the economy of Pakistan was mainly agricultural and the 
majority of the population was made up of poor farmers. Many of the Hindus who 
migrated from Pakistan to India were professional traders and skilled workers, 
while most of the refugees who migrated to Pakistan were unskilled rural 
labourers. As a result, Pakistan faced a lack of skilled and professional personnel 
and a business class more specifically.28 All the major cities, Delhi, Madras 
(Chennai), Bombay (Mumbai) and Calcutta (Kolkata), which had been developed 
by the British as principal economic and administrative centres, were located in 
India. Over 90% of industry was based in India, and Lahore was the only city in 
Pakistan which was of economic and cultural significance.29   
Pakistan’s comparative weakness was particularly important in the context 
of the ongoing crisis in Kashmir. Before partition, there were 562 Princely States, 
all of which enjoyed autonomy under British rule, but at independence each had to 
decide whether to join India or Pakistan. The rulers were advised that, in deciding, 
they should consider the majority religious belief of their population and their 
geographical proximity to India and Pakistan.30 In Kashmir, which bordered both 
countries, the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, was Hindu, but the population over 
which he ruled was 77% Muslim.31  Singh postponed making a decision because 
he neither wanted to be a part of India because he feared the democratisation 
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process taking place there, nor did he want to join Muslim Pakistan.32  Despite 
pressure from Ghandi and Mountbatten, he remained undecided and a tribal 
rebellion erupted against Singh’s rule in the Poonch region of Kashmir which 
demanded accession to Pakistan.33 Singh sent in the troops to quell the rebellion 
and thousands of Muslims were killed. In response, some 2,000 tribesmen from 
Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province joined the rebels and took control of the 
western and northern regions of Kashmir on 2 October 1947, naming them Azad 
Kashmir (Free Kashmir).34  Two days later, the Maharaja signed an instrument of 
accession to India and asked for the urgent dispatch of Indian troops, which 
defeated the rebels and took control of two thirds of the state of Kashmir.35 
Pakistan refused to accept the Kashmiri accession, and a military conflict started 
with India which only ended in January 1949 when the UN Security Council 
mediated a ceasefire. The UN, with agreement from Pakistan and India, directed 
that a plebiscite should be held to establish the wishes of the Kashmiri people, but 
it was never held because of India’s later opposition. The ceasefire line, called the 
Line of Control (LOC), is a de facto border between Azad Kashmir under the 
control of Pakistan and the Jammu Kashmir under the control of India. It is not 
officially recognised by either country and is the root cause of running problems 
and subsequent wars between Pakistan and India.36  
In addition to these crises and disputes, independence was the catalyst for 
security threats to the internal integrity of Pakistan. Beneath the apparent unity of 
Islam, ethnic division created conditions for secessionist claims and resentments 
in the Pashtun regions, most notably in Balochistan and in East Pakistan. Pashtun 
tribes have lived for centuries in an area straddling the current Afghan-Pakistan 
border. In creating Afghanistan as a buffer state, the frontier drawn by the British 
(the Durand Line) intentionally divided the Pashtun tribes living there to reduce 
their disruptive capacity. The majority were mostly incorporated into the border 
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states of the Raj, in what would become Balochistan and NWFP (North West 
Frontier Province, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), while the remainder were in 
Afghanistan. In a complex of issues, the British-administered Pashtun community 
was uncertain about Muslim separatism and, when partition looked inevitable, its 
leader, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, demanded the creation of an independent 
Pashtunistan. Afghanistan then claimed the treaties with Britain, including the 
Durand Line, were no longer valid and demanded the creation of an independent 
Pashtun state to reunite tribes on both sides of the border. These demands were 
rejected, but Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s admission to the UN on 
account of this dispute. This left Pakistan’s leaders concerned about the security 
of their Western border and its vulnerability to both Afghan and Indian agitation, 
particularly if co-ordinated with activity in Kashmir.37  
The Balochi are another ethnic group with their own language on the 
borders of Afghanistan and Iran and along a large section of the Pakistani coast. 
On the day after Pakistan’s independence from India, the leader of the Balochi 
State of Kalat declared independence from Pakistan. This defiance only lasted 
until March 1948 but created a cycle of agitation and suppression which resulted 
in a low level guerrilla campaign. Fears for the security of these areas were 
heightened by the fact that their loss would mean the rest of Pakistan could only 
access the sea through Sindh Province. This would become more critical once the 
deep sea port of Gwadar was bought from the Sultan of Oman in 1957 and 
incorporated into Balochistan Province.38  
The Bengalis formed the majority of the population in East Pakistan and 
their main exports were cotton and jute. However, they began to feel marginalised 
as the government was dominated by the political elite in West Pakistan. This 
perception was greatly exacerbated when Urdu was adopted as the official 
language throughout Pakistan. This became the catalyst for the Awami League 
which sought to cultivate Bengali sentiment and resentment towards West 
Pakistan.39 How this situation developed into a drive for secession and the 
subsequent civil war will be explored in Chapter 3.  
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1.3 The Process of Alliance Building 
The economic weakness of Pakistan and its perceived security threats, 
especially in relation to India, compelled the new government in Karachi to seek 
foreign allies. Like many nations at the time, Pakistan turned to the United States 
for help. However, it took all of seven years for Islamabad to be accepted into the 
US system of alliances. An examination of the process and decisions which led to 
this exposes the ambiguous foundations upon which the relationship was first 
formed. This section also examines what alternatives Pakistan had in its choice of 
allies in the context of the Cold War and how the US emerged as its favoured ally. 
It also examines how American strategic aims made India its first choice of 
regional partner but ended up heavily allied to Pakistan. 
In line with ideals of Muslim unity and non-alignment, it was natural for 
Pakistan to approach Turkey and Iran, but these countries were unable to offer the 
support Pakistan wanted because of their own relationship to India.40 Turkey and 
Iran had historical, cultural, linguistic and economic ties to India. Approximately 
20% of Indian Muslims shared Iran’s Shia faith, whilst the two countries also 
traded extensively with each other.41 The Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, 
for his part, also made a point of letting India know that he sometimes consulted 
the Hindu Holy Book, the Bhagavad Gita. Other Middle East countries also 
shrank from taking sides because they were reluctant to antagonise India as the 
largest non-aligned nation. India’s leading role in that organisation effectively 
excluded Pakistan from taking up its chosen position in the non-aligned 
movement. 
Pakistan was also disappointed with Britain and the Commonwealth for 
being unwilling to intervene in the Kashmir dispute. As a dispute between 
member countries, the Commonwealth had avoided addressing the issue and had 
no machinery for enforcing its actions in any case.42 When he returned from the 
1951 Commonwealth Conference after India had refused to hold the agreed 
plebiscite in Kashmir, Liaquat declared, “Pakistan must not be taken for granted. 
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Pakistan is not a camp-follower of the Commonwealth.”43  With China still in the 
throes of revolution this left Pakistan with little choice other than to abandon its 
non-aligned aspirations and to take sides in the gathering Cold War. 
As Pakistan was founded on the basis of the Islamic religion, it was more 
reluctant to ally with the Soviet Union because of its official atheist doctrine and 
its record of suppressing religious practice. The words, “communist” and “non-
believer”, were viewed in some Pakistani cultures as synonymous. The poor 
image of the Soviet Union was further exacerbated by its perceived threat to 
Pakistan security. In Jinnah’s vision of Islamic solidarity, “Muslim countries 
would stand together against possible Russian aggression and would look to the 
US for assistance.”44 Jinnah also understood the geo-political significance of the 
region in Cold War calculations and the attraction of Pakistan in strategic terms to 
US policy-makers: “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America 
…. Pakistan is the pivot of the world …”45  For their part, the Americans had 
shown little sympathy for a separate Muslim state prior to partition, but policy-
makers did recognise Pakistan’s potential importance strategically. For example, 
the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, reminded President Truman that 
Pakistan, after independence, will become “the largest Muslim country in the 
world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world”.46 As a result 
of such calculations, the US was one of the first nations to establish diplomatic 
relations with Pakistan, appointing an Ambassador to Islamabad on 22 September 
1947. 
Jinnah was equally quick in asking Washington for aid. In September 
1947, he sent a special envoy, Laik Ali, to Washington to negotiate a $2 billion 
loan and to highlight his county’s need of economic and military development.47 
His diplomatic memorandum to the State Department confirms Pakistan’s early 
Western focus and priorities:  
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Primarily defence, and secondly, economic developments are the two vitally essential 
features of Pakistan’s life, and for both of these she has to look, firstly, to the USA, and 
then to Great Britain, for assistance.48  
 
   However, the US was, at that time, more focussed on Europe and the 
Middle East, and therefore rejected the request. Nevertheless, a comparatively 
small sum of $10 million was offered from America’s war relief funds. Within a 
month of Laik Ali’s visit to Washington, even these rather small steps towards a 
meaningful alliance with America faced a serious setback due to the explosion of 
war in Kashmir. Much to Pakistan’s displeasure, the US declined to take sides in 
the conflict and, instead, Washington placed an arms embargo on both Pakistan 
and India.49 This effectively tilted the power-balance in favour of India because of 
its considerable military superiority over Pakistan. At the time, the US did not 
wish to prejudice its relationship with India, but the growing threat of Soviet 
expansion was to bring the US and Pakistan together again in the coming years. 
Pakistan used its geo-strategic importance and Islamic antipathy towards 
communism to campaign for military and economic aid in line with US 
containment policy. As early as August 1947, a series of Pakistani officials, 
including the Ambassador to Washington, the Foreign Minister and Prime 
Minister assured the US Secretary of State that communism was contrary to Islam 
and that Pakistan was anxious to maintain its stand against communist 
infiltrators.50 The following year, Ambassador MAH Ispahani went further and 
suggested that Pakistan could become a base for both military and air operations 
against Soviet threat. “It is in the interest of other nations besides Pakistan,” he 
said, “that Pakistan should remain well equipped and strong, ready to meet any 
emergency that the international situation may hurl upon the world.”51 On a visit 
to Cairo in May 1949, Prime Minister Liaquat said Pakistan would help combat 
communist penetration in South East Asia.52 He added that in the confrontation 
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with communism, “the Muslim countries between Cairo and Karachi had an 
important part to play. It should be the concern of the Western powers to 
strengthen the Middle East countries.”53  
This campaign was unsuccessful in gaining more aid for Pakistan, but the 
testing of the Soviet atomic bomb and the communist revolution in China in 1949, 
followed by the communist invasion of South Korea in 1950 alarmed US policy-
makers. They were particularly concerned about the security of the oil-fields in 
the Middle East and, in an echo of the Anglo-Russian “Great Game” of the 
previous century, they also suspected the Soviet Union had intentions to gain 
access to warm water ports and the wider Indian Ocean through Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. As a result of these concerns, America’s attention turned from 1949 
more towards South Asia.  
The Americans’ first choice of partner in South Asia, however, was India, 
and they invited Prime Minister Nehru to visit Washington in October 1949, much 
to the concern of the Pakistan leadership.54  In the event, two factors brought 
Pakistan and the US together. First, the USSR capitalised on Pakistan’s concerns, 
and on 3 June 1949 invited Prime Minister Liaquat to visit Moscow – an 
invitation which was initially accepted with enthusiasm.55  This acceptance did 
not represent a reversal in Pakistan’s overall foreign policy strategy. Instead, it 
was to emphasise that the US should not take Pakistan for granted and to put it in 
a better bargaining position with Washington. This is illustrated in Ambassador 
Ispahani’s letter to Prime Minister Liaquat. 
Your acceptance of the invitation to visit Moscow was a masterpiece in strategy ... Until 
a few months ago, we were unable to obtain anything except a few words from middling 
State Department officials. We were taken much for granted as good boys who would not 
play ball with communism or flirt with the left; boys who would starve and die rather 
than even talk to communists … we were treated as a country that did not seriously 
matter. On the other hand, the US Government paid much attention to India…. [But after 
the Liaquat acceptance of the invitation to visit Moscow], overnight Pakistan began to 
receive the serious notice and consideration of the US Government.56   
 
The second factor was that Nehru used his US visit to emphasise his 
concept of non-alignment. He explained, “we have no intentions to commit 
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ourselves to anybody at any time” and, when asked where India stood in the Cold 
War, he replied, “India wants no part of that war.”57 He went on to explain that 
Indian foreign policy would be, “the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with 
any major power or group of powers, but through an independent approach to 
each controversial or disputed issue.”58  
This clear statement disappointed the US, and in December 1949 
Washington decided to invite a Pakistani delegation to visit.59 As a result, instead 
of going to Moscow, Prime Minister Liaquat met President Truman in 
Washington in May 1950.60 The US State Department’s policy note, drafted a 
month ahead of the visit, suggested that the Soviet flirtation may have been 
significant: “The principal US objectives were the orientation of Pakistan’s 
Government and people towards the US and other western countries and to wean 
it away from the Soviet Union.”61  
For his part, Prime Minister Liaquat had three objectives for his three-
week visit to the United States. First, to bring his newly-born country close to the 
US politically; second, to get help to develop Pakistan’s economy; and third, to 
procure US arms and weapons. To these ends, Liaquat emphasised once more 
Pakistan’s antipathy towards communism, its preference for liberty, democracy 
and private property, and its preference for US economic and military assistance. 
In discussions with military officials, he highlighted the fighting qualities of 
Pakistan’s anti-communist Muslim warriors.62  He also explained the cultural and 
ideological relationship between Pakistan and other countries of the Middle East. 
In this way, Liaquat sought to link Pakistan’s military strength to creating long-
lasting stability in the area.63  Finally, the Pakistan Prime Minister also 
emphasised the geo-political significance of both parts of his country, drawing on 
historical precedents:  
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Whereas one borders on Burma, not far from where the Japanese advance was halted in 
the last war, the other borders on Iran and Afghanistan and has an important situation in 
relation to the communications to and from the oil-bearing areas of the Middle East. This 
part also controls the mountain passes through which the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent has 
been invaded ninety times in the past centuries.64  
 
It is important to note, however, that Liaquat was always clear that 
Pakistan sought its own security first and foremost. When asked at a press 
conference how large a standing army Pakistan wanted, Liaquat replied, “if your 
country guarantee[s] our territorial integrity, I will not keep [an] army at all.”65 
Liaquat’s desire to cooperate impressed the Americans but his request for military 
aid was not seriously considered at the time.66  However, just a month after the 
visit, war broke out in Korea prompting an American rethink. In February 1951, a 
meeting of US ambassadors to South Asian countries in Colombo favoured the 
participation of Pakistan in the defence of Middle East countries.67  In May 1952, 
the Director of the State Department’s policy planning staff, Paul Nitze, criticised 
Western weakness in the Middle East and recommended direct US involvement in 
the defence of the region, including assistance to Pakistan.68  Assistant Secretary 
of State, George C. McGhee had gone further in April, 1951 saying, “Pakistan’s 
contribution would probably be the decisive factor in ensuring defence of the 
area.”69  
It was believed in the US that Pakistan wanted to be its ally because it saw 
communism as the main threat to its security and that of the free world. That 
perception may have been further encouraged by Pakistan’s then Ambassador, 
Muhammad Ali, who, confirmed in the summer of 1952 that his country had 
abandoned neutralism and was clearly on the side of the West. “Do not count 
Pakistan as a neutral nation in Asia,” he said. “Our basic sympathies are strongly 
with the West.”70  Despite Pakistan being seen increasingly as a potential asset by 
the US, Washington remained reluctant to give military aid. The fear was that 
arming Pakistan could entangle the US in disputes between Pakistan and India 
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which would have been a distraction from the main business of containing 
communism.71  
Prime Minister Liaquat was assassinated on 16 October 1951 at a public 
meeting in Rawalpindi. The circumstances of the incident, in which the alleged 
assassin was also immediately shot dead, and the subsequent failure of the 
authorities to fully investigate, led to a theory that the US orchestrated the killing 
in retaliation for Liaquat’s earlier flirtation with the USSR.72 This seems unlikely 
given Liaquat’s rather successful visit to the United States just over a year before 
his assassination. Whatever the truth of such claims, conspiracy theories involving 
US participation in Pakistan’s political life have always resonated among the 
people of Pakistan.  
The US now had two main reasons for choosing Pakistan as its closest ally 
in South Asia - its strategic location between the Persian Gulf and East Asia; and 
its willingness, unlike India, to work with Washington. US policy-makers had 
come largely to accept the importance of Pakistan in its defence of Middle East 
against communist expansion.73 Moreover, Pakistan had military facilities, such as 
airfields, from which the Persian Gulf could be controlled and defended, and its 
army could also be used for the defence of that region.74  Besides West Pakistan’s 
strategic importance for the defence of Middle East, East Pakistan also formed the 
western border of Southeast Asia. Thus Pakistan as a whole formed an important 
connection of defence systems between the Middle East and Southeast Asia.75  
This meant that Pakistan was of strategic importance to the defence of the free 
world out of proportion to her general resources.76  
Nevertheless, continuing concerns over Pakistan’s relationship with India, 
together with a desire to avoid being dragged into a conflict over Kashmir, led the 
Truman administration to act cautiously in its relations with Pakistan. This began 
to change when Dwight Eisenhower became US President in 1953, with the 
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hawkish John Foster Dulles as his Secretary of State. Dulles advocated alliances 
as a means by which the power of the USSR and China could be contained in the 
region. With this in mind, he visited both India and Pakistan in May that year. 
India stuck to its non-aligned approach and declined to join any such alliance, but 
Pakistan leapt at the chance. Dulles concluded that “Pakistan occupies a high 
position in the Muslim world. The strong spiritual faith of the people makes them 
a dependable bulwark against communism.”77   
Now that communism had spread beyond the USSR, Dulles observed that 
“Communist China borders on northern territories held by Pakistan and from 
Pakistan’s northern borders one can see the Soviet Union. Pakistan flanks Iran and 
the Middle East and guards the Khyber Pass, the historic invasion route from the 
north into the subcontinent.”78 By November, The New York Times had become 
enthusiastic about Pakistan as a potential ally in the cold war. An editorial argued 
that “there is plenty of courage and skill among the Pakistanis for a first class 
fighting force, if one is needed.”79 The US Secretaries of State and Defence had 
calculated that Pakistan’s active support might be obtained without involving 
unmanageable problems with India.80 However, when the US informed India of 
its intention to provide military aid to Pakistan, Nehru accused Pakistan of 
bringing the Cold War to South Asia, and used this as part of an excuse to rescind 
India’s earlier agreement to the Kashmir plebiscite.81  Nehru was also deeply 
concerned over the possibility of war with its neighbour. In response, President 
Eisenhower wrote to assure him that if US aid to Pakistan was misused or directed 
against another country, he would act, “both within and without the United 
Nations to thwart such aggression.”82  
On 25 February 1954, Eisenhower formally announced his decision to 
give military aid and assistance to Pakistan. This was enthusiastically welcomed 
in Pakistan. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali declared, “Pakistan today enters a 
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glorious chapter in its history, and is now cast for a significant role in world 
affairs.”83 Thus, on 19 May 1954, the US and Pakistan signed their first defence 
agreement called the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement (MDAA), providing 
formal confirmation of Pakistan’s alignment with the West. By joining the US 
military alliance against the leading communist powers, Pakistan took a serious 
risk of Chinese and Soviet hostility, but it was ready to take that risk as long as the 
US military aid would allow it to build up its defence capabilities sufficiently to 
counter the Indian threat. 
As arrangements for the MDAA were being completed, communist forces 
achieved an unexpected military success against the French in Vietnam. With 
substantial encouragement and support from Mao,84  Viet Minh forces surrounded 
the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu on 13 March 1954 forcing the French to 
surrender and withdraw from the country. This prompted Dulles to reconsider 
how to contain communism in Indochina.85 The US feared that if regional states 
opposing communism were left militarily and economically undefended, and were 
allowed to fall, they would become communist and ultimately seek an alliance 
with China and the Soviet Union, denying the whole region to the US.86  
The Chinese were now an added threat to the region backed by the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 1950.87 As a 
result, the US sponsored defence alliances in the region in addition to giving 
military and economic support. On 5 September 1954, the South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO) was formed comprising Pakistan, the US, the Philippines, 
Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France and Thailand. As well as being 
committed to deterring aggression, the treaty stressed the goals of economic 
development and social well-being within the member countries.88  
The formation of SEATO was welcomed by Muhammad Ali. “Neutralism 
is no longer possible and Pakistan had to choose between seeing eye to eye with 
communism or the Western powers.”89  By the following year, however, 
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Pakistan’s commitment seemed more nuanced. Prime Minister Ali met with the 
Chinese Premier, Chou-en-Lai, at the African-Asian Bandung Conference of 1955 
to emphasise that joining SEATO was not an aggressive act towards China. Chou 
declared that Ali had told him that, although Pakistan was a party to a military 
treaty, it was not aimed at China.  
Pakistan had no fear China would permit aggression against her. As a result of that, we 
achieved mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties. The Prime 
Minister of Pakistan further assured us that if the US should take aggressive action under 
the military treaty or if the US launched global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it 
….
90
  
 
Therefore, despite SEATO, China maintained an accommodating 
relationship with Pakistan, and in October 1956, the new Pakistani Prime Minister 
Suhrawardy paid an official visit to Beijing. He again assured Chou-en-Lai that, 
“SEATO was exclusively a defence pact” and that “Pakistan would like to 
strengthen relations with China.”91  In reply Chou declared that SEATO would 
never impair and weaken the relationship between Pakistan and China. This 
understanding was important since the two countries shared a common border, 
and the statement of understanding was possible because China also had territorial 
disputes with India.  
The US formed another international organisation in its continued policy 
of containment. Initially known as the Baghdad Pact, it became the Central Treaty 
Organisation (CENTO) comprising Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the UK, and 
its main aims were to defend the Middle East and protect its oil fields.  Although 
it was CENTO’s main sponsor, the US did not join the pact, opting for observer 
status only. Aware of Arab anti-Western sentiment in the region it concluded that 
full membership would create more problems than it would solve.92 US 
Ambassador Gallman noted the interplay between foreign and domestic politics in 
making the decision to stay out of CENTO. “The United States stayed out in order 
to avoid antagonising Egypt, to side-step objections from Israel and to prevent a 
Senate fight over ratification during an election year.”93 Without the US, it was 
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feared that the alliance would be insignificant, so Pakistan initially deferred 
joining. However, under pressure from other CENTO members, it finally joined in 
June 1955.94 Joining these two international organisations signified that Pakistan 
was now undeniably a member of the Western bloc. However, this membership 
was controversial in the country and led to widespread opposition and disorder in 
the country.  
Long-standing differences between East and West Pakistan persisted and 
now became focused on foreign policy. Important sections of the press and the 
main political parties of East Pakistan, including the Azad Pakistan Party, the 
Awami League and the National Awami Party, were opposed to membership of 
SEATO and CENTO, which they saw as undermining Pakistan’s newly-won 
sovereignty and constraining commercial freedom.95 In February 1957, Moulana 
Bhashani, an influential, anti-imperialist and political leader of East Pakistan, 
demanded the cancellation of the alliance agreements and warned he would fight 
for an independent and neutral foreign policy.96 This opposition seriously 
concerned the military, particularly its Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, 
who saw the US as the only route to a speedy modernisation of the armed forces 
and had been personally involved in persuading the US to ally itself with 
Pakistan.97 The nation’s first general election was planned for April 1959, and 
both Ayub and the US feared that if it were allowed to go ahead those elected 
might take Pakistan out of SEATO and CENTO. So the US, backed by President 
Mirza, encouraged Ayub to stage a coup in order to derail the election.98   
Ayub Khan declared Martial Law on 7 October 1958, Mirza then 
abrogated the new democratic constitution which had only been in place for two 
years, branding Pakistani politicians as traitors because of their “unintelligent and 
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irresponsible criticism” of foreign policy.99  President Mirza declared all political 
parties to be illegal, dismissed the Cabinet, dissolved the National and Provincial 
assemblies and imprisoned opposition leaders. Finally, he appointed Ayub as the 
Chief Administrator of Martial Law. Mirza had miscalculated, however. By 
appointing Ayub to this post he had effectively made his own position as 
President superfluous. The General deposed him on 27 October 1958 and assumed 
the title of Field Marshal. In this role, he became the sole political leader of 
Pakistan.100  
There is evidence that the US and the British knew in advance of the coup. 
Mirza had informed them about his plan to assume absolute power, and even 
divulged the planned date.101 Nawaz claims that Dulles advised Mirza that whilst 
the US favoured democracy over authoritarianism there may be exceptions 
justifiable for limited periods, but such issues were for Pakistan's leaders and 
people to decide. “In effect,” Nawaz argued, “the green light was given for 
Martial Law.”102 The British High Commissioner, Alexander Symon, also 
instructed his officials to destroy any “papers held in this office which indicate 
that we knew in advance [about the coup] to be destroyed”.103 
Thus the US and Britain, either approved the coup, or at a minimum, 
turned a blind eye to it. The coup leaders were perceived to be pro-Western, and 
military rule was justified as being the best way to bring development, 
modernisation and even democratisation to the country. Within four days of the 
coup, Ayub received best wishes from the US Chargee d’Affaires and a letter of 
friendship from US Defence Secretary, Neil McElroy, who also told his Foreign 
Relations Committee that he was “inclined to believe well of our friends.”104 
Ayub was eager to reassure his American allies of his country’s continued loyalty 
to the West. “Recent developments have, if anything, strengthened Pakistan’s 
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faithfulness to its alliances,” he said. “Pakistan is more than ever on the side of the 
free people of the West”105 Ayub made it plain that he thought continued aid, 
which he saw as a matter of life and death for Pakistan, should be his country’s 
reward for such loyalty.106 Most significantly, US aid increased from $67 million 
in 1955 to $145 million after the coup. It seems that President Eisenhower was 
content to have Ayub as a military dictator better to ensure a long-lasting alliance 
with Pakistan.107 To further strengthen that alliance, in December 1959, 
Eisenhower became the first US President to visit the country.108  In this way, the 
US started what was to be a consistent pattern of turning a blind eye to military 
coups in Pakistan and supporting the dictators that took power. This suggests that, 
for the US, tolerating the suppression of democracy was a price worth paying for 
furthering its national interests and deterring communist expansionism. 
The new military regime ensured that the military alliance remained 
intact.109  The US became even closer to Ayub as Washington sent civilian 
advisors to Pakistan. In return, the US used Pakistani airbases to maintain 
surveillance of Soviet territory.110 Ayub assured the US that “Pakistan will stand 
by you if you stand by Pakistan.”111  In that spirit, he signed a bilateral defence 
agreement with the US on 5 March, 1959. In the agreement, the US said it 
regarded the preservation of Pakistan’s independence and integrity as “vital to its 
national interests and to world peace”. Specifically, Article 1 included the 
undertaking that: 
In the case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of 
America will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be 
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mutually agreed upon and as envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and 
Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist Pakistan at its request.112  
 
On 15 April 1959, the agreement was supplemented by a formal note from 
the US Ambassador James Langley to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Manzur 
Qadir: 
The United States would promptly and effectively come to the assistance of Pakistan if it 
were subjected to armed aggression. A threat to the territorial integrity or political 
independence of the members (of CENTO) would be viewed by the United States with 
the utmost gravity.113  
 
There were those in Pakistan who viewed this as the equivalent of 
NATO’s commitment to collective security in the Washington Treaty.114 
Certainly, Article One goes some way towards that interpretation. However, the 
formal note falls well short of guaranteeing military action if Pakistan were 
attacked. Any such attack would be “viewed … with the utmost gravity” allows 
the US considerable wiggle room. The problem for Washington was that Pakistan 
viewed this as a commitment to its defence, which led to considerable 
disappointment when subsequent US administrations interpreted the agreement 
rather differently. However, the agreement clearly did indicate a far closer 
relationship between the two countries. Following the agreement, the US gave 
$565 million to help modernise Pakistan’s air force, including the delivery of 120 
F80s, 57 bombers and 12 F140s.115  US aid also came in the form of grants, 
military sales and military training.  
One effect of the agreement was the downturn in Pakistan’s relations with 
the USSR. When Moscow became aware of the negotiations in December 1958, it 
warned Pakistan that a new military agreement with the US would increase the 
danger of it being “drawn into the military gambles of these states and complicate 
the situation in that part of the world which lies in immediate proximity to the 
Soviet Union, which affects – and cannot but affect – its security interests”.116  
Pakistan rejected Moscow’s warnings on the grounds that the right to collective 
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security against any danger and threat was accepted under the UN Charter.117  
Moscow also made it plain that the bilateral agreement was perceived to be a 
hostile act and, “the government of the USSR will, naturally, take all the 
necessary steps towards safeguarding the security of the Soviet frontiers …”118  
These warnings were prescient and resonated when the U2 incident occurred later 
that year. 
Before that, however, Ayub spotted a possible opportunity to bring about a 
resolution of the Kashmir problem. India and China were preoccupied at the time 
with an escalating border dispute following an unsuccessful uprising in Tibet. 
Ayub tried to capitalise on this to resolve differences with India by resurrecting a 
proposal for the joint defence of the sub-continent against any threat from the 
north, meaning both the USSR and China.119  On 24 April 1959, he proposed that 
“in the event of an external threat, Pakistan and India should defend the sub-
continent in cooperation with each other.”120  However, this would be conditional 
on India accepting Pakistan’s terms for a settlement in Kashmir and the canal 
waters dispute.121 “Once these [issues] are solved, the armies of the two countries 
could disengage and move to their respective vulnerable frontiers.”122  
India’s Commander-in-Chief, General Cariappa, supported the idea 
precisely because it would release troops for use along its external borders. He 
acknowledged that the defence problems of India and Pakistan were indivisible: 
“Pride and prestige factors must be subordinated to achieving the actual need of 
the hour.”123 India’s High Commissioner in Pakistan, Kewal Singh, was more 
doubtful about Ayub’s proposal seeing it as insincere opportunism.124 Nehru 
decided to reject the idea, asking, “against whom was there a need for joint 
defence?”125   
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Eisenhower visited Pakistan and India that December, and Ayub sought 
his help in settling the Kashmir dispute. However, the United States’ shared 
concern with India about China meant it would not pressure Nehru.126 
Eisenhower’s continued disinclination to upset Delhi showed that India was still a 
prized ally the US wanted to win over some time in the future.127  Undeterred, in 
July 1960, Ayub was still promoting Indo-Pakistan co-operation:  
...we shall have a good chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past, 
which was that whenever this subcontinent was divided – and often it was divided – 
someone or other invited an outsider to step in.128  
 
Eisenhower’s reluctance to support Ayub’s plan did not prevent Pakistan 
from allowing the US a secret air base under the guise of a communications centre 
at Badaber near Peshawar which served U-2 surveillance aircraft and their illegal 
flights over the Soviet Union.129  In May 1960, a U-2 from that base was shot 
down over Soviet territory. The US initially claimed it was an unarmed weather 
plane from Turkey, but later admitted the truth.130 In a clear reference to Pakistan, 
the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, warned countries which placed their 
territories at the disposal of forces aggressive towards the USSR that they were 
“playing with fire”.131 At a diplomatic party in Moscow shortly afterwards, 
Khrushchev threatened a Pakistani diplomat that Russia would destroy Peshawar 
with rockets if such an incident happened again. Pakistan, however, did not take 
these threats seriously because it felt reasonably safe sheltering under the 
American nuclear umbrella.132 When Ayub was asked about Soviet threats he 
said, “if Russia attacked Pakistan, the latter would not be alone. It would mean 
world war. The source of attack would not remain unscathed.”133  
1.4 The Consequences of the Relationship with the US 
Pakistan had become the United States’ closest ally in Asia through 
various means, including its defence agreement and membership of SEATO and 
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CENTO.134 The US had benefited from this relationship by bolstering its 
containment strategy in the vast area from Turkey to the Philippines. Pakistan, 
however, was never so committed to containment policy. For, although the 
rhetoric made reference to containment, leaders from Liaquat Ali Khan to Ayub 
Khan had always made it plain that Pakistan’s primary concern was to get military 
support to deal with the Kashmir issue and to deter Indian aggression. Joining 
SEATO and CENTO was largely perceived to be a means of securing aid from the 
US.135 Judging by Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan’s assessment this aim was 
largely achieved. 
United States’ aid has greatly increased the defensive capabilities of Pakistan’s small 
army. It now possesses greater fire-power, better mobility and cross-country 
performance, and command and control facilities. It has become a hard hitting force.136 
 
However, the close relationship with the US had, as stated earlier, 
aggravated domestic dissent which, though suppressed after the military coup, 
would re-emerge in the tensions leading up to the 1971 secession of East Pakistan. 
In addition, its alliance with the US, on occasion, had detrimental consequences in 
terms of its relationship with other countries. The Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, 
expressed concern that US aid would make Pakistan more aggressive and more 
willing to go to war against India. “I do not know anyone,” he said, “who can say 
that this has brought security and stability to Western Asia.”137  The Indian press 
warned that the US-Pakistan relationship would make negotiated settlements to 
problems in Asia more difficult and only create further tension in the region.138 
And, of course, the MDAP, as stated earlier, prompted Indian withdrawal of its 
agreement to the Kashmir plebiscite which has never been held.  
The Soviet leadership opposed the agreements and Pakistan’s membership 
of the pro-American organisations. Before this, the Pakistan-Soviet relationship 
was cool but not marked by hostility. The USSR had opposed partition of the sub-
continent in favour of a united India but when Pakistan came into being, Moscow 
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had accepted it.139 After Pakistan joined forces with the US, however, the Soviet 
leadership openly sided with India and supported its claim over Kashmir, even 
going so far as to declare Kashmir an integral part of India.140 Khrushchev and 
Bulganin visited India in November 1955 offering military and economic aid and 
reiterating their pro-Indian position on Kashmir.141 Moscow further alienated 
Pakistan by supporting Afghanistan’s claim to the Pashtun areas of Pakistan, 
which brought further destabilisation to the Western borderlands between the two 
countries.142 Thus, the USSR not only became openly hostile to Pakistan itself and 
its interests in the Afghan border region, but also more openly supportive of India. 
As India was the prime focus of Pakistan’s foreign policy, its decisions to ally 
itself with the US could be considered counter-productive at least in this respect.  
Pakistan’s relationship with the Muslim world, particularly Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and Afghanistan was also prejudiced.  Egypt regarded CENTO as the 
product of Western national interests because it was not initiated by the local Arab 
states. Even after the Suez War in 1956, Egypt refused to allow Pakistani troops to 
enter its territory as part of the UN Emergency Force. It also refused to receive the 
Prime Minister of Pakistan when he expressed a desire to visit. Nasser pointedly 
claimed that “Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India”,143 and later 
declared Kashmir to be an integral part of India.144 The Saudi Government also 
resented CENTO and pressed Pakistan to withdraw its membership. Saudi media 
criticised Pakistan by arguing that it had now joined up with Turkey, which “feels 
honoured to co-operate with the Jewish state.”145 The Saudi King even publicly 
thanked Nehru for his policy towards Muslims living in India and acknowledged 
that the fate of the Indian Muslims was in very safe hands.146 The attitude of Saudi 
Arabia shocked the people and government of Pakistan. China, on the other hand, 
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appeared to appreciate that Pakistan’s alliance with the US was directed against 
India rather than China and the containment of communism.  
Pakistan’s alliance with the United States did mean it got sufficient aid to 
build up its military as a deterrence against possible aggression. However, 
Pakistan failed in its aim to get support on Kashmir or to secure a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute. Expectations that Western alignment would help were 
not fulfilled and Pakistan never received clear and unequivocal support from the 
US over Kashmir.147 At the same time, the Soviet Union had shifted to an openly 
hostile position towards Pakistan and one supportive of India and its claims to 
Kashmir. Even more troubling was the fact that Pakistan had become more 
isolated amongst Muslim countries, in contrast to its original aim of befriending 
them. However, the understanding arrived at with Chou-en-Lai at Bandung 
reflected a genuine shared interest with China against India and began what would 
become an enduring partnership.  
 
1.5 Implications for the Relationship 
The eight-year process of alliance-building reveals underlying ambiguities 
in the US-Pakistan relationship. Both states entered the alliance to further their 
own national interests but, despite the rhetoric of unity, these diverged 
considerably. Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed of Quaid-e-Azam and Oxford Universities points 
out that the US was pursuing a global strategy whilst Pakistan was regionally 
focussed.148 This regional focus was also influenced by internal divisions and the 
need to protect the integrity of the new state from regional interference. The 
objects of American strategy were first the Soviet Union and later China, and its 
purpose was to stifle communist expansion. The object of Pakistan’s strategy was 
primarily India and its purpose was security against the military and economic 
superiority of its bigger and hostile neighbour, including having the capacity to 
negotiate on Kashmir from a position of strength. The US was engaged in an 
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ideological confrontation between capitalism and communism while Pakistan was 
an Islamic state confronting a Hindu threat.149  
The question arises as to whether interests converged in a mutual aversion 
towards communism, but the evidence suggests Pakistan was ambivalent. The 
rhetoric of Jinnah and Liaquat indicated a clear anti-communist and pro-Western 
stance but the latter’s acceptance of Moscow’s 1949 invitation points to a more 
open mind, and Ipshani’s letter quoted above suggests this may have been a ploy 
to galvanise the Americans.150 Furthermore, Roedad Khan, a former Pakistani 
civil servant throughout the Cold War, confirmed in a personal interview that 
Jinnah never intended to forge a real “friendship with the USSR.”151  However, 
Muhammad Ali’s assurances to Chou-en-Lai and Suhrawardy’s aim to strengthen 
relations with China clearly indicate that by 1955 not all communists were 
considered bad if they shared a common enemy in India. Thus, Pakistan’s attitude 
to communism appears to have been India-centric: the USSR, which was 
supporting India militarily and technologically, was a threat whilst China, which 
had disputes with India, was not. Ahmed points out also that, unlike the USSR, 
China was not trying to export its ideology in the region and was therefore 
perceived in an entirely different way to Moscow.152 Whilst this may have been 
true for Pakistan it is unlikely that India or the US would have drawn the same 
conclusion and, in any case, the Chinese track record was not fully formed in 
1955, so it suggests that China’s attitude to Pakistan was also India-centric. Thus, 
Callard’s conclusion that Pakistan joined US alliances but “had no strong 
convictions about the balance of righteousness” in the rift between the West and 
Communism seems fair.153 
Thus, the key characteristic of US-Pakistan relations was that both states 
entered into the alliance with different aims and objectives and with different 
attitudes towards communism. Much was then built on these ambiguous 
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foundations creating scope for later friction, misunderstanding and 
disappointment when the alliance was put to the test. The fact that the US 
ultimately allied with Pakistan to such an extent in spite of long-standing 
reservations also indicates that Pakistan’s unique geo-strategic location enabled it 
to exert reverse influence on its bigger and more powerful partner, in essence to 
get the US to buy its co-operation and access to its territory with aid and arms. It 
also shows that the US was prepared to turn a blind eye to military dictatorship to 
secure the alliance in the face of democratic opposition.  
The formation of the relationship also required the US to indulge in wilful 
blindness, in this case over Kashmir. The evidence of enmity between Pakistan 
and India was plain but the Eisenhower administration thought it could arm 
Pakistan without making unmanageable problems with India. In so doing it started 
a regional arms race and galvanised hostilities over Kashmir, and the US found 
itself making assurances based on dubious claims that it could control the use of 
the arms it was shipping into the region. Additionally, the fact that Pakistan was 
the United States’ reluctant second choice after India also created insecurity in 
Islamabad that their ally might again tilt towards their enemy when conditions 
changed.  
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CHAPTER 2: DECLINE AND DISAPPOINTMENT: INDIA, 
                         CHINA, ISLAM AND THE BOMB, 1961-1979 
 
2.1 Introduction 
When Ayub stood firm alongside the US over the U2 incident, he was 
confident he would not stand alone if attacked. Sixteen years later Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, told his National Assembly in vivid terms 
that it was the US that was attacking him:  
…the elephant [the US] is mad at me….Bloodhounds are roaming in the streets to 
quench their thirst with my blood…this is not an indigenous development, this is a 
colossal conspiracy hatched by an imperial foreign power and her stooges.1  
 
Relations between the two states would get even worse two years later 
with American citizens killed in anti-US riots in Pakistan. After fourteen years in 
the making, the next eighteen years saw the strategic alliance unravel into mutual 
disappointments, threats, sanctions and confrontations. This chapter explores the 
key events and decisions which caused this deterioration to occur and how they 
began to establish a pattern of mutual distrust. It also examines how fluctuations 
in US policy towards Pakistan may have been reflected in alternating US 
presidential administrations. 
 
2.2 India: The US Disappoints Pakistan 
John F. Kennedy became US President in 1961 and his Democratic 
administration adopted a more pro-India policy.2 As a Senator in 1958, he 
advocated engagement with the non-aligned movement,3 and during the Sino-
Indian border clash of 1959 he argued for maximum support for India against 
Communist China. 
We must be willing to join with other Western nations in a serious long-range program of 
long-term loans, backed up by technical and agricultural assistance - designed to enable 
India to overtake the challenge of Communist China. . . . We want India to win that race 
with Red China.4 
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Now as President, Kennedy increased World Bank aid to India over the 
period 1961-63 to $2,225 million.5 The magnitude of the change can be judged by 
the fact that US economic aid to India for the entire twelve years from 
Independence to 1959 was officially valued at only $1,705 million. In Pakistan, 
Ayub Khan suspected India would divert the aid towards its military to threaten 
Pakistan and be more difficult to deal with on Kashmir.6 He was further 
disappointed when US Vice-President Johnson paid a goodwill visit to India with 
the American First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy in 1961 and encouraged Nehru to 
extend his leadership to other parts of Southeast Asia.7 
Fearful of US plans to encourage Indian regional hegemony, Ayub met 
Kennedy in July of that year. Before leaving he set out his concerns to his 
domestic press and said Pakistan was concerned, upset and disappointed over US 
policy in the region.8 Ayub Khan indicated that Pakistan might pull out of SEATO 
if large amounts of aid to India continued. He was also critical of American 
military aid to India which included 350 US tanks and non-recoil guns.9 Ayub 
Khan warned Washington that if India became too powerful, its smaller 
neighbours would have no alternative but to seek China’s protection.10 “Can it 
be,” Ayub Khan asked that “the US is abandoning its good friends for people who 
may not prove such good friends?”11 During his US visit Ayub pointed out that 
Pakistan was the only country in the region which had allowed the US to use its 
territory for bases and how it had supported the US over the U2 incident.12 He told 
a joint session of the American Congress, “the only people who will stand by you 
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are the people of Pakistan …. provided you are also prepared to stand by them.” 
He went on to urge his audience, “not to take any step that might aggravate our 
problems or in any fashion jeopardize our security.”13 He also said, “If India uses 
American aid for economic development we have no objection, but if it uses it for 
military purposes, then Pakistan has to prepare herself to meet the threat.”14 
Kennedy sought to placate Ayub with public praise and the promise of 
prompt delivery of twelve F-104 supersonic fighters which had already been 
pledged by Eisenhower. He also promised to discuss Kashmir with Nehru15 and 
assured Ayub that if America gave arms to India, Pakistan would be consulted 
first.16 On the strength of this, Ayub returned to Pakistan apparently pleased with 
the outcome of his visit to the US. When asked if he was satisfied that the US was 
not abandoning Pakistan for others who may not be quite such good friends of the 
country, he answered unequivocally in the affirmative.17 However, Kennedy had 
better reason to be pleased with the meeting having not altered his Indian policy in 
any significant way at all.  
Ayub’s satisfaction was short-lived, in any case, and it collapsed when war 
broke out between India and China. The US supported India against Communist 
China as might have been expected given Kennedy’s earlier remarks, but this only 
prompted Pakistan to turn to Beijing. The Sino-Indian border had been disputed 
since 1959 when China claimed the territories of Ladakh and Arunchal Pradesh. 
The dispute turned to war in October 1962 when China launched an assault on 
India in response to the latter establishing military posts in mountains behind 
Chinese positions.18  
Six days later Nehru appealed to the world community for support urging 
it not to allow the principle of “Might is Right” to prevail in international 
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relations.19 The US and Britain promptly signed an aid agreement with Delhi, and 
the first shipment of aid was rushed to India that November.20 The war was short 
and China declared a ceasefire on 21 November 1962, but Nehru was encouraged 
by the support from the West, and particularly from the United States, and 
declared that India would continue its military build-up even though this 
particular dispute was settled.21 Accordingly, Western powers continued their 
military and economic aid after the cease-fire was signed, ostensibly to deter any 
repetition of Chinese aggression.22 In May 1963, US Ambassador to India, 
Chester Bowles, said the US was “very anxious to help” India build up her 
strength against China and the only thing to be determined was the amount of 
military aid that it could absorb.23 A British-Canadian mission studied India’s air 
defence needs24 and a separate US mission visited to study its military 
requirements.25 Under another agreement, the US and UK strengthened Indian 
defences with radar installations and training for Indian technicians. This 
agreement also provided for periodic joint training exercises in India.26  
If these developments alarmed Pakistan then it also noted with discomfort 
that the US was encouraging the Soviet Union to give aid to India. On 10 
December 1962, the US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Averell 
Harriman, expressed approval of India’s relations with the Soviet Union which he 
declared to be in the United States’ interest.27 Both the US and the USSR wanted 
to strengthen India against China and encouraged her to take military aid from any 
country that was willing to provide it. According to Nehru, the USSR also had no 
objection to India receiving military and other aid from the US and UK.28  
The declared objective of US military aid was to enable India to repel 
Chinese aggression but it seemed to Pakistan it would increase its own 
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insecurities.29 Pakistani leaders considered the war between India and China to be 
just border skirmishes exaggerated by Delhi to maximise military aid. In support 
of this view, Ayub contended that China would not have attacked through the 
difficult Himalayan Mountains if the objective had been to achieve a decisive 
victory since it would have been easier to outflank India through Burma.30 Bhutto 
also pointed out that, even during the war, the bulk of India’s armed forces 
remained on the Indo-Pakistan border, observing that this was “a strange method 
of resisting the Chinese.”31 However, his criticism may have been unfair since 
such a strategy could merely reflect Indian fears of an opportunistic attack by 
Pakistan which, as will be discussed later, was a genuine possibility.  
In addition to their scepticism about Indian claims, Pakistan’s leaders had 
further objections to the Western rush to arm its neighbour. Ayub complained to 
Kennedy that India’s pro-Soviet and anti-Western policies could not justify the 
military aid it was getting.32 The US tried to argue that Pakistan still received 
more military and economic aid per capita income than India, but such subtle 
distinctions were lost on the people of Pakistan.33 Another complaint was that, 
despite Kennedy’s earlier promise, military aid had been given to India without 
consulting Pakistan, as Foreign Minister Bogra, reported to his National 
Assembly:  
I speak in anguish not in anger when I have to say that one of our Allies had promised us 
that we would be consulted before any arms assistance is given to India. I regret to have 
observed that this was not done.34  
 
It was from these perspectives that Pakistan saw its closest ally 
strengthening its formidable enemy with the obvious concern that this strength 
might be turned on Pakistan.35 Kennedy assured Ayub that all the aid was for 
defeating Chinese communist subversion, which both Pakistan and India opposed, 
and that it in no way diminished or qualified US commitment to Pakistan.36 Just 
as Eisenhower had tried to placate Nehru in 1954, Kennedy now tried to placate 
Ayub with an assurance that if US assistance to India should be misused and 
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directed against another in aggression, he “would undertake immediately, in 
accordance with constitutional authority both within and without the United 
Nations, to thwart such aggression.”37 This time, however, Ayub was not satisfied 
by Kennedy’s assurances and his reply shows signs of the disenchantment which 
was beginning to enter the relationship: 
I am grateful for the assurance you have given that the arms you are now supplying to 
India will not be used against us. This is very generous of you, but knowing the sort of 
people you are dealing with whose history is a continuous tale of broken pledges, I 
would not ask a friend like you to place yourself in an embarrassing situation. India’s 
conduct over Junagadh, Mangrol, Hyderabad, Kashmir and Goa should be well known to 
you. Our belief is that arms now being obtained by India from you for use against China 
will be undoubtedly used against us at the very first opportunity.38  
 
What would have satisfied Ayub is if Kennedy had linked his aid to 
Kashmir. All along, Pakistan wanted military aid to India to be conditional on 
Delhi’s willingness to settle the Kashmir dispute and other outstanding issues 
between the two countries, but the US was unwilling to do this. The US 
Ambassador to India, John K. Galbraith, told the Pakistani Ambassador in Delhi 
on 29 October 1962 that “any demand from the US for a Kashmir settlement 
would ruin the very favourable prospects in future for Pakistan.”39 Ayub 
responded to Kennedy on 5 November: “No, Mr. President, the answer to this 
problem lies elsewhere. It lies in creating a situation whereby we are free from the 
Indian threat, and the Indians are free from any apprehensions about us. This can 
only be done if there is a settlement of the question of Kashmir.”40  
The US and UK did put some pressure on India to discuss Kashmir with 
Pakistan through the good offices of Averell Harriman of the US and Duncan 
Sandys of the UK, but would not make their aid conditional because of their 
primary concern to deter and contain China.41 Galbraith made this clear at a press 
conference in New Delhi on 28 December 1962 by stating that American 
assistance was “in no way contingent on an India-Pakistan agreement on the 
Kashmir problem … When our friends are in trouble, we are not doing business 
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that way.”42 Ayub again wrote to Kennedy and Macmillan on 2 January 1963 that 
“Only a speedy and just Kashmir settlement can give us any assurance that the 
contemplated increase of Indian’s military power is not likely to be deployed 
against Pakistan in future.”43 However, in March 1963 US Secretary of State, 
Dean Rusk, reiterated that while the US believed it very important for the security 
of the entire subcontinent that India and Pakistan resolve their problems, “I would 
not in any sense qualify our aid purpose by this word ‘condition’.”44 Both Bhutto 
and Ayub saw this as a great lost opportunity to settle Kashmir,45 but US Assistant 
Secretary of State, Phillips Talbot, told Congress that it would have been a great 
mistake to use aid as a lever to force India to negotiate over Kashmir since this 
would have opened the way for increased Soviet penetration in India.46  
An alternative for Pakistan was to take advantage of India’s temporary 
vulnerability and launch its own attack to regain the disputed territory. Pakistan’s 
capability was probably sufficient to engage in a limited war confined to Kashmir, 
and both Ayub and Foreign Minister Bogra admitted that it was due to pressure 
from the US and UK that Pakistan did not do so. Washington and London warned 
Pakistan against any such action and Kennedy urged Pakistan to offer a no-war 
pledge with India.47 Galbraith also tried to get assurance from Pakistan that it 
would not create trouble for India during the war. Pakistan again urged the US to 
propose to India a reasonable settlement of the Kashmir problem, but Galbraith 
declined, saying, “it would be taken as a form of blackmail at a time of [Indian] 
weakness.”48 In the event, Pakistan did not go to war with India at this time. 
Hassan Abbas, a Pakistani-American academic in the area of South Asian and 
Middle Eastern studies, is of the view, however, that by heeding US and UK 
warnings at this time Pakistan lost its best opportunity of settling the Kashmir 
dispute through the use of arms.49  
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2.3 China: Pakistan Disappoints the US 
It is not difficult to understand how the events of 1962 caused Pakistan to 
turn to China. By July 1963, Ayub again warned that if US aid to India continued 
on the same large scale he would be compelled to forge an alliance with Beijing.50 
So, when Bhutto, as Foreign Minister, suggested Pakistan should improve its 
relations with both China and the USSR, Ayub agreed.51  
Although relations with China had initially cooled under Ayub, there were 
signs of improvements even before the Sino-Indian border dispute. In 1961, 
Pakistan voted for Communist China to be given its seat as a sovereign state at the 
UN despite having previously voted against, at every UN session from the ninth to 
the thirteenth.52 There was even speculation about a possible secret military 
understanding between the two countries. Bhutto even hinted at this by suggesting 
that if Pakistan were involved in a clash with India it would not stand alone. He 
said: “An attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and 
territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia.”53 Relations with China then 
developed further through a series of agreements about borders, trade, air travel 
and culture. 
The border agreement settled a dispute which had existed since 1949 when 
the new People’s Republic of China rejected the boundary drawn up by the British 
in 1914 (the McMohan Line) which demarcated the Indian Empire. The disputed 
area lay between China and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. On the Pakistan side 
was the territory of Hunza and Baltistan, and on the Chinese side was the province 
of Sinkiang. Following a Pakistani approach in 1961, China announced in May 
1962 that the two countries had agreed to negotiate. Talks began in Beijing on 12 
October 1962 (just before the Sino-Indian dispute) and, on 28 December 1962 
(just after the ceasefire), agreement was reached on the location and alignment of 
the boundary.54 Pakistan considered it got the best of the bargain by gaining 750 
square miles of territory formerly under Chinese occupation and control. In return, 
Pakistan dropped claims to Chinese territory which it had never occupied or 
                                   
50
 Pakistan Times, 21 July, 1963. 
51
 Sherwani, Pakistan, China and America, p. 94. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Shaheen Irshad Khan, Rejection Alliance? A Case-Study of US-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1967 
(Lahore: Ferozesons, 1972), p.100. 
54
 Byron N. Tzou, China and International Law: the Boundary Dispute (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1990), pp. 69-70.  
 52 
 
controlled. The Pakistan newspaper, Dawn, claimed that “this bears eloquent 
testimony to the reasonableness of the Chinese Government.”55 Importantly for 
Pakistan, the agreement also acknowledged Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed 
state, and China for the first time publicly refused to recognise the accession of 
Kashmir to India.56 This agreement served the national interests of both sides. The 
two governments believed they needed new friends in a hostile world. China 
gained Pakistan, her third largest neighbour, whilst Islamabad wanted a new 
protector in place of the United States.57  
Pakistan also signed an air travel agreement with China on 29 August 
1963 for air services between Dhaka and Shanghai via Canton and also from 
Lahore and Karachi over the Himalayas into China.58 This was opposed by 
Washington. The US State Department claimed it would have an adverse effect 
on efforts to strengthen the security and solidarity of the subcontinent and that it 
was “an unfortunate breach of free world solidarity.”59 Sino-Pakistan relations 
continued to develop when the Chinese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
visited Pakistan in February 1964. In a sign of changing attitudes, a Dawn 
editorial commented that they came “... in a vastly changed and even a 
revolutionary historical context. Many earlier barriers have fallen, prejudices 
withered away and taboos revised.”60 China also offered to assist Pakistan 
establish heavy industry and shipping in the country with an interest-free $6 
million loan. This resulted in a heavy mechanical complex in Texala and the 
National Shipping Corporation of Pakistan which commenced service in 1965. A 
maritime transport agreement was also signed in October 1966, and in 1967 
Pakistan received two loans totalling $47 million for purchasing wheat and rice 
urgently required, at the time, in East Bengal.61   
  Pakistan’s motives for closer relations with China were clear - partly it 
was for leverage over the American decision to arm India, and partly in the hope 
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of Chinese support in the event of an Indian attack. For Beijing, it was a way of 
isolating India, as well as a useful demonstration that China was a reasonable, 
peaceful, and friendly country. Such a policy could also demonstrate to Moscow 
that its strategy of using India to counter China had drawbacks.62 The air 
agreement was a particular advantage to China. This was the first such agreement 
with any non-communist country. PIA (Pakistan International Airlines) flights 
were a quick means of transport from China to the Middle East and Africa where 
the Chinese were engaged in a campaign to win support from Afro-Asian 
countries in her border dispute with India. China did not require Pakistan to revise 
its ties with the US and in March 1963, Chou-en-Lai took a measured view of 
Pakistan’s continued membership of SEATO and the aid it received from 
Washington. He noted that Islamabad had assured Beijing that its participation in 
SEATO was not for the purpose of being hostile to China. He also observed that 
the development of Sino-Pakistan relations had been a gradual process but after a 
period of suspicion, Chou was able to say in the spring of 1963: “Since President 
Muhammad Ayub Khan assumed leadership of your country as your President, 
facts have further proved that Pakistan’s policy towards China is one of the 
friendship and not one of hostility.”63  
Pakistan’s move demonstrated its independence of action but its 
predicament did not allow it to give up on America as a source of economic and 
military aid and, to affirm the relationship, a CENTO meeting was hosted in 
Karachi two months after the border agreement with China.64 Nevertheless, China 
became the most serious complicating factor in the US relationship with Pakistan, 
if not with the whole subcontinent.65 US Under Secretary of State, George Ball, 
warned Pakistan in March 1964 about its relations with Communist China, 
adding that “... we are very much concerned. We will watch this very carefully.”66 
To reinforce the point, the US took retaliatory measures by deferring a 
development loan of $4.3 million for the development of Dacca airport. Pakistan, 
however, was able to continue its work on the airport using its own resources, an 
effort applauded from the sidelines by the Peking Review: “When the choice had 
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to be made between national pride and an American role, with all its 
accompanying insolence and insults, Pakistan preferred to uphold the honour of 
its people ...”67  
However, the US continued its warnings with Phillips Talbot cautioning 
in March 1965 that if Pakistan chose a different political road to the US it would 
prejudice their “special relationship.”68 At the same time, economic pressure was 
applied on Islamabad. Member countries of the World Bank, at the instigation of 
Washington, postponed an announcement on contributions to Pakistan’s 
development programme from July to September 1965.69 After Washington 
unilaterally cancelled Ayub’s trip to America in April 1965, he made his famous 
“Friends Not Master” statement. As Ayub put it: “It is our policy as an 
independent nation to normalise our relations with our neighbours however 
different ideologies might be, and that right we shall not allow to be 
compromised. It was in this context that I said we are looking for friends not 
masters.”70  
US President Lyndon B. Johnson, however, wanted to make Pakistan an 
example for all nations receiving or expecting American aid. Choudhury 
portrayed America’s attitude towards Pakistan as that of a naughty child.71 A 
succession of senior American officials, including Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 
visited Pakistan to assure its leaders that they need not turn to China for security 
because the US would come to Pakistan’s aid if it became a victim of Indian 
aggression. Ayub, however, was not convinced. He said, “guarantees are easy to 
give but difficult to implement.”72  
 
2.4 War with India 
Guarantees and trust were put to the test, and diverging interests were 
exposed, in 1965 when Pakistan went to war with India over Kashmir. There were 
two main reasons for this action. First, Pakistan thought it could take advantage of 
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perceived Indian weakness after its poor performance in the war with China and 
the death of Nehru in May 1964. Second, Pakistan’s improving relationship with 
Beijing led Ayub to believe it was an opportunity to strike India.73 The action was 
ill-judged and further drove Pakistan and the US apart. Morgenthau, a year earlier, 
had pointed out the contradiction in American policy towards Islamabad. “The 
military forces of Pakistan, built up with our [US] massive support, have as their 
primary target not the Soviet Union or China, but India…”74  
In Operation Gibraltar, Pakistani-trained guerrillas were sent into Indian-
controlled Kashmir to help the local population against the Indian government. 
This was followed by Operation Grand Slam in which regular Pakistani troops 
crossed the Ceasefire Line. In response, India attacked Lahore in West Pakistan 
and the crisis escalated into a full-scale war on 6 September 1965.75 Ayub and 
Bhutto met US Secretary of State McConaughey to ask for immediate US support 
under the terms of the 1959 Pakistan-US bilateral agreement. McConaughey, 
however, said the issue should be referred to the United Nations. Ayub countered, 
“You are on trial, and you cannot hedge or hide from this obligation.”76  
On 10 September 1965, the government of Pakistan officially appealed for 
US assistance, but Washington maintained its line. “In accordance with our 
assurances to Pakistan, the United States is urgently to meet this common danger 
by fully supporting the immediate United Nations action to end the hostilities. 
The appeal by the United Nations Security Council must be honoured.”77 It was 
made clear to Pakistan that “it could not expect US assistance in case of a conflict 
with India because a double defeat for the Indian armed forces coming after the 
debacle with China in 1962 would be intolerable for India.”78 This prompted 
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Bhutto to observe, “if the United States could only act through the Security 
Council, then there was no need for alliances.”79  
Washington was also disconcerted by the fact that the two combatants in 
the conflict were using arms against each other which it had supplied. Eisenhower 
had assured Nehru that US military weapons would not be used against India.80 
Asked why he used American arms against India, Ayub said that he could not 
keep them in cotton wool. The arms were in his arsenal to deploy when required.81 
At the same time, Western military equipment supplied to India to fight China, 
was also used against Pakistan despite Kennedy’s earlier assurances to Ayub that 
this would not happen.82 This was an embarrassment and Washington decided to 
impose an arms embargo on both countries from 8 September 1965.83 Though the 
US claimed the arms embargo was even-handed, in practice it had greater effect 
on Pakistan. Pakistan’s military was totally dependent on America, being nearly 
100 percent equipped with the US arms, while India’s equipment was not more 
than 10 percent American. In the meantime, the USSR, which was the main 
source of India’s arms, continued its military support.84 Bhutto later condemned 
the embargo as a decision unworthy of an ally or even a neutral and concluded 
that, “Pakistan-US relations could not be the same again.”85  
The US had reason to be cautious, however, as Cold War dynamics meant 
there was a real risk of the war pulling in the great powers. China took the side of 
Pakistan and when India attacked Lahore, Beijing branded it the aggressor and 
rejected Delhi’s claims of self-defence. Chou-en-Lai also criticised the US, when 
he declared: “To appeal for peace without distinguishing between right and wrong 
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will only encourage the aggressor.”86  During Ayub’s state visit to China in March 
1965, Chinese leaders assured him that in the event of an attack, “China would 
definitely support Pakistan.”87 Choudhury further claims the Chinese expressed 
their readiness to enter the conflict against India as the war went badly for 
Pakistan. However, such an intervention was not required. Pakistan accepted a 
cease-fire under pressure from the UN and both superpowers before any second 
front could be launched. Nonetheless, Choudhury takes the view that China was 
quite willing to intervene in the war on behalf of Pakistan, if Pakistan had 
formally asked it to do so.88  
The USSR was critical of China’s support for Pakistan. Moscow feared 
that such an alliance would lead to the US turning to India, thereby undermining 
its own role in South Asia.89 As a result, Moscow offered to act as mediator in the 
conflict.90 The arms embargo had made the war unsustainable for Pakistan so 
Ayub accepted this offer and a peace conference was hosted at Tashkent in 
January 1966. As something was needed to justify the military costs and 
sacrifices, Pakistan was initially reluctant to accept terms without a mechanism 
for resolving Kashmir.91 In the event both sides agreed to exchange the territories 
each had occupied during the war without any mention of a plebiscite in Kashmir. 
This was a great disappointment to the people of Pakistan. They thought they had 
won the war and expected some territorial gains, or at least some promise of a 
favourable solution to the Kashmir problem.92  
After the war, President Johnson invited Ayub to the US in an attempt to 
restore relations and spoke warmly of the good relationship with Pakistan. In 
1966, the arms embargo was partially lifted. Having got Pakistan reliant on 
American equipment, the US feared that a refusal to provide spare parts would 
lead Pakistan to turn to other suppliers and become reliant on other countries. 
Therefore, in 1967, the US announced the resumption of the sale of spare parts 
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and non-lethal weapons to both India and Pakistan.93 However, Pakistan went on 
to obtain military hardware from other countries – albeit from America’s allies. 
For example, 90 F-80 fighter jets came from West Germany, and the US 
permitted Italy to sell Pakistan 100 M-57 tanks, and in July 1969 it was reported 
that the US had also asked Turkey to release some 100 Patton tanks to Pakistan.94 
The Tashkent Treaty did not provide a long-lasting peace since it did not 
recognise the fundamental imbalance of power between the two combatants.95 In 
the treaty, both countries agreed to respect each other’s peaceful intentions, to 
promote cooperation and to discourage war and aggression. However, both sides 
were aware that such a peaceful environment could not be sustained for long 
because of Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan once again started a military build-up. In 
addition to those Western armaments mentioned above, Pakistan also turned to 
China, so the Chinese T-59 tank began replacing the US M-47/48 tanks as the 
main battle tank from 1966, 80 of which were exhibited in the Joint Services Day 
Parade on 23 March 1966. The war had proved that Pakistan’s tank-infantry ratio 
was lopsided and more infantry was required. Three more infantry divisions, 
referred to as “the China Divisions”, were raised by the start of 1968, largely 
equipped with Chinese equipment.96 Pakistan’s sense of betrayal by the US 
pushed it closer towards India’s arch enemy. Soon, China would succeed the US 
as Pakistan’s major arms supplier and, in the long run, also became Pakistan’s 
nuclear partner.97  
Although peace prevailed in Pakistan, it did not restore the prestige of 
Ayub Khan who was condemned for signing the treaty and effectively losing 
Kashmir. Soon after Tashkent, Bhutto resigned as foreign minister. He started to 
oppose the treaty and openly attacked Ayub over it. Bhutto then founded his own 
party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 1966, whose main programme was to 
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destroy Ayub’s regime.98 This led ultimately to Ayub’s resignation in March 
1969. According to the constitution, Ayub was supposed to transfer power in 
these circumstances to the speaker of the National Assembly but, instead, he 
transferred it to his Chief of Army Staff, General Yahya Khan. Ayub believed 
that only the military had the ability to save Pakistan from external aggression 
and from internal disorder and chaos. After taking power, General Yahya, 
abrogated the constitution and declared martial law, and on 1 April 1969, he 
declared himself President of Pakistan.99  
At this time, there was disenchantment on both sides over the US-Pakistan 
relationship.  Nevertheless, the US had gained access to bases in Pakistan from 
where it could monitor and contain the USSR, and Pakistan had received 
substantial aid, particularly for its military. However, the US remained concerned 
that communist influence, in the form of China, had increased and there were 
grounds to believe it could increase further. For Pakistan, the alliance with the US 
had not improved its security against India. Although Pakistan’s military bristled 
with US armaments, it was no match for its neighbour and Ayub had completely 
failed to achieve any kind of military or diplomatic resolution of his key problems 
in Kashmir. But, despite this, neither side broke off relations completely leaving 
scope for closer so-operation again in the future as events required. 
 
2.5 Civil War and Secret Diplomacy 
When Yahya Khan became Pakistan’s second military dictator in 1969, 
Richard Nixon had been US President with Henry Kissinger as his National 
Security Advisor for just three months. During his short but eventful term, 
Yahya’s relationship with Nixon and Kissinger was to be dominated by two 
themes: a bloody civil war between East and West Pakistan; and the Sino-Soviet 
Split which led to US rapprochement with China. This section examines the 
development of the bilateral relationship through these two major and intertwined 
themes. 
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2.6 Civil War  
The two parts of Pakistan were separated by 1,000 miles either side of a 
hostile India. Although the two parts were united by Islam, there were also ethnic, 
linguistic and economic differences which ultimately led to secession. In 
recognition of these differences the Awami Muslim League was formed in 1948 
(renamed simply the Awami League in 1955) to promote Bengali interests.100 
West Pakistan was less populated than the East but it dominated politically, 
economically and militarily creating a list of grievances around which Bengali 
sentiment could organise. Government spending in the West was more than 
double that in the East and Punjabis from the West dominated the military. Urdu 
was also essentially the official language of the whole of Pakistan.101  
 By 1966, the leader of Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, 
formulated “Six Points” for autonomy in East Pakistan including a confederate 
national government for defence and foreign affairs, but with separate currencies, 
taxation and paramilitary forces for each province.102 Yahya Kahn tried to make 
concessions by promising to bring more Bengalis into the government 
bureaucracy and the military, and in November 1969 announced that Pakistan’s 
first free elections based on universal adult suffrage would be held in December 
1970 to elect a National Assembly and frame a new constitution. He announced 
that sovereignty would then pass to the National Assembly.103 This gave the 
Awami League a whole year to campaign on the basis of the Six Points. They won 
167 of the 169 seats allocated to East Pakistan, with Bhutto’s PPP party winning 
only 81 out of 144 West Pakistani seats. Thus, Rehman had a democratic mandate 
to be Prime Minister - the first time that power would be concentrated in East 
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Pakistan.104 With this backing, he declared his intention to devise a constitution 
for regional autonomy based on his six-point programme.105  
 Political, business and military leaders in West Pakistan could not accept 
this political outcome. It threatened their control of the military, foreign exchange 
earnings and even their access to markets. When it became clear no compromise 
was possible, Bhutto announced a boycott of the first meeting of the National 
Assembly, and Yahya then postponed its meetings indefinitely.106 In response, 
Rehman called for civil disobedience against the national government claiming it 
was “the sacred duty of each and every Bengali in every walk of life, including 
Government employees, not to cooperate.”107 Furthermore, he urged his people to 
“build forts in each homestead. You must resist the Pakistani army with whatever 
you have in hand … the struggle this time is the struggle for independence.”108 In 
response, Yahya accused Rehman of treason, defiling the national flag and of 
creating terror and turmoil.109  
Chances of a political settlement thus disappeared and West Pakistan lost 
control, so the military attempted to restore order. On 25 March 1971, a 
crackdown, called Operation Searchlight, was organised in Dhaka against East 
Pakistan’s army, police, students, politicians and others. Rehman and his 
followers were arrested and the political activities of the Awami League were 
prohibited.110 Two days later, Major Ziaur Rahman, a veteran of the East Bengal 
Regiment, declared Bangladesh a new and independent state. A liberation army, 
the Mukti Bahini, formed from the Bengali military and police, was joined by 
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unarmed farmers, factory workers and students, and thus a guerrilla war 
commenced.111 Fighters from the Mukti Bahini sheltered in India where they 
received training and weapons. They also used Indian bases for attacks on West 
Pakistan’s military targets and supply routes. In response the West Pakistan 
military intensified its operations.112 Casualty figures vary from US estimates of 
between 4,000 to 6,000 dead in Dhaka113 to Rehman’s estimate of 3 million 
deaths in total.114 The upheaval forced an estimated 10 million people to flee to 
India by the end of the war in December 1971.115  
Such a huge migration posed a serious threat to political stability in India, 
so a solution was needed for the refugees’ safe return. Since early intervention in 
the war would have brought condemnation, India initially called on the 
international community for help. However, there was little optimism that other 
countries would respond.116 Indira Ghandi gave warning of what would follow 
the world’s inaction: “If the world does not take heed, we shall be constrained to 
take all measures as may be necessary to ensure our own security.” 117 By mid-
July 1971, the Indian military started intervening in the conflict, helping the 
Mukti Bahini become an effective fighting force.118 By mid-October, Bangladeshi 
forces had taken control of substantial territory.  
Now India turned the refugee crisis to its advantage by opposing a 
UNHCR plan for a reception centre in East Pakistan on the basis that no refugee 
should return until an Awami League government was securely established.119 At 
the same time, the Indian army started military movements and exercises along 
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East Pakistan’s borders. Fearing that India was planning to attack, Pakistan’s high 
command ordered a pre-emptive strike against eight Indian bases on 3 December 
1971, thus triggering a full-scale war.120 Pakistan was defeated once more and on 
16 December confirmed Bangladesh’s independence.121  
At the start, the US treated this crisis as an internal affair and made no 
official comment on the killings resulting from Operation Searchlight. Even when 
the crisis escalated and thousands more were killed, the US still did not condemn 
West Pakistan. Appalled, the US Consulate General in Dakha, Archer Blood, sent 
a telegram to his State Department revealing the extent of bloodshed in the 
conflict and dissented from his government’s “moral bankruptcy” for failing to 
denounce West Pakistan’s repression and, what he described as “genocide”.122 
But neither the White House nor the State Department was moved to change 
policy.  
When it became known that US weapons had been used in Operation 
Searchlight, contrary to the agreement under which they had been supplied, 
public criticism forced the Nixon administration to ban arms deliveries to 
Pakistan once again.123 However, it was discovered later that the ban was limited 
to new licences only, so arms covered by existing licenses were still delivered. It 
was not until early November, 1971 that arms deliveries finally ceased, although 
other forms of aid still continued.124 Other members of the international 
community were more willing to act against West Pakistan. In June 1971, the 
World Bank said that unless and until the crisis was settled politically by West 
Pakistan, it would not get any of its development aid.125  
When full-scale war erupted, however, Nixon feared that India, with 
Soviet support, might attempt to shatter the cohesion of West Pakistan, so he sent 
a message to the Soviet leadership on the Hot Line asking them in the spirit of 
superpower détente to restrain its ally, Delhi. He also ordered a task force, led by 
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the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal.126 The Presidential 
Order did not specify the task force’s mission,127 but Kissinger later revealed it 
was sent “ostensibly for the evacuation of Americans, but in reality to give 
emphasis to our warnings against an attack on West Pakistan.”128 He added that 
the US also wanted forces in place in case the Soviet Union put pressure on 
China.129  
What motivated Nixon to remain non-judgemental, to deter Gandhi’s 
aggression, to continue aid to Pakistan and to be concerned for the security of 
China was the fact that, at the same time as the crisis was playing out, Pakistan’s 
leaders were secretly acting as intermediaries between the US and China on what 
was a much bigger diplomatic project for the US strategically and for Nixon 
personally. 
 
2.7 Secret Diplomacy with China, and Nixon’s Opportunism 
If the Pakistan-China relationship had been an irritant for Johnson, it was 
now an asset for Nixon as Pakistan once again became valuable to US interests. 
This time its value was in the relationship with Mao’s regime rather than its geo-
strategic location. The US had been slow to fully appreciate the Sino-Soviet split 
because communism had been treated as a monolith, but increasingly through the 
1960s the division between the two great communist powers had become more 
visible. The dispute climaxed in 1969 when there was a brief war over the border 
between China and the USSR.  
The US had refused to recognise the PRC after the 1949 revolution but by 
the late 1960s it was being acknowledged that there could be benefits in a 
relationship with China. In addition to rebalancing cold war international relations 
against the USSR, it could yield specific benefits. China could get access to 
technology and strategic information, and for the US a friendly China could 
pressure the North Vietnamese to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War. As an 
important part of the process of integrating Communist China into the 
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international community, China became a member of the United Nations on 15 
November 1971.130 For Nixon himself such a bold move would boost his prestige 
and re-election campaign.  
Sino-US negotiations had begun back in 1969. With Pakistan acting as 
mediator, diplomatic notes were exchanged, and by April 1971 Chou-en-Lai 
officially confirmed to Yahya Kahn his willingness to receive the US President’s 
special envoy in China. An arrangement was made for Kissinger to visit Pakistan 
and, whilst there, he feigned illness as a pretext for being out of the public eye, 
and secretly flew to Peking to negotiate a later and very public visit for Nixon.131 
Thus, at the time of the East Pakistan crisis, Yahya’s role in Sino-US negotiations 
was pivotal and any unfriendly gesture by the US could have jeopardised the 
whole project. Kissinger later explained how he and Nixon saw this situation as a 
dilemma: 
The United States could not condone a brutal military repression in which thousands of 
civilians were killed and from which millions fled to India for safety ... But Pakistan was 
our sole channel to China; once it was closed off it would take months to make 
alternative arrangements.132  
 
Nixon’s visit to China successfully took place in February 1972 during 
which there was a historic meeting with Mao. With a concession to withdraw US 
troops from Taiwan, both governments signed the Shanghai Communiqué which 
aligned the countries against any powerful country (meaning the USSR), which 
might try to exert hegemony over Asia.133 Nixon then went on to win a landslide 
victory in the 1972 election and an end to the Vietnam War was negotiated the 
following year. The US and China were thankful to Pakistan for the role it played 
in the process and Nixon paid compliments to Yahya Kahn.134  
The benefits and losses from these two linked episodes seem unevenly 
distributed but much of the damage Pakistan suffered came from the civil war 
which arose from internal factors which were not products of the US relationship. 
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Despite this, the US did give material and diplomatic help to Pakistan - first, by 
not condemning the repressive nature of Operation Searchlight; second, by 
continuing development aid when other nations stopped; and third, by 
constraining both India and the USSR. In Pakistan there was, and still is, dismay 
that the US was complicit in allowing the secession of East Pakistan.135 However, 
any US intervention would surely have drawn a response from the USSR via 
India with inherent dangers of escalation. Kissinger makes a good case that East 
Pakistan was a lost cause in any case: 
There was no likelihood that a small military force owing loyalty to one wing of the 
country could indefinitely hold a population of 75 million of the other. Once indigenous 
support for a united Pakistan evaporated, the integrity of Pakistan was finished. An 
independent Bengali state was certain to emerge, even without Indian intervention. The 
only question was how the change would come about.136  
 
Nixon and Kissinger were also convinced that West Pakistan was secured 
because of their policies. As Nixon later wrote:  
By using diplomatic signals and acting behind the scenes we had been able to save West 
Pakistan from the imminent threat of Indian aggression and domination. We had also 
once again avoided a major confrontation with the Soviet Union.137  
 
This did little to help Yahya Kahn, however. Under his leadership Pakistan 
had been decisively defeated by India again and had lost the most populous part of 
his country. Demonstrations broke out against his military government and, like 
his predecessor, Yahya Khan was forced to resign on 20 December 1971. On this 
occasion, however, the military had lost much of its reputation. As a result, Yahya 
had little option but to pass control to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the former Foreign 
Minister turned critic.  
 
2.8 Pakistan Diversifies: Islam and the Bomb 
Like his predecessors, Bhutto’s security outlook was focused on India 
which he described to the UN General Assembly in 1965 as “a great monster, a 
great aggressor always given to small aggression.”138 Unlike his predecessors, 
however, he had repeatedly criticised Pakistan’s unbalanced foreign policy which 
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he now sought to diversify. He believed that in supporting the US in its fear of 
international communism, Pakistan had not only weakened its defence against 
India but also added to its list of immediate enemies. Furthermore, he was of the 
view that as long as Pakistan was committed to the US, good relations with 
Muslim countries would be difficult.139 Accordingly, he set out to diminish 
dependence on the US and to place Pakistan at the forefront of Islamic 
countries.140 In so doing, he set the ground for a steadily deteriorating relationship 
with Washington. 
Since Bhutto had long recognised the importance of China in balancing 
against India and had pushed for closer relations, he now saw it as his most crucial 
ally. 141 To develop this relationship he visited China three times between January 
1972 and the summer of 1976. In pursuit of a more balanced Cold War stance he 
also sought better relations with the USSR. He visited Moscow in March 1972, 
and this led to the restoration of trade, economic, scientific and technical ties. 
Addressing the National Assembly, he reported that he had convinced Moscow of 
Pakistan’s peaceful intentions and was “… glad that we have been able to 
normalize our relation with this great power and neighbouring state.”142 In 
October 1974, he visited the USSR again and was offered assistance in oil and gas 
prospecting. A new long term trade agreement was also signed to replace an 
earlier one which had been signed before the secession of East Pakistan.143  
However, it was his pursuit of nuclear weapons that was the cause of the 
greatest difficulties with Washington. In fact, Pakistan was a relatively late entrant 
to the nuclear arena. A committee for exploring the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
was set up in 1955 followed by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 
in 1956, but it was not until 1965 that the first nuclear power plant was 
established. This was at Karachi and was built with Canadian assistance on the 
condition that it would be operated under IAEA safeguards. In effect, this meant 
that Pakistan was agreeing not to develop a nuclear weapons capability. However, 
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Bhutto had warned the UN in 1965 of the potential for nuclear proliferation if, in a 
barely hidden reference to India, “a sixth country” joined the ranks of nuclear 
countries.144 The following year, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi began to 
argue that Third World countries should be given permission to conduct peaceful 
nuclear explosions.145 This prompted Bhutto to warn what could happen if this 
issue was not dealt with equitably: 
Nuclear powers cannot on the one hand acclaim non-proliferation in principle and on the 
other actively assist India and Israel to acquire nuclear capability …. if India acquires 
nuclear status, Pakistan will have to follow suit even if it entails eating grass.146  
   
Gul claims Bhutto sought a defence guarantee from the US to deter India 
from nuclear blackmail against Pakistan but was unsuccessful.147 Because of this 
failure, he took personal charge of a new nuclear project.148 It is said at a meeting 
of about 50 Pakistani scientists at Multan on 2 January 1972 Bhutto was told that 
they could make a nuclear bomb if they had the right resources and facilities. 
Bhutto assured them that resources and facilities would be made available.149 A 
comprehensive programme was then devised and approved later the same year.150  
Bhutto first arranged to keep the programme under his sole control – and 
therefore also under civilian control. A Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Production was put under his direct supervision, along with all atomic energy 
affairs, and he made the Chairman of PAEC answerable only to himself.151 He 
then set about procuring $300 million to finance the programme and turned to the 
oil states where Kuwait, Libya, Iraq UAE and Saudi Arabia assured him of 
financial support and co-operation. These countries were generally supportive 
since Pakistan’s nuclear bomb could also serve as a future deterrent against Israel 
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after their defeat in the recent 1973 October War.152 They feared Israel’s nuclear 
capability and believed any move towards acquiring their own nuclear weapons 
would be wholly unacceptable to the international community. It was thought that 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme would be seen as an attempt to counter India and 
therefore rather less controversial than a deterrent aimed at Israel. Moreover, 
Pakistan’s location made it less vulnerable to an Israeli attack. The former 
Pakistani ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Shahid Amin, reported that “the Saudis 
regard Pakistan as a trustworthy friend who will come to Saudi Arabia’s 
assistance whenever the occasion arises.”153  
In Libya, Gaddafi was interested in making his own nuclear bomb, which 
he described as a “Sword of Islam”, but did not have access to the scientists or 
equipment needed.154 He had tried to buy a bomb from China in 1970 but was 
refused, so he saw Pakistan’s approach as another opportunity. In 1973, a secret 
meeting took place in Paris between Pakistan and Libya, as a result of which 
Pakistan received a large sum of money from Libya.155 In February 1974, 
Pakistan hosted a meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Committees (OIC) in 
Lahore to further cement its relationship with the Muslim countries. During his 
visit to the OIC, Gaddafi went to a cricket stadium in Lahore which had been 
renamed, the “Gaddafi Stadium”. Addressing a huge crowd there, the Libyan 
leader assured the Pakistani people that his country was ready to sacrifice its 
blood if Pakistan were ever threatened. He also promised Pakistanis that “Our 
resources are your resources”156 and he was as good as his word. Money began to 
flow to Pakistan from Libya. Bhutto’s nuclear project thus had two main aims: to 
counter-balance India’s military capability and to put Pakistan at the head of the 
Islamic world. The US became concerned over the possibility of an “Islamic 
bomb”, fearing that it could be used in a future Arab-Israel conflict.157  
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Bhutto’s nuclear project was galvanised in May 1974 when India tested its 
first nuclear explosion, under the codename, “Smiling Buddha”. Soon afterwards 
Gandhi wrote to assure Bhutto that her purpose was peaceful and she continued to 
condemn the military use of nuclear energy. In reply, Bhutto dismissed her 
assurance with reference to India’s broken promises on the Kashmir plebiscite and 
warned her to expect public opinion in Pakistan to react to the “… chauvinistic 
jubilation widely expressed in India at the acquisition of a nuclear status.”158 
Bhutto decided to turn to China for help, initially requesting that they provide a 
nuclear umbrella for Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack. In return, he got an 
unspecific assurance from Chou-en-Lai that every necessary action would be 
taken in favour of Pakistan when the circumstances arose.159 In May 1976, Bhutto 
visited Beijing, accompanied by a number of Pakistani scientists, to strike a deal 
on developing Pakistan’s nuclear capability. The following January, an agreement 
on scientific and technological co-operation was signed which included China’s 
assistance in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear energy. Bates Gill an expert 
on Chinese foreign policy, later claimed that this Chinese assistance was not 
restricted to nuclear energy, but also included the acquisition of highly enriched 
uranium which is necessary to build nuclear weapons.160 Later in March and June 
1977, Chinese scientists visited Pakistan to select sites and discuss 
implementation plans.161  
Bhutto also turned to the French for assistance and on 18 March 1976, 
Pakistan signed an agreement with Paris for the construction of a nuclear 
reprocessing plant in Chasma. The US administration reacted sharply against this, 
arguing that Pakistan could use the plant for the development of nuclear weapons. 
After pressure from Washington, the agreement was discontinued in December 
1976.162 However, the French facility was still operated under an agreement with 
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the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in which the Pakistani 
Government undertook not to use any plant, equipment or material to make 
nuclear weapons and to abide by and co-operate with the Agency’s safeguards.163 
Bhutto argued that Pakistan had a perfect right to develop nuclear energy and said 
that America’s objections were an attempt to undermine his country’s 
sovereignty.164             
Up to 1976, Kissinger offered a deal based on the idea of Pakistan giving 
up its nuclear weapons in return for increased modern conventional arms from the 
US. When Bhutto indicated he was not interested,165 Kissinger is reported to have 
threatened to “make a horrible example of him” if he did not abandon his plans to 
reprocess plutonium.166 Bhutto later claimed that Kissinger made good this threat 
in the post-1977 election turmoil in Pakistan, and that the US funded his 
opponents in order to topple his government.167 Within six months of the election, 
he was removed in another military coup and charged with murder. Subjected to a 
rigged trial, he was found guilty by the Supreme Court following the dictates of 
military, rather than civil, law. Two years later, Bhutto was executed.168 His 
execution did not mean the end of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, however. The 
incoming General Zia ul-Haq was as committed to the “Islamic bomb”, but after 
Bhutto’s death the programme was removed from civilian control and put it firmly 
in the hands of the military where it has been ever since. 
 
2.9 US Involvement in Bhutto’s Fall 
Reports of Kissinger’s threat to Bhutto have generated claims about US 
involvement in the political turmoil and military coup that removed him from 
power. Full examination of this topic would require lengthy research beyond the 
scope of this thesis but, because of its significance in US-Pakistan relations and 
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resonance in popular discourse, it is discussed here alongside contributions from 
interviewees. 
Bhutto himself believed the US was heavily involved in his fall. In his 
death cell memoir, If I am Assassinated, he refers to his meeting with Kissinger 
and concludes that his decision to continue Pakistan’s nuclear programme led to 
his death sentence.169 However, Gerald Feuerstein, Deputy Chief of the US 
Mission in Islamabad, recalls that whilst Kissinger had been sent to warn Bhutto, 
he had adopted a balanced “carrot and stick” approach to persuade him to stop the 
programme. The “carrot” was the offer of A-7 bombers, whilst the stick was not 
any direct threat from Kissinger but his emphasising the fact that the Democrats, 
who favoured a tougher non-proliferation approach than the Republicans, were set 
to win the upcoming election.170  
Tariq Fatemi, former Pakistani ambassador and current special advisor to 
Nawaz Sharif, supports the idea that Kissinger was referring to Carter’s likely 
win in the 1977 presidential election and a consequent harder line on 
proliferation.171 On the other hand, Bhutto’s daughter and future Prime Minister, 
claimed Kissinger did indeed make a direct threat. She recalled her father 
returning from the meeting “flushed with anger” saying Kissinger had “spoken to 
him crudely and arrogantly”: 
During the meeting Kissinger had claimed that he considered my father a brilliant 
statesman. It was only as a well-wisher that he was warning him: Reconsider the 
agreement with France or risk being made into ’a horrible example’.172  
 
Claims made by an alleged former ISI Director, Brigadier Tirmazi, have 
been widely used to corroborate Bhutto’s version of events. Tirmazi reported that 
Kissinger had not only said to Bhutto that he would “make a horrible example of 
you”, but had also added, “When the railroad is coming, you get out of the 
way.”173 There are doubts, however, about the Tirmazi claims and more recent 
investigations have been unable to establish the authenticity of his evidence.174 
Thus, there is no definitive evidence of Kissinger’s exact intention or wording but 
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it would be reasonable to conclude that a strong warning, at a minimum, was 
issued.  
At the time, Bhutto openly accused the US of plotting against him. He 
claimed there was “a massive, huge, colossal international conspiracy” against 
Pakistan and that “foreigners were behind the nationwide agitation by opposition 
parties to force his resignation.” Citing his opposition to the US, he reported to 
Parliament that vast sums had flooded in from abroad to finance the campaign 
against him.175 The new US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, promptly denied 
these allegations, stating that his government had no intention of interfering in 
Pakistan’s domestic affairs and had given no assistance to any political 
organisations or individuals. He also pointed out that “despite occasional 
differences on specific points” the US had maintained economic assistance and 
arms shipments to Pakistan uninterrupted.176  
The timing of events raises an obvious objection to the conspiracy theory. 
The meeting with Kissinger in August 1976 was under the Republican Presidency 
of Gerald Ford. By January 1977, Ford and Kissinger had been replaced by the 
Democrat President Carter and Secretary of State Vance, who had adopted a 
strong human rights agenda in international relations. Therefore, the question 
arises as to how Kissinger could influence events after the party he served had 
been voted out of power and he was no longer in office. Benazir Bhutto suggested 
that “changes in the US administration did not necessarily mean changes in all the 
US centres of power” and pointed out that, “the CIA often acted autonomously 
and that their policies were not established overnight.”177 She listed the reasons 
why there might be no change of policy in the CIA concerning her father: 
Here was a man who had spoken out against American policy during the Vietnam War, 
who had promoted normalised relations with Communist China, who had supported the 
Arabs during the 1973 war and advocated independence from the superpowers at Third 
World conferences. Was he getting too big for his boots?178  
 
Allegations by Tirmazi have been used to support Benazir Bhutto’s 
assertions with specific accusations. It was argued, first, that Washington 
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cultivated bureaucrats, PPP stalwarts and ministers as US agents; second, that US 
diplomats directed operations against Bhutto through direct and frequent contact 
with opposition leaders; and finally, that a wireless link was established between 
the US Consulate and the residence of Maulana Maudoodi of the opposition 
Janat-i-Islami Party. These are now subject to the same doubts about authenticity 
as those concerning the nature of Kissinger’s original threat to Bhutto. A credible 
ISI source, former Director-General Asad Durrani, interviewed for this research, 
casts further doubt on their accuracy. He points out that opposition against Bhutto 
arose internally because he had mishandled issues and manipulated elections and, 
though he does not rule out the possibility of opportunistic US involvement, he 
argues that Bhutto could not have been deposed if he had held a good grip on the 
country.179 Abbas goes further and cites Rafi Raza, a close associate of Bhutto, 
who argued that the US did not threaten Bhutto. He points out that if the US had 
conspired with Zia over the coup then it is likely the General would have gone on 
to halt the nuclear programme.180 Gupta is also of the view that there is no proof 
that the US was responsible for the coup though he argued that Washington 
appeared to favour authoritarian governments in Pakistan during the Cold War as 
the best means of maintaining control over the country and containing the 
possibility of communist expansionism.181 On the evidence available, therefore, 
there is no strong, reliable indication of US orchestration of either the opposition 
or the coup itself. 
There were also widespread suspicions that America was involved in 
Bhutto’s execution. This view is represented by the Balochistan JUI Senator, 
Hafiz Hamdullah, who is of the opinion that there was a “US hidden hand” in the 
execution of Bhutto, and other Pakistani leaders who created problems for them, 
including Benazir Bhutto and General Zia.182 An alternative interpretation is that, 
whilst the US was not directly involved, their threats encouraged and cleared the 
way for the execution.183 Feuerstein rejects these ideas, however, and claims that, 
on the contrary, Carter sent two mercy pleas to General Zia to save Bhutto.184 The 
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first plea came when on 18 March 1978, the Lahore High Court found Bhutto 
guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. The court decision triggered a call 
for clemency from Carter.185 The second request from Carter came when on 2 
February 1979, the Supreme Court of Pakistan rejected Bhutto’s appeal. That 
same day, the ambassador Arthur Hummel delivered another request for 
clemency from President Carter.186  
Of the fifteen interviewees for this research who expressed an opinion on 
the matter, eleven considered the reasons for Bhutto’s execution were domestic, 
particularly his confrontation with Zia. After the coup Bhutto campaigned 
provocatively against Zia, colourfully claiming he would make shoelaces of the 
General’s distinctive moustache.187 This became a zero-sum battle in which 
Bhutto made it plain he aimed to regain power with popular support and execute 
Zia for treason.188 Zia consulted widely about Bhutto and the risks involved with 
letting him survive and concluded that if he did not kill Bhutto, then Bhutto would 
kill him.189. Roedad Khan, a Pakistani civil servant from 1949 to the end of the 
Cold War, recalls Zia telling him, “It was his neck or my neck, one of us had to 
go.”190  
There was no shortage of opportunity for Zia to relent and save face by 
heeding calls for clemency from many foreign leaders, and not just President 
Carter.191 Roedad Khan also recalls Zia actually gave an assurance to the Chinese 
that he would not hang Bhutto which the Chinese premier proudly took to Carter 
at a Washington summit. However, when the Chinese ambassador relayed his 
premier’s praise for showing great statesmanship, Zia asked, “When did I say that 
I will not hang him?”192 Bhutto and his legal team are also held partially 
accountable for the outcome by not taking the trial seriously and treating it as a 
political platform rather than making a proper defence.193. Fatemi also points out 
that the manner of the trial and execution was unwelcome to the human rights-
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oriented Carter administration, and that it contributed to Zia being ostracised by 
the US.194 Thus, this analysis reveals no firm evidence to indicate the US was 
instrumental in Bhutto’s ouster or execution and that it was more likely the result 
of the domestic dispute with Zia which Bhutto himself had escalated to deadly 
proportions to stir up popular sentiment. Nevertheless, the idea that a US “hidden 
hand” was responsible has become well established in popular discourse and is 
part of a collection conspiracy theories which blame the US and other outside 
forces for the course of events in Pakistan.  
 
2.10 Carter, Zia and a Low Point in Relations 
 The first two years of General Zia’s regime took relations with the 
US to a low point. There were three main issues which led to difficulties: the 
nuclear programme; human rights; and India. This period culminated in a mob 
attack on the US embassy in Islamabad on 29 November 1979 in which two US 
personnel were killed. 
The Carter administration was increasingly concerned about nuclear 
proliferation. US Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, notified Pakistan 
that the US was no longer concerned with the past ties between the two countries 
and that future relations would hinge upon Pakistan’s willingness to cease its 
nuclear programme.195 Moreover, under amendments to the 1961 Foreign 
Assistance Act, the Symington Amendment of 1976 and the Glen Amendment of 
1977, the US suspended military and economic aid to Pakistan. The Symington 
amendment allowed Congress to stop aid to countries trying to acquire nuclear 
weapons not subject to safeguards, while the Glen Amendment prohibited 
transfers to countries that attempted to acquire nuclear reprocessing equipment, 
materials or technology, whether or not such safeguard systems were in place.  
When Pakistan refused to cease its plan to acquire a nuclear reprocessing 
plant, the Glenn Amendment was invoked and aid was suspended in 1977. Aid 
was restored when France cancelled its nuclear agreement with Pakistan, only for 
it to be ended again in 1979 under the Symington Amendment because of 
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Pakistan’s building of a uranium enrichment facility.196 Undeterred, Zia continued 
the nuclear programme because it was popular in the country and had become tied 
up with Pakistani nationalism. As Khan stated: “For the average Pakistani, nuclear 
development became a sacred national duty, and those who opposed it were 
looked upon as enemies of the national cause.”197 Zia dismissed Carter’s non-
proliferation policy as a “noble cause” but hypocritical in its implementation 
because of the way it affected Pakistan in contrast to a more tolerant attitude to 
Brazil, South Africa and India.198 In response, Pakistan withdrew from CENTO in 
March, 1979 saying, “…. in the light of these new realities, the alliance had lost 
its relevance to Pakistan’s security concerns.”199 On 14 August 1979, the US 
Ambassador was summoned to be informed of Pakistan’s, “…serious concern 
over the escalation of the campaign of threats and intimidation in regard to 
Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear program.”200  
 At the beginning of Zia’s time in office, Carter’s human rights policy 
did not seem to be a threat to his position. There was no obvious shift to a more 
repressive policy. After all, his predecessor, Bhutto, had jailed thousands of 
political opponents, whom he described as troublemakers, without the due process 
of law. Indeed, Zia, on assuming power, ordered most of these political prisoners 
to be released and allowed political parties to operate (with the single exception of 
Bhutto’s party, the PPP).201 Moreover, Zia, during the initial phase of his rule, did 
not subdue civil institutions under military admiration but merged the civil 
machinery of the state with the military administration. In this way, he gave the 
impression to Carter’s administration that he was gradually moving his country 
towards democracy.  
 Some American officials still judged the military regime as a 
negation of a democracy,202 but the steps taken by Zia in 1977-78, which included 
the promise of democratic elections pacified most US critics. However, the US 
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started taking the issue of human rights in Pakistan seriously in the weeks 
preceding Bhutto’s conviction for the murder of Nawab Ahmed Khan, when the 
military authorities arrested hundreds of Bhutto’s political supporters and 
sympathisers. When Bhutto was hanged on 4 April 1979, Carter’s administration 
condemned Zia and his supporters as flagrant violators of human rights.203. Zia 
appeared to pay little regard to this and further irritated the US by dissolving all 
political parties, banning all political activities, arresting a number of politicians 
and indefinitely postponing the long awaited elections which he himself had 
previously said would be held in November 1979. Zia also gave his military 
courts precedence over the civilian courts. This turn of events in Pakistan gravely 
damaged the Pakistan-US relationship.204  
 India was another factor that damaged relations with the US. 
Washington had recognised India as the dominant power in South Asia when 
Bangladesh separated from Pakistan after the Pakistan-India War in 1971 and, 
under Carter, US officials became more active in emphasizing the hegemonic role 
of India in the region. As Hussain explains, this was guided by the Brezezinski 
Doctrine of “regional influentials” in which US interests in the Third World were 
linked to states perceived as influential in a region by virtue of their size, strategic 
location, aspirations and economic resources. India fell into this category in South 
Asia in the same way that Indonesia and Egypt did for South-East Asia and the 
Middle East respectively.205 US Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
said in Delhi in July 1977 that the US expected India to play a “leading role in the 
region of South Asia.”206 Pakistan took that statement as convincing proof that the 
US had left Pakistan to the wolves. This perception was further aggravated when 
Carter paid official visits to India and Iran and ignored Pakistan.  
 Relations were further damaged in November 1979 when an angry 
mob attacked and set fire to the US embassy in Islamabad in the mistaken belief 
that the US was indirectly involved in the Islamist attack on the Great Mosque in 
Mecca.207 As a result of the attack, two US officials and four Pakistani staff 
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members died.208 Another 40 people were trapped inside the burning building and 
were nearly burnt to death.209 Zia’s administration was accused by Washington of 
leaving the embassy unprotected and then failing to safeguard the lives of US 
citizens.  The US even argued that the attack had been supported by the Zia 
regime. There is some evidence to back up America’s accusations. For example, 
General Akhtar, head of the ISI, arrived at the scene but chose to do nothing. 
Pakistani troops were present in the area, but took no action against the mob.210 
Several embassy officials were trapped in the burning building but it is said that it 
took hours for the Pakistan army to reach the scene, despite the fact that Zia’s 
residence and military headquarters were not very far from the embassy.211 In 
response, Carter ordered the postponement of all future investment in Pakistan 
and called for an overall reduction in the size of US commitments there.212 Within 
a few weeks, however, circumstances changed dramatically with the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and Carter was obliged to swiftly put 
his human rights and non-proliferation concerns on hold and revert to the 
opportunistic courting of Pakistan of his predecessors. Containment of the Soviet 
Union had to take precedence over human rights violations in Pakistan. 
 
2.11 Strategic Outcomes for the US and Pakistan  
 The diverging strategic aims that underlay the relationship from the 
start now began to draw the two allies in different strategic directions as soon as 
opportunity and necessity arose. Opportunity arose for the US when Nehru 
appealed for international help in his border dispute with China. India was always 
the US first choice of regional partner so little time was lost in coming to the 
rescue with aid and arms to deter what was being billed as Chinese communist 
expansion. Up until then, Kennedy had been able to gloss over the implications of 
his pro-India policy, but once he started to arm India he was no longer able to 
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placate Pakistan’s doubts about his constancy. His refusal to prejudice his new 
Indian relationship with conditions over Kashmir deepened the insecurity of his 
older ally. Thus the necessity arose for Pakistan to resume its search for 
alternative strategic partners in the direction of China. This in turn made the US 
doubt Pakistan’s constancy to which it responded with a mixture of persuasion, 
warnings, sanctions and assurances, none of which changed Pakistan’s subsequent 
behaviour. Thus this period saw mutual disappointments and frustrations as each 
party followed different paths from co-operation to confrontation.   
 In terms of Cold War strategy, this period of the relationship had 
been of mixed benefit to the US. It had been successful in containing territorial 
expansion in the region by the USSR but had lost some regional influence itself. 
Relations with India had been strengthened in 1962 but Nixon’s pro-Pakistan and 
pro-Chinese policies encouraged Indira Gandhi’s Soviet leanings to allow the 
USSR more influence there, though she maintained nominal non-alignment. 
China was now well established as an alternative arms supplier and economic 
developer to Pakistan but this had also created a channel for the US to capitalise 
on the Sino-Soviet split, to improve its own relations with China and to find a way 
out of the Vietnam debacle. The resultant easing of Cold War tensions had 
enabled détente to occur rendering Pakistan of less strategic value to the US. 
 Reduced Cold War imperatives made it possible for Carter to 
indulge in new liberal strategies focussed on non-proliferation and human rights, 
in relation to which Pakistan became a problem rather than an asset. India’s 1974 
nuclear test signalled the acceleration of a reciprocal Pakistani programme with 
the added complication of links to the Arab states and their confrontation with 
Israel. Despite pressure and severe sanctions, Washington could not restrain 
Pakistan and was unable to control nuclear proliferation in the region. Association 
with Pakistan also became an embarrassment over General Zia’s coup and 
repressions but Carter was unable to use aid as a carrot to encourage 
democratisation, because his own democratic processes in the form of 
Congressional opposition prevented it, so was left with little influence over that 
issue either. Thus, this period highlighted the limits of US power and influence 
over Pakistan. 
 The consequences of this phase of the relationship for Pakistan were 
mostly negative. The US had shown its eagerness to support India and Ayub had 
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been unable to use the alliance to make diplomatic or military headway on 
Kashmir, resulting in his fall from power. This demonstrated that the US alliance 
only amounted to American even-handedness in Indo-Pakistan disputes, which 
disproportionately weakened Pakistan. Worse came with the loss of East Pakistan 
which neither the US nor China were willing to save, though the security of West 
Pakistan was protected by the US. The regional security balance tipped 
dramatically in India’s favour with its nuclear test which Bhutto, followed by Zia, 
determined to match in direct confrontation with the US. Thus, the US aid which 
had continued, with breaks in 1965 and 1971, was suspended in 1979. By then, 
however, Pakistan was less isolated from the rest of the world community with 
improved relations and backing, not just from China, but also from Arab States 
which would finance the nuclear project. With the exception of China, though, 
these states did not share Pakistan’s strategic aims in the regional struggle with 
India. 
 US decisions not to intervene to help Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute 
were one of the main disappointments in this period for Islamabad. In contrast, for 
example, the USSR had twice cast its UN veto in favour of India. This raises the 
question as to whether the US could or ought to have done more. Former 
Pakistani Ambassador Sarwar Naqvi points out that, throughout the 1950s, the US 
was very active in trying to find a solution through the UN and its special 
representatives. The outcome was a UN resolution requiring a plebiscite for 
Kashmiris to decide their own future, to which India would not agree, and for a 
withdrawal of forces, which both sides failed to comply with, leading to 
stalemate.213 A common interpretation as to why the US did not do more is that it 
did not want to upset India and, more to the point, had no leverage there.214 But 
whilst this may have been true later it was not the case in 1962 when Nehru was 
pleading for Western support. After that, however, US leverage in both countries 
diminished and it could not twist either the Indian arm or the Pakistani arm.215  
 This suggests Kennedy’s failure to negotiate conditions for Nehru’s 
support may have been a missed opportunity to encourage India to move towards 
what was, after all, the UN position. Talbot’s view that requiring conditions in 
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return for aid would have increased Soviet penetration in India (quoted above) is 
unconvincing since that option was already open to Nehru who, nonetheless, was 
asking for Western help. Progress on Kashmir at this stage could have forestalled 
Ayub’s 1965 war and may have avoided the cracks in the relationship opening in 
the way that followed. Brigadier Gul makes a case for also suggesting that 
Pakistan’s Chinese partnership, which followed, may have made it less likely that 
the US would help. Had Pakistan been allowed to have Kashmir, China would 
have had strategic access through Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. Thus it was, and 
still is, not in US interests to let Kashmir become part of Pakistan.216  
 
2.12 Implications for the Relationship 
 The history of this period clearly demonstrates the fractured 
foundations upon which the relationship was formed and represents a playing out 
of the consequences of diverging interests. Washington’s global containment 
strategy did not anchor it exclusively to Islamabad and it embraced Pakistan’s 
regional friends and foes alike in the form of China and India respectively. In 
response, Pakistan demonstrated its regional security was not anchored 
exclusively to the US and embraced not just China but the anti-Israel Arab states 
and, more significantly, a resolve to get independent nuclear weapons. In part, 
both parties were revisiting their pre-alliance positions: Truman’s reluctance to 
get involved in Indo-Pakistani conflicts; Eisenhower’s first choice of India; and 
Jinnah’s vision of Islamic unity coupled with the unfinished business of partition. 
The nuclear issue only served to emphasise Pakistan’s preoccupation with India. 
 Wilful blindness was also a prominent feature of this period. The 
implication of earlier US wilful blindness over Kashmir became apparent when 
Washington was unable to prevent Ayub’s failed 1965 campaign and ended up 
handing the advantage to the enemy of its ally. This did not stop the US 
continuing to indulge in this tactic. Kennedy’s bland assurances to Ayub and his 
assumption that he could arm his new friend, India, without unmanageably 
provoking Pakistan fall into this category. He acted as though blind to the fact that 
these moves would inflame Pakistan’s insecurity and further escalate the regional 
arms race, and he was powerless to honour US assurances about thwarting the 
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misuse of American weapons. Following on, Nixon combined opportunism and 
wilful blindness by indulging Yahya’s repressions in East Pakistan to facilitate 
détente with China, only to see both East Pakistan and Yahya fall once the 
moment of opportunity had passed. Carter’s switch to human rights and rejection 
of Pakistan served to amplify the opportunism and wilful blindness that had 
preceded it. 
 This period also set the transactional pattern for the relationship, the 
main feature of which was disappointment leading to lack of trust on both sides. 
Whether Pakistan indulged in wilful blindness over its US alliances or not it was 
deeply disappointed that its ally aided and abetted India, failed to help resolve 
Kashmir, and allowed the loss of East Pakistan. It was also angered over the 
hypocrisy of non-proliferation which appeared to give a blind eye to India, and 
other countries, whilst threatening and punishing Pakistan. Pakistan’s switch to 
China, the Arabs and the bomb then angered the US which was also frustrated by 
what it saw as impulsive and ill-judged aggression against India. Past 
disappointments then created a mutual expectation of future disappointment and 
declining trust. This was reflected in the threats and sanctions applied to Pakistan, 
though there is no evidence that this extended to direct interference in the fall or 
death of Bhutto.   
 Another feature of the relationship up to 1979 was the fluctuation of 
US policies towards Pakistan and India. This emerging pattern suggests that 
Democrat administrations were less favourable to Pakistan, and tended to be pro-
India, while Republican administrations were more favourable to Pakistan. India 
was the favoured choice of Truman (Democrat) who had also been reluctant to 
partner Pakistan despite Nehru’s rejection. Eisenhower (Republican) went on to 
make Pakistan his closest non-NATO ally, but Kennedy (Democrat) had then 
tilted to India, setting off a chain of mutual disappointments with Pakistan. Nixon 
(Republican) had opportunistically supported Pakistan, nudging India back to 
closer ties with the USSR, but Carter (Democrat) had then condemned Pakistan 
over human rights and nuclear proliferation. Whilst there may be multiple 
explanations for these fluctuations beyond simple party preferences, including the 
impact of events, opportunities and threats, the basic pattern was visible, and 
General Zia would use it to his advantage when turmoil in neighbouring 
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Afghanistan brought the USSR to his country’s borders and the US back to his 
office door.      
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CHAPTER 3: AFGHANISTAN: COLD WAR PARTNERS 
                         AGAIN, 1979-1989 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Just when Pakistan had become more of a problem than an asset to the 
Carter administration, events in the Middle East and Central Asia were to make 
her a key strategic ally of the US once again. These events were the Iranian 
Islamic Revolution in February 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979. However, the process of rebuilding the relationship would not be 
straight-forward and it would not proceed smoothly once the two sides were 
working together again against the Soviet Union.  
 This chapter explores the Soviet invasion and the change of direction of 
the US in Cold War strategy and in Washington’s attitude to Pakistan. It contrasts 
Carter’s approach in the remaining year of his Presidency with Reagan’s single-
minded confrontation of the USSR and looks at how General Zia approached each 
to get the best deal. The argument here is that he had learnt from Pakistan’s 
previous experience and took the initiative in using his reverse influence to 
negotiate with the US more effectively than before. The chapter reviews national 
interests and argues that, despite joint action, this was not a period when strategic 
aims converged and that co-operation was only possible because of substantial 
wilful blindness, particularly over nuclear proliferation. The process of that wilful 
blindness and its consequences are explored in some detail in this chapter. The 
evolution of the Mujahidin is also briefly examined to establish the extent to 
which the US or Zia had control over it. The process of ending the conflict in 
Afghanistan with the Geneva Accord is used to show how diverging interests 
would start to pull the two sides apart again. The chapter ends with a survey of the 
strategic consequences of this period of the relationship and a conclusion about its 
legacy. 
 
3.2 Afghanistan 
Before the Iranian Revolution, US policy in the Middle East rested on the 
idea that, if properly armed, the “twin pillars” of Iran and Saudi Arabia would be 
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able to safeguard Western interests in the region. This coincided with the Shah’s 
aim to make Iran the dominant regional power, which resulted in the US 
transferring arms in massive quantities to his regime. The Shah was regarded by 
them as the “policeman” of the Gulf who could keep the area free of communist 
influence and maintain navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, while Saudi 
Arabia also played a lesser role in this strategy.1 The Islamic Revolution which 
ousted the Shah was vehemently anti-American in nature and undermined 
America’s position in the region. Instead of Iran being an ally, it became a threat 
to US interests and to pro-Western states in the oil-rich Gulf region. 
 On the heels of the Islamic Revolution came the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan which jolted Carter’s complacency about Soviet foreign policy goals 
and signified a sharp shift away from détente and back to confrontation in the 
Cold War. Afghanistan had been nominally non-aligned but a coup in 1978 
brought in a Marxist regime under Nur Mohammed Taraki with a radical 
programme of land reform and a campaign against Islam which led to violent 
popular pro-Muslim reaction and increasing instability. By March 1979 there was 
armed revolt in Herat with up to 3,000 deaths, including some forty Soviet 
citizens. A power struggle emerged between Taraki and his more radical rival, 
Hafuzullah Amin, and the regime’s continued existence came under threat.2 On 
the night of 24/25 December 1979, Soviet planes landed in Kabul and two days 
later about 1,000 Red Army troops took the Presidential Palace and executed 
Amin and his family. A former leader of the governing party, Babrak Karmal, was 
installed by the Soviets and their invasion force was enlarged to 70,000, rising to 
over 100,000 by the mid-1980s.3  
The USSR presented the invasion as a lawful response to an invitation 
from the legitimate Afghan government to restore order resulting from external 
destabilisation, and it was described as “neighbourly assistance” to help the 
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regime ward off external aggression and to block anti-Soviet penetration on its 
southern border.4  
However, it was interpreted very differently in the West. The Carter 
Administration saw it as aggressive, ideological and an example of territorial 
expansion by the Soviet Union. US apprehensions were influenced by communist 
encroachment elsewhere in the world – Ethiopia, South Yemen, Nicaragua and El 
Salvador; amplified by a new hostility in the shape of the Islamic regime in 
Tehran.5 In addition to being yet another serious challenge to US interests in this 
region, Carter framed the invasion as a wider threat to the strategic balance and 
stability of the entire world.6 The US President outlined the ominous geo-political 
implications in his State of the Union address of 23 January 1980. The USSR was 
in striking distance of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf; Pakistan and Iran had 
become more vulnerable to Soviet intimidation; and, “if that intimidation were to 
prove effective, the Soviet Union might well control an area of vital strategic and 
economic significance to the survival of Western Europe, the Far East and 
ultimately the US.”7  
 This reflected the theory that the expansionist drive of Russia, now the 
USSR, was partly a result of its long-term desire for warm water ports, which 
would give it effective control over maritime activity and resources in the region. 
This theory was rejected by some on the grounds that it was no longer likely to be 
critical for the technically advanced USSR8 or that, if still valid, the USSR would 
have turned their attention to Iran since Afghanistan is the gateway to the sub-
continent rather than the Gulf.9 Gibson argues, however, that from Afghanistan 
the USSR could have annexed the neighbouring and restive province of 
Balochistan with access to over half the Pakistani shoreline and the deep water 
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port of Gwadar.10 Either way, the idea was influential since the Western and 
Japanese economies were heavily dependent on the region’s oil reserves and 
supply routes. At that time the US got 33 percent, Western Europe 66 percent and 
Japan 75 percent of their oil from there.11 As a result, the USSR was now within 
350 miles of their collective jugular vein in the Persian Gulf.12 Pakistan’s Foreign 
Minister, Shahi, saw it in an even more dramatic way - Soviet control of these sea 
lanes could collapse the will of industrialised countries, break up the Western 
alliance and isolate the US.13  
However, while the US feared the worst, the evidence shows that the 
Soviet Politburo’s intentions were limited to stabilising Afghanistan as a 
defensive measure against Pakistani and US expansion. They believed 
Afghanistan was being destabilised  by Pakistan, which Ahmed and Rais confirm 
was true as discussed later in this chapter, and that the US was intent on 
entrenching itself closer to the Soviet border now it had lost bases in Iran.14 When 
Taraki asked for help during the March 1979 crisis, the initial response of the 
Soviet politburo had been to avoid direct intervention, so they just gave him 
limited military aid. It was only in September, when Taraki was executed by 
Amin after a failed assassination attempt, that fears began to grow that Amin 
might turn to the US for assistance. Removing Amin appeared to be the only way 
to bring the situation under Soviet control and it was at this point the invasion was 
planned, though the final decision was not taken until 12 December.15 
 For Carter, though, coming on top of the Iranian hostage crisis, the 
invasion put him under increased domestic pressure from anti-détente critics who 
attacked him for being soft on communism. As a result, with an election looming, 
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he felt he had to show that he could stand up to the USSR.16 It was also felt that 
inaction would only encourage Soviet aggression elsewhere.17 As a result, 
Washington shelved its policy of détente in favour of the much more robust Carter 
Doctrine of 23 January 1980 which declared that: 
An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be 
regarded as an assault on the vital interest of the United States of America, and such an 
assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.18  
 
This new policy included strengthening naval forces in the Indian Ocean 
and a willingness to work with countries in the region, which would bring the US 
back into strategic partnership with Pakistan.19  
 Carter did not wait long to call Zia. The day after the Soviet invasion, he 
phoned the General to offer backing to Pakistan and proposed to reaffirm the 1959 
US-Pakistan Bilateral Agreement in which the US pledged support against Soviet 
aggression. The speed at which the invasion changed American attitudes towards 
Zia and Pakistan, from violators of human rights to front line state in the struggle 
against Soviet expansion, was remarkable.20 Foreign Minister Shahi thought that 
Pakistan’s immediate reaction to the invasion, calling for an immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops, was important in transforming the 
Carter administration’s attitude.21 Zia’s Chief of Staff, General Khalid Mahmud 
Arif was more cynical and suggestive of opportunism, observing that, “the arch 
critics of the autocratic military ruler of Pakistan began to woo him. They 
suddenly discovered Zia’s hitherto unknown ‘sterling qualities’ and the special 
importance of Pakistan in the changed circumstances.”22 Schaffer and Schaffer 
also point to the fact that Carter took the initiative in making the urgent call to Zia 
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as an indication that the US needed Pakistan at that time more than Pakistan 
needed the US.23  
 Zia was, however, characteristically cautious. Previous experience of US 
alliances suggested there were risks in tying Pakistan closely to the US, which 
could include provoking some kind of Soviet retribution. Initially, Zia deflected 
Carter’s proposal and bought time by suggesting instead that his Foreign Minister 
should visit Washington to discuss the crisis in early January 1980.24 In the 
meantime, he consulted with senior military and civilian advisors. Foreign 
Minister Shahi drew up three strategic options for dealing with the Soviet action - 
to accept it; to defy it directly; or to defy it indirectly.25 Neither of the first two 
options was acceptable. The first set a precedent for tacit approval of regional 
intervention by the USSR or India. The second was impracticable because of the 
disparity in military power between Pakistan and the USSR. Shahi explained that 
the third option was selected because, “the only hope of withdrawal of Soviet 
forces lay in mobilising the force of international public opinion and concerting 
political and diplomatic pressure against the Soviet military intervention.”26 
However, General Arif interpreted the third option very differently, arguing that 
Pakistan should give “… overt political, diplomatic, and humanitarian support to 
the refugees with covert assistance to the Mujahidin”27, which was just how 
events would later unfold. 
 In the context of this research it is important to understand Pakistan’s 
reasons for choosing this option in order to gauge how far its interests coincided 
with those of the US. Evidence from interviewees indicated a range of 
perspectives and differing opinions. On one side of the argument, Senator Hafiz 
Hamdullah concluded that Pakistan should have remained neutral and claimed 
that Zia took the decision only on the advice of the US.28 On the other side, the 
religious scholar and former advisor to Zia, Maulana Khilji, was clear that the 
General “used the US to save Pakistan from inevitable Soviet domination”, and 
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that the conflict had been “a war for Islam and [the] borders of Pakistan against 
the invasion of USSR.” He likened US-Pakistan relations at that time to “two 
brothers.”29 Most interviewees did, indeed, consider that the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan was a genuine threat to Pakistan’s security but for a more complex 
set of reasons. Roedad Khan recalled:  
The Red Army was in Jalalabad, breathing down our neck. … The people, media and 
everyone in Pakistan was against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. I attended a 
conference in GHQ [General Headquarters] and they were all saying that their 
destination was not Jalalabad but the warm water ports of Pakistan.30  
 
 Brigadiers Gul and Noor and Colonel Hanif confirmed that if the Soviet 
Army remained unchecked they expected Moscow to use Afghanistan as a 
launching pad for an invasion of Balochistan, and also perhaps Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa.31 Noor also referred to a dramatic petition sent by the Afghan 
Mujahidin to Zia: 
We have previously warned you that Kabul would be on fire but you didn’t listen to us 
and didn’t provide us help. As a result, today Kabul is on fire and now again we are 
giving this warning that if at this stage you would [not] help us then [the] fire in 
Afghanistan will also enter Pakistan.32  
 
 Ambassador Fatemi pointed out that this view of an aggressive USSR was 
also strongly promoted by the US (as well as the British and some Arab states) to 
put pressure on General Zia who was “desperate to be accepted by the 
international community.”33 However, journalists Ashraf Malkham and Shaukat 
Piracha were more sceptical about the prospect of the Soviet Union attacking 
Pakistan. They argued that Zia’s “prime interest was … how he should benefit 
from the situation to legitimise his rule.”34  
 In addition to legitimacy, Zia needed money to stay in power. The 
unifying effects of an imminent threat and US funds could deliver both, and on 
this basis the Pakistani people were given the message that the USSR would 
continue to expand if not stopped in Afghanistan.35 Roedad Khan conceded that, 
“people were scare[d] to death. General Zia did have popular support and he took 
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full advantage of that.”36 The political scientist, Zafar Jaspal, acknowledged the 
potential threat of the Soviet occupation, but agreed the leadership had also tried 
to exploit the conflict for its own vested interests.37  
 Beyond these issues, there were also key strategic concerns about 
Afghanistan which related to the integrity of Pakistan’s border areas and to the old 
enemy India. Firstly, there had been running disputes between the two countries 
over the Pashtunistan question (see the introduction), so Islamabad needed a co-
operative regime in Kabul to neutralise this threat but, as Ambassador Naqvi 
pointed out, the USSR had consistently opposed Pakistan’s position on this.38 The 
second concern, emphasised by several interviewees, was the potential “strategic 
depth” which Afghanistan provided for the Pakistani army in the event of conflict 
with India. Afghanistan could provide Pakistan with “strategic depth” in two key 
ways: it offered a military refuge free from Indian assault, and the possibility of a 
secure second front which would allow the military to deploy all its limited 
resources against India. Lt. General Durrani explained that this had already been 
used in the 1965 and 1971 wars with India when the Afghan government assured 
Ayub and Yahya they could safely divert troops from their Western border to 
fight against India in the East.39 The political scientist, Rasool Rais, added it was 
also important that “Afghanistan should not be used by India, by Baloch 
nationalists, insurgents….. or any state or non-state actors against Pakistan.”40 The 
scope for Indian interference was all the greater because of its close relationship 
with the USSR. Thus, an independent and sympathetic Afghanistan was critical to 
Pakistan’s security against India.  
 There was also an ideological perspective. Naqvi, Hanif and former 
Minister of State at the Foreign Office, Nawabzada Khan, all cited Muslim 
antipathy to communism as a reason for opposing the USSR.41 Equally important, 
however, was the prospect of economic and military aid to strengthen the army 
and consolidate the Zia regime in power.42 The main target of the military build-
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up was, as ever, India. As the political scientist Ishtiaq Ahmed explained, “It was 
all about money more than anything else. It was not [an] ideological relationship 
…we were India centric.”43  
 The interests of Zia and the US overlapped in opposing the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan. They both wanted to prevent the USSR from further 
expansion and to see it withdraw from Afghanistan. Beyond these two basic aims, 
however, their goals began to diverge. The US aim was to maintain its position in 
the Cold War and, specifically, to protect Western capitalist economies from the 
communist threat. Zia’s aims, on the other hand, were to defend his regime and 
borders, to protect Islam and to prevent India seizing any strategic advantage from 
the crisis. The US saw the USSR as its main enemy, while Pakistan still saw India 
in that role. Whilst the immediate target of both sides was the Soviet Union, their 
reasons for acting differed. 
 
3.3 Carter and Zia: Peanuts 
From Washington’s perspective Pakistan’s location once again became 
important in America’s containment of the Soviet Union. Echoing phrases from 
the 1950s, Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brezezinski, observed, 
“Pakistan on account of its unique geo-strategic location is the key stone of the 
President’s Doctrine for the defence of Middle East and the South Asian Region. 
Pakistan acts as a pivot between the states of the Indian subcontinent and the oil 
rich West Asian states.”44 In particular, it was possible to monitor the Persian Gulf 
and the Straits of Hormuz from its 460 miles of coastline.45 With this in mind, the 
US started building a Rapid Defence Force (RDF) to protect oil supply routes. To 
make this force effective, facilities were to be kept in Oman, Kenya, Somalia and 
Diego Garcia, and Pakistan was also in a position to play an important RDF role if 
required. Robert Komer, US Under-Secretary of Defence, in his testimony to 
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Congress in February 1980 outlined his country’s reliance on Pakistan and other 
regional countries:   
The United States would be hard pressed to defend its interests in the [Indian Ocean and 
Persian Gulf] region if regional forces are not able or inclined to participate in their 
defences. Accordingly, we would hope to have a direct military support from regional 
states which are at risk.46  
 
 This also demonstrated the importance of the theory of the Soviet Union 
always seeking warm water ports to US strategy. It was vital that Pakistan did not 
become a client of, or allied to, the USSR because all those strategic advantages 
could be turned against the West. As Khan observed, “the fact that Pakistan has 
been propelled to the forefront of superpower politics is because of its 
geographical location. Pakistan is the backyard to the Gulf and cannot remain 
indifferent to the changes that take place there.”47  
 However, other important geographical and political features stemmed 
from General Arif’s third option of providing overt support for refugees from 
Afghanistan and covert assistance for the Mujahidin, tactics which the US also 
intended to use to undermine the Soviet occupation. Pakistan, rather than Iran, 
was the natural geographical and communal destination for Afghan refugees 
because most of them were Pashtuns and shared an ethnic identity with the 
Pashtuns living in the border regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. At 
the same time, since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Pakistan was the only route 
through which the US could channel material support to the Afghan Mujahidin, as 
a US Congressional Research Study highlighted: 
US options for influencing events in Afghanistan are limited to providing direct or 
indirect assistance to Afghan guerrilla forces and refugees, and supporting the 
government of President Zia-ul-Haq in neighbouring Pakistan. In both cases, the options 
would appear to require working through the Government of Pakistan, since that country 
is the only haven of the Afghan resurgents to which the US has access. Opposition forces 
operate from within both Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier provinces of Pakistan. 
It seems unlikely that the United States could channel any aid through Iran.48  
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Unlike his predecessors of the 1950s, however, Zia did not have to 
persuade Washington of this fact and, in fact, he found himself in a very good 
bargaining position.   
 Foreign Minister Agha Shahi met Carter, Vance and Brzezinski in 
Washington on 12 January 1980 and presented them with a list of military 
equipment wanted by Pakistan worth billions of dollars. The US response was 
modest - $400 million in aid over two years, divided equally between the military 
and the economic sector assistance. Shahi also requested an upgrading of the 1959 
Mutual Defence treaty because his government wanted a more credible guarantee 
from the US that it would help if its territorial integrity were threatened. President 
Carter rejected this and offered instead to reaffirm the 1959 Agreement of Co-
operation. This was not enough for Pakistan, in large part because that agreement 
had never been ratified by the US Congress. One of the reasons given for the US 
failure to help Pakistan in its 1971 war with India was the absence of 
Congressional ratification, so Islamabad now wanted the assurance of a treaty 
which had been formally ratified by Congress.49 This was perhaps the most 
important point of disagreement between the two parties. When the talks ended 
without any agreement, General Zia expressed his disappointment and taunted 
President Carter by describing his offer as “peanuts”, in a reference to his peanut-
farming ancestry.50 
 Zia believed the US offer of military aid was not proportionate to the size 
of the threat facing Pakistan at that time.51 The General concluded that the aid was 
insufficient to ensure Pakistan’s security, but sufficient to alienate the Soviet 
Union - a superpower which now had its military on Pakistan’s border.52 
Washington sought to quell Pakistan’s disquiet, and a US State Department 
spokesman commented that the “the $400 million figure is seen in Washington as 
only part of a larger package also involving nations friendly to Pakistan.”53 This 
was insufficient for Islamabad, however, which wanted military aid from the US 
comparable to that given to Turkey and Egypt. Such aid was felt to be a more 
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effective deterrence against the Soviet Union, but also a more effective lever 
against India. 
 These demands were rejected by President Carter, although he was caught 
in a dilemma. Firstly, there was India. Improving relations with India had been 
high on the list of foreign policy priorities from the start of his presidency and this 
would be prejudiced by supplying Pakistan with significant levels of military aid. 
India was already critical of the limited offer he had made to Pakistan and the US 
Ambassador to India, Robert Goheen, was concerned that it could imperil Indo-
US relations which were just being stabilised after many years of acrimony and 
suspicion. Nayar claims that Goheen’s concerns were influential in dampening US 
enthusiasm for arming Pakistan.54 The second restraint on Carter was the issue of 
nuclear proliferation which had become a key element of his foreign policy. The 
desire to prevent Pakistan acquiring an independent nuclear capability was the 
reason for the Symington Amendment and the cancellation of US economic and 
military assistance. Although Carter had already offered to resume some 
assistance, to go back on this to a greater extent, would undermine the policy and 
affect the credibility of the US to impose it elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, 
Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, had hinted there might be some 
leeway here: “We will not put aside the nuclear issue with Pakistan because it is a 
basic principle of this administration, but it is only one of several foreign policy 
issues.”55 A leading Senator, Charles Percy, had also suggested that “the US 
should make an exception to its nuclear policy and accept Pakistani assurances 
that it would not manufacture a nuclear weapon.”56  
 Nayar argues that the third reason for Carter’s caution was the spectre of 
events in Iran. Washington did not want another Shah of Iran on its hands and 
Zia’s unpopular dictatorship gave the impression to the Americans that his regime 
could easily go the same way. American public opinion was also still heavily 
influenced against Zia because of his inaction, or even connivance, in the fatal 
mob attack on the US embassy a few weeks earlier.57 Notwithstanding these 
problems, General Zia was well aware of the strength of his bargaining position. 
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He believed he could get substantial military and economic aid without having to 
compromise his regime or his nuclear programme.  
 Zia knew that the prospect of any compromise between Moscow and 
Islamabad over Afghanistan would cause considerable concern in Washington. 
Therefore, he decided to manipulate his position to his own advantage. Within 
twenty four hours of declaring Carter’s offer as “peanuts”, Zia announced plans to 
hold talks with Moscow. He expressed desire for greater harmony and 
understanding with his neighbour, the Soviet Union.58 He said, “in the absence of 
active participation by the US, Pakistan may have to adapt itself to a new reality. 
After all, if you lived in the sea, you had to learn to swim with the whales.”59 Zia 
got the response from Washington that he wanted. A high-level delegation, 
including the National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and the US Deputy 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, was sent to Pakistan in February 1980.60  
 The US delegation tried to convince Zia that the proposed package to 
Pakistan was just a start and it would be increased over time because other 
countries were also committed to making their contribution.61 They further 
assured him that the Pakistan-US alliance would not be affected by Washington’s 
relationship with India. The US said it would never succumb to India pressure and 
abandon Pakistan. Nevertheless, General Zia wanted reassurance that aid would 
not be linked to Pakistan’s internal politics or its nuclear programme. 
Furthermore, he also insisted that Pakistan should not be required to make 
assurances that any military aid would not be used against India, and wanted the 
US security guarantees to cover not only acts of Soviet aggression but any attack 
on Pakistan territorial integrity.62 Clearly Zia had India in mind once again here. 
Washington was unwilling to accede to General Zia’s requests. Brzezinski 
indicated that US aid would rise over time, but not to the levels requested by the 
Pakistan leader. There was no agreement on the other areas raised by General Zia 
either. There was, however, a reiteration of America’s assurance to help defend 
Pakistan if Soviet forces threatened its security,63 and a joint statement was made 
declaring that the Soviet intervention and aggression against Muslims in 
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Afghanistan violated international covenants and represented a serious threat to 
Pakistan.64  
 Even with the Soviet Union in occupation of Afghanistan and threatening 
Pakistan’s borders and Western oil, no comprehensive agreement between the two 
sides proved possible. This raises the question of why this was so. On the US side, 
there were two possible explanations. First, as stated earlier, there were 
considerable constraints on President Carter limiting his possible course of action. 
Second, there may have been a desire on the part of the US to call General Zia’s 
bluff regarding his supposed accommodation with the USSR. After all, a similar 
tactic had been used before by Liaquat in 1949. However, reflections by 
participants at the talks give no indication that this latter factor was relevant. 
Thomas Thornton, a member of the US delegation, believed that both sides had 
misjudged the situation badly.  “The Americans overestimated the extent to which 
Pakistan had rethought its role following the Soviet attack; the Pakistanis erred in 
believing that the American offer could be bargained upward.”65 This indicates 
that the US expected Pakistan to be willing to shift its policy aims in line with 
America’s and essentially accept its “take it or leave it” terms. Thornton 
reinforces this view of US inflexibility with the observation that, “the basis for a 
deal was lacking, and since the Americans had made their offer as a package, it 
fell as a package.”66  
 From the Pakistan perspective, General Zia believed he could play the 
long game because he expected Carter to lose the upcoming presidential election. 
He believed that a more right-wing Republican President would be more 
amenable to providing aid. General Arif also believed that the US misjudged 
Pakistan’s willingness to stand firm. The US thought that “Soviet pressure on 
Pakistan, and her security compulsions in the face of her economic difficulties, 
would compel her to backtrack and agree to a bilateral relationship with the 
United States, more or less on US terms.”67 
 Thus, it appears that neither side had much intention of giving ground to 
the other. Underlying this intransigence was the running problem of misaligned 
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strategic aims. US Assistant Secretary of Defence, David McGiffer, of the US 
delegation, noted that Pakistan was more focussed on India than the USSR. “It 
was perfectly clear that their [Pakistan’s] orientation as far as equipment was 
concerned was what would be useful on the Indian border. They were not 
interested in the sort of thing we thought they needed to secure the Afghan 
border.”68 This shows that, at this time, neither side had altered its primary 
security priorities in relation to the new situation in the region. Carter’s policy was 
still determined by the regional factors which impacted on the global struggle of 
the Cold War, whilst Zia remained primarily focussed on India as the existential 
threat. 
 There was, however, more scope for common ground over the issue of 
refugees. The US accepted that the influx from Afghanistan put a big burden on 
the weak Pakistani economy and that this should be shared by the international 
community. US Assistant Secretary of State, Harold Saunder, acknowledged the 
problem and went further in commending Pakistan for “its humanitarian action 
over the past many months in providing food, clothing and shelter to these Afghan 
refugees.”69 He urged the UNHCR to implement a relief programme to which his 
government would contribute additional funds.70 Accordingly, the US contributed 
$190,000 to the UN emergency programme set up for that purpose. Zia continued 
to welcome the refugees to his country and, in so doing, improved his own 
reputation with the US and the wider world.  
 US opinion was naturally sympathetic to refugees as victims of Soviet 
aggression and US politicians visited the refugee camps for media opportunities 
and to see their plight for themselves, which helped soften attitudes in America 
towards Zia and his regime. The General also framed his refugee policy in moral 
terms, as one of Muslim solidarity. He said there was no limit to the sacrifices his 
nation would make for them:  
Pakistan was carved out from the Indian sub-continent as a homeland for the Muslims so 
we feel that Pakistan must be the home of any Muslin anywhere in this world. If three 
million refugees have come from Afghanistan we feel it is our moral, religious and 
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national duty to look after at least three million Afghans if they want to come to 
Pakistan.71  
 
 This moral duty did, however, put a lot of pressure on the host country’s 
economy, social infrastructure and community. In addition to the demands on 
public finances, health services and education, there were also difficulties over 
employment and agriculture. In some areas refugees formed as much as 35-40 
percent of the total population and competed with locals for a limited number of 
jobs. They had also brought livestock with them which, through over-grazing, 
damaged agricultural land in the already economically depressed areas of NWFP 
and Balochistan.72  
 Fearing economic decline might force Zia to change his policy towards the 
refugees, or even towards Afghanistan, the US provided increased funds, 
amounting to over $600 million by 1988, and encouraged Saudi Arabia, Japan and 
Western Europe to contribute to the cause. The US also supported the refugee 
assistance efforts of the Catholic relief services, Save the Children, the Salvation 
Army, the International Rescue Committee and the Council for International 
Development, with grants totalling $16.1 million by 1988.73 Funds were also 
made available to transport seriously ill patients to hospitals in the United States. 
In addition, the US, along with other major creditors, rescheduled Pakistan’s debts 
and agreed that the World Bank should provide assistance and the International 
Monetary Fund should provide a $1.7 million loan.74  
 
3.4 Reagan and Zia: Aid and the Bomb  
The new Republican President, Ronald Reagan, was, from Islamabad’s 
perspective, well worth waiting for. He arrived in office in January 1981 with the 
firm conviction that détente had amounted to a sorry US surrender to the global 
Soviet threat, particularly under Carter. Reagan was intensely anti-communist and 
viewed the Soviet Union as an aggressive, expansionist and malign presence. His 
foreign policy aimed to restore US economic and military strength. While Carter 
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took a principled stand on human rights, Reagan was disinclined to pressure 
friendly regimes whatever their nature or human rights record.75 Afghanistan was 
one country where Reagan wanted to see the roll-back of communism, and 
recognised that the US needed Pakistan to help deliver this objective. Zia believed 
that the change in the White House would be beneficial for Pakistan. 
 New negotiations between the two countries started in April and were 
concluded the following September with the formal signing of a six-year aid 
package from the US worth $3.2 billion, with the aid once again to be divided 
equally between the military and economic sector. The total was eight times larger 
than Carter’s offer and, even allowing for the difference in the terms of the two 
packages, it was still almost three times greater per year. In specific terms, this 
meant General Zia would receive $267 million in military aid annually. Included 
in the package was the sale of forty F-16 fighter aircraft.76 Ambassador Fatemi 
explained that it was not just the money which encouraged the Pakistanis but it 
was also that it came with a totally different philosophy. 
The entire thrust of the Reagan administration was you just tell us and we will give you 
whatever you want, wherever you want, but we have to confront the Soviets. We have to 
make it painful for them, we have to make [it] extremely difficult for them and, in the 
process, if you play the game then you will be richly awarded.77  
 
 General Durrani, in an interview, felt that this was a very good aid 
package, but believed that Reagan’s enthusiasm was such that they could have got 
$5 billion if they had bided their time.78 
 However, the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear programme remained an issue 
between the two sides. Zia refused to abandon the project, and the US was 
unprepared to support it. This dispute was circumvented by nuancing the issue. 
Washington accepted the right of Pakistan to continue its nuclear programme but 
remained opposed to its actual deployment. Justifying this to his Foreign Affairs 
Committee on 16 October 1981, Under Secretary of State, James L. Buckley, 
explained, “while Pakistan has refused to curtail its nuclear programme, Pakistani 
leaders totally understand without a doubt that any explosion of a nuclear weapon 
would cost Pakistan the intended aid package.”79 US Senators accepted this 
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compromise. On 18 October, just two days after Buckley’s statement to the 
Senate, a six-year waiver of the Symington Amendment was approved. It was this 
amendment which, only two years earlier, had halted all US aid to the then 
ostracised dictator of Pakistan.80 This showed clearly the major shift in US foreign 
policy under the Reagan administration. Thus the US generously started helping 
Zia’s regime and had intentionally overlooked his coercive policies.81   
 A key judgement that Zia still had to make was the extent to which he 
aligned with the US. He wanted American aid but did not want to go so far as to 
prejudice existing relations with others, including most notably China and other 
Muslim nations.82 Foreign Minister Shahi claims a successful balance was 
achieved in the new relationship with Washington. The non-aligned status of 
Pakistan was maintained since no US military bases were any part of the final 
agreement.83 However, the expectation, expressed by a Pakistani government 
spokesman, that the development of bilateral relations with the United States 
would not affect relations with any third country proved to be very much at odds 
with the view taken by India and the USSR.84 However, Zia was clearly pleased 
with the outcome. On his official visit to the US, he portrayed Pakistan as a 
bastion of stability on the periphery of a volatile region. He went on to say that the 
US aid would further strengthen his country’s stability, security and confidence in 
the future. An American analyst at the time supported giving Pakistan the aid 
package. 
Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan are driving millions of refugees into Pakistan as 
they draw nearer to Persian Gulf. Iran staggers on like a Rasputin, for how long no one 
can foresee, amid reports of sizeable Soviet aid to the communist Tudeh Party. And 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India equivocates on Soviet aggression. Only Pakistan’s 
Balochistan province stands between the Red Army and the Arabian Sea’s oil-supply 
lanes.85  
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 The argument that a stable and secure Pakistan was critical to US interests 
in the region would be used to reinforce support for continuing aid through the 
years ahead. For example, in May 1984, Howard N. Schaffer, the US Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asian Affairs, reiterated: 
We continue to believe ... that a stable Pakistan, one of the world’s largest Islamic states, 
can serve as an anchor for the entire region, lending its considerable weight and influence 
to the cause of regional peace and harmony. Conversely an unstable, insecure Pakistan 
adds to regional tensions and invites outside interference.86  
 
 Although Shahi maintained that the US aid package was compatible with 
Pakistan’s non-alignment policy, the two sides’ joint strategy to undermine the 
Soviet occupation in Afghanistan told a different story. The aim of both sides was 
to trap the USSR into a protracted and costly occupation by directing large 
amounts of aid and arms to the Afghan resistance, the Mujahidin.87  
 In fact, Pakistan had been sponsoring a network of Afghan resistance 
fighters long before the Soviet invasion and the aid agreement with Reagan. 
Around 5,000 Mujahidin had been trained in 1974-5 by Pakistan to protect its 
interests, particularly in the border regions.88 Bhutto gave this support to counter 
the Pashtun nationalists who had claims on Pakistani territory.89 These forces 
were activated by Pakistan after the pro-Soviet coup in Kabul in 1978. Therefore, 
by the time of the Soviet invasion in December 1979, Pakistan already had close 
connections with resistance fighters across the porous border in Afghanistan. 
General Durrani explained that the decision to support the Mujahidin against the 
Soviet army had been a gamble taken before the US had offered any aid. 
Afghans have always resisted very well. It is a country in which the outsiders have never 
been comfortable ... But, the decision at that time look[ed] like a gamble. It had its 
hazards also, i.e. if no one comes to our help then Pakistan would be at the mercy of the 
Soviet Union and India. There was also an assessment that in due course some other help 
would come because no one was going to be comfortable with the Soviet Union victory 
in Afghanistan.90  
 
 As a result of Islamabad’s links with the resistance movement in 
Afghanistan, General Zia insisted that Pakistan, and not the US, should control 
and organise the aid to the Mujahidin. This meant the military, and particularly 
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the ISI, became very influential as the main distributor of money and weapons 
from the US, as well as the aid from Saudi Arabia and other Muslim donors.91 
 Zia formed an alliance of seven resistance groups based in Peshawar in 
Pakistan, which became known as the Islamic Union of Afghan Mujahidin 
(IUAM). Its main function was to coordinate political, military and diplomatic 
activities. Weapons, supplies and ammunition were funnelled through this alliance 
to the Mujahidin fighters on the ground in Afghanistan.92 Of these groups, four 
were fundamentalist and three were more moderate. The leaders of the 
fundamentalist groups were Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Rasul 
Sayyaf and Younis Khalis. The moderate parties were led by Moulvi Nabi 
Muhammadi, Pir Sayad Ahmad Gilani and Sibghatullah Mujadidi, all of whom 
favoured some form of constitutional government.93  
 However, Zia backed Hekmatyar because he was the only resistance leader 
prepared to sign a document confirming that, in power, he would respect the 
Durand Line – the current border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a result, 
the ISI funnelled most of the $2.8 billion of US aid to Hekmatyar and his radical 
party, Hezb-i-Islami (Party of Islam).94 However, as support for the insurgency 
grew, aid increasingly came from sources other than the US and Arab states. 
Indeed, Jason Burke, a leading Western commentator on the region, claims that as 
little as 25 per cent of aid came from state sources with much donated by private 
individuals and Muslim charities.95  
 In Pakistan, madrassas were another important source of both recruits and 
funding for the jihad. Although some have argued that the US helped set up and 
organise madrassas across Pakistan,96 Zia’s former religious adviser, Maulana 
Khilji, rejects such claims. He attributes the rise in the number of madrassas at 
that time to Zia’s programme of Islamisation and the system of Zakat in which the 
well-off gave money to charitable causes which included donations to madrassas 
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and their students.97 Hamdullah supports this view and argues that these kinds of 
maddrassas were, in fact, set up two years before the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan by an institution called Wafaq-ul-Madaris. He does concede, 
however, that some might have been set up by Zia with US funding.98 
 Although the evidence on funding madrassas is contested, it appears 
unlikely they were wholly funded by, or under the control of, the United States. 
Overall, the picture suggests that the US had only limited control over the jihad 
against the Soviet Union. The Mujahidin network had been nurtured by Pakistan 
over a prolonged period of time and was later controlled by the ISI through its 
distribution of US aid after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979. As the 
campaign progressed, it drew in funding from Islamic states and charitable 
sources which considerably outweighed the US contribution. At the same time the 
indigenous Mujahidin had been augmented by a range of irregular Muslim forces 
with a variety of allegiances, but who were more interested in defending Islam 
than defeating India or protecting Western capitalism. If, as Maulana Khilji 
claimed, the US and Pakistan were like “two brothers” at this time, there were 
certainly a lot of other relatives involved in the conflict. 
 Moscow was not blind to what was going on. In the early stages of the 
conflict it condemned Pakistan for collaborating with the West and for giving 
shelter to the Afghan refugees who were described as rebel fighters. It further 
accused Pakistan of allowing US and Chinese military advisers in the refugee 
camps to train the rebels in guerrilla warfare. As a result of this, the USSR 
launched cross-border raids on the camps and went on to violate Pakistan’s 
territory and air space in over 600 incidents.99 This had the effect of stiffening 
both Republican and Democrat support for Pakistan in the US.100 
 This improved the relationship between the US and Pakistan but did, 
however, attract some criticism. Hussain summed up the concerns many had over 
America’s long-term commitment to Pakistan. “This is, however, by no means a 
durable or lasting relationship since on most regional and international issues, 
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Pakistan-American objectives diverge sharply.”101 There was also a concern that 
Washington would link conventional arms supplies to Pakistan abandoning its 
treasured nuclear project.102 Most worryingly of all, there was the prospect of 
closer relations with the US leading to some kind of retaliation from the USSR, to 
which the regular incursions on the border attested. Linked to this was the fear 
that the USSR could support separatists together with India in NWFP and 
Balochistan to destabilise Pakistan along ethnic lines. Even the increased “aid-
cum-sales package” could not deter threats of this magnitude.103 In such 
circumstances, some argued that smaller states like Pakistan should remain strictly 
non-aligned.104  
 India was never far from fears about the implications of the US partnership 
either. Relations had gradually improved since the end of the 1971 war but the 
resumption of US aid was now evoking a negative reaction from New Delhi.105 
Foreign Minister Shahi later claimed Indira Ghandi had exploited the situation to 
get increased Soviet military aid to vastly increase her offensive capability to an 
extent grossly disproportionate to Pakistan’s “modest increase.”106 The policy of 
sheltering and arming the Mujahidin was also criticised on the grounds that the 
Soviet Army might escalate their pursuit of the Mujahidin, or destroy their supply 
routes, with more extensive actions on Pakistani territory, even giving an opening 
for India to make an opportunistic attack.107  
 Criticism in the US was more focussed on General Zia and the nuclear 
issue rather than the principle of making Pakistan a bulwark against the USSR and 
Afghanistan. Liberal critics rejected the unconditional nature of the aid which they 
said should have been linked to the restoration of democracy as a way of 
promoting longer term US security interests and national values.108 In Congress, 
however, the arguments were dominated by the idea of linking aid to Pakistan’s 
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nuclear programme. Reagan’s responded by arguing that “… the best available 
means for counteracting possible motivations towards acquiring nuclear weapons” 
was through a policy of conventional military aid and security guarantees.109 
Senator John Glenn, who had long campaigned against Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme and authored the 1977 Glenn Amendment, also appeared to accept 
Reagan’s argument that US aid and support for Pakistan could reduce its 
perceived need for a nuclear weapon.110 However, Zia’s nuclear ambitions would 
soon re-emerge to challenge such ideas and disturb this fragile accommodation.   
 On 16 January 1984, Pakistan’s leading nuclear scientist, Dr. Abdul 
Qadeer Khan, revealed to the Qaumi Digest that he had succeeded in enriching 
weapon grade uranium. Khan’s motives for admitting this have not been 
definitively established but Sharifuddin Pirzada, a former Zia aide, claims it was 
part of Zia’s plan to infer to India he had the bomb, but with sufficient ambiguity 
to avoid losing US aid. The problem was that Khan had exceeded his brief. A 
subsequent statement of clarification by the General insisted there were no plans 
to build a bomb, but that Khan had been right to say Pakistan could build one if it 
wanted to.111  
 Reaction in the US was compounded by embarrassment, particularly for 
Glenn and his supporters, as further claims emerged. Senator Alan Cranston 
asserted that Pakistan was pressing ahead with its programme and would soon be 
capable of producing several nuclear weapons per year. He also later accused the 
State Department of obscuring, withholding or downright misinterpreting the 
facts.112 His claims had some credibility in the light of the bland testimony which 
US Assistant Secretary of State, Howard Schaffer, gave to Congress shortly after 
Khan’s statement: 
The assistance program ... contributes to US nuclear non-proliferation goals. We believe 
strongly that a program of support, which enhances Pakistan’s sense of security; helps 
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remove the principal underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear weapon 
capability.113 
 
 Glenn and Cranston proposed an amendment to the Foreign Assistance 
Act 1961 that aid should be discontinued unless the President could certify that 
Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device and was not developing one or 
acquiring materials to make one. However, law-makers opted for an alternative 
amendment, proposed by Senator Pressler and others, which made it much easier 
for their collective wilful blindness to continue. The Pressler Amendment allowed 
aid to continue as long as the President would certify annually that Pakistan did 
not have a nuclear explosive device and that the aid he proposed for that year 
would significantly reduce the risk that Pakistan would possess one.114 
 In the meantime, Reagan sent a warning to Zia in September that there 
would be serious consequences if Pakistan crossed the red line of producing 
enriched uranium over the five percent level, which was sufficient to produce 
nuclear energy but not a nuclear bomb. He warned that, “the nuclear issue may 
undermine all that we are trying to achieve and the considerable progress we have 
made so far.”115 The Pressler Amendment was formally enacted in March 1985, 
so Zia’s aid became dependent on the President’s willingness each year to issue a 
certificate of denial about his nuclear programme and for Congress to be prepared 
to accept it. In the event, both complied and Reagan duly issued certificates along 
with soothing assurances regarding Pakistan’s weapons capability. In a letter to 
Congress in November 1988, Reagan wrote: “I am convinced that our security 
relationship and assistance program are the most effective means available for us 
to dissuade Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosives.”116  
 These assurances appear all the more wilfully blind when placed in the 
context of evidence which was in the hands of the Reagan administration which 
revealed Pakistan’s involvement in the development of nuclear weapons both 
before and after the Pressler Amendment. In addition to a series of intelligence 
reports about Pakistan’s covert and underground efforts at making nuclear 
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weapons,117 there was more public evidence. In July 1984, three Pakistanis were 
arrested in Houston trying to smuggle 50 ultra-high-speed electronic switches 
used for triggering atom bombs.118 This prompted more criticism from the anti-
proliferation lobby in Congress and resulted in yet another amendment - the 
Solarz Amendment, which was passed in August 1985 and demanded that aid be 
cut off to non-nuclear nations found illegally exporting nuclear-related materials 
from the US.  
 In 1987, another Pakistani was caught illegally trying to buy from a US 
manufacturer materials used in centrifuges that enriched uranium for nuclear 
weapons.119 However, Reagan continued to justify his government’s policy:  
Our aid has bolstered Pakistan’s ability to withstand Soviet efforts at intimidation by 
strengthening its conventional military capabilities and by supporting its economic 
development. Continuation of this assistance….is vital to demonstrate US resolves to 
resist Soviet aggression and to underline our on-going commitment to the security and 
stability of the strategically significant Southwest and Asian region.” 120  
 
 It is interesting to note that these incidents would have clearly infringed 
the unsuccessful Amendment proposed by Glenn and Cranston but the Pressler 
version allowed support to continue on the strength of the President’s word that 
aid was still reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation. On 28 January that year, 
Abdul Qadeer Khan boasted to an Indian journalist that what the CIA and foreign 
papers had been saying about Pakistan possessing the bomb was correct. “They 
told us that Pakistan could never produce the bomb and they doubted my 
capabilities, but they now know we have done it. … Nobody can undo Pakistan or 
take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the 
bomb if our existence is threatened.121  
 In a follow-up interview that March, Zia again tried to make the issue 
more ambiguous. “You can write today that Pakistan can build a [nuclear] bomb 
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whenever it wishes.”122 Reagan’s Ambassador on Nuclear Non-Proliferation was 
less ambiguous in telling a Congress Committee that Pakistan had enriched 
uranium beyond the permitted 5 percent.123 Criticisms, accusations, warnings and 
calls for punitive action rebounded between the Administration, Congress and 
Islamabad throughout the remainder of the covert war in Afghanistan, but the 
certificates were delivered each year until the Soviet Union had withdrawn in 
1989. Despite this, it seems the US knew very well what was going on. General 
Durrani recalled that the US “did tell us time and again that this nuclearisation 
that you are embarked upon was not going to continue forever … you have been 
developing the nuclear program taking the unfair advantage of the situation.”124 
That situation would soon expire but it appeared that Abdul Qadeer Khan had 
been able to take sufficient advantage of it to get Zia his bomb. 
 
3.5 Endgame  
As these controversies were taking place in Washington and Islamabad, 
changes were taking place in Moscow, in part, driven by Afghanistan, which in 
turn would lead to peace talks and a Soviet withdrawal. The decision to intervene 
in Afghanistan had been taken by Brezhnev and a small circle of advisors 
overruling his military who had strongly objected to the operation.125 After 
Brezhnev died in 1982 his successors as Soviet General Secretary, Andropov and 
Chernenko, continued the campaign but neither lived long and the reformist 
Gorbachev took over in March 1985. For a few months the new Politburo 
increased its military commitment to the Afghan campaign but it remained 
apparent that the war was unwinnable. This was followed by an attempt to 
broaden the base of the Afghan government with the hope that this could lead to 
greater stability in the country. Moscow also sought to pressurise Pakistan into 
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ending its support for the Mujahidin by escalating bombing and incursions along 
with terrorist subversion.  
 The US had increased its covert aid to the Mujahidin since Reagan came 
to power in 1981. He was also willing to supply modern weapons, including most 
notably portable Stinger missiles to destroy helicopter gunships and reduce Soviet 
control of the air. Reagan also stepped up his political support for Pakistan with a 
private message to the Soviet leadership to keep its “hands off” his ally.126  
 Ultimately, the Soviet attempt to win the war failed and by 1986 
Gorbachev was determined to seek a negotiated way out of the debacle. This was 
made clear in his speech to the 27th Soviet Party Congress when he described the 
war in Afghanistan as “a bleeding wound.”127 In certain respects, the war had 
become Moscow’s Vietnam. The following November, Gorbachev sent a 
conciliatory message to Pakistan looking to improve relations.128 
 In addition to the hopeless military situation there were other reasons to 
pull out. Many Soviet families had suffered personal losses and tragedies over the 
course of brutal fighting with Afghan resistance forces, whom they regarded as 
fanatics and little better than savages. It was disliked by many in the military and 
foreign policy apparatus and it was becoming more difficult to justify to the 
population at large. At the international level the Soviet Union had been strongly 
criticised and left isolated because of the intervention. The war had also imposed 
severe financial burdens on the Soviet economy which was already on the verge 
of collapse under the pressure of the arms race with the West. Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, also foresaw that the war would seriously 
damage the chances of wider reform and perestroika if it were not resolved.129 
Accordingly, on 13 November 1986 Gorbachev told the Politburo: 
We have been fighting for six years. If we don’t change our approach we will fight for 
another twenty or thirty years! Are we going to fight forever, knowing that our military 
can’t handle the situation? We need to finish this process as soon as possible.130  
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 The UN acted as intermediary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but it 
was only after Gorbachev came to power that real progress was made. The 
outstanding issue which made the final agreement so difficult was the future 
government in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal. General Zia refused to 
negotiate directly with the Soviet Union’s proxy Afghan leader, Babrak Karmal. 
“To be crude and direct, we have always stated that Pakistan will not talk to this 
man who came to head of the Afghan regime by riding on Soviet tanks.”131 After 
Babrak Karmal was replaced by Najibullah, Shevardnadze proposed in November 
1987 to start withdrawing troops by the following 15 May if all accords were 
signed by that date, which would include the US stopping all its assistance to the 
Afghan resistance. In the flurry of activity which followed, General Zia opposed 
the proposed agreement because he did not accept the continuation of a pro-Soviet 
Kabul regime under any leader. Instead he called for an interim government 
acceptable to the majority of the Afghan people.132 
 However, the Geneva Accord was signed between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan on 14 May 1988. It committed the Soviet Union to withdraw its 
troops within a year, but neither the US or USSR were required to stop their 
support for their respective client. As a result, the Najibullah administration 
remained in place until the new post-Soviet government in Moscow cut all aid to 
their ally in 1992 and the Najibullah government quickly fell from power. Despite 
major splits in the Mujahidin between the Peshawar Seven, the Afghan resistance 
remained unanimous in its opposition to Najibullah and three million refugees 
stranded in Pakistan refused to return whilst he remained leader.  
 Zia’s proposal for an interim government, however, would include equal 
places for Najibullah’s PDPA, as well as Mujahidin parties, and technocrats from 
the diaspora. This proposal was unacceptable to all parties and would have been 
totally unworkable given the history and wide differences between all sides. Zia 
resisted pressure to change his policy from both the US and USSR. However, he 
had lost influence in Pakistan since the ending of martial law and the election of a 
new government in 1985. In the new situation, Zia, as President, had to share 
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power with Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo. Despite strong appeals 
from Zia, Foreign Minister Noorani decided to sign the Geneva Accord.133 This 
was seen as a defeat for Pakistan and the Mujahidin at the time. One resistance 
figure told an American despairingly: "Everything we fought for is lost. We have 
been betrayed.”134 
 The Soviet troop withdrawal was completed in February 1989, but by that 
time Zia and Reagan had left the scene. Five months after the signing of the 
Geneva Accord, Zia died in an air crash along with some close associates and the 
US Ambassador. An official enquiry concluded it was probably sabotage, but in 
the absence of more definitive explanations it has fuelled many conspiracy 
theories in Pakistan, mostly involving the “hidden hand” of the US. Five of the 
interviewees for this research believed that the US was involved. Ainullah Shams 
argued that Zia was killed because of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. His death 
would be an example to the rest of the world.135 Despite his assertion that the US 
and Zia had been like brothers, Maulana Khilji believed that Zia was martyred by 
the US because he was proposing to promote Islam in the region more assertively. 
In support of this he recalled attending a convention of Islamic scholars in the last 
days of Zia’s rule when the President indicated his intention to introduce more 
Islamic laws in Pakistan, which would limit American influence in the region.136  
 Other theories have included the idea that Zia was killed for not returning 
the Stinger missiles to the US after the war, and as retribution for removing Prime 
Minister Junejo after the signing of the Geneva Accord. There were also stories of 
Israeli and, of course, Indian involvement. As with the case of Bhutto’s arrest and 
execution, the significant point for this research is not whether such ideas are true, 
but that they have such resonance, not only amongst the population at large, but 
also in elite circles. As the journalist Syed Fasih Iqbal observed, “in every big 
accident that occurred in Pakistan, there is some secret hand of the US.”137 
  After Reagan stood down in early 1989, his successor, George H. W. 
Bush, warned Congress that he might not issue the annual certificate regarding aid 
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and Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The new US Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert 
B. Oakley, followed this up with a warning: 
At times, friends need to be frank with each other. The US is a strong supporter of 
controls over nuclear development … we are also bound by our own laws, which include 
the Symington, Pressler and Solarz amendments. These provisions would prohibit US aid 
to Pakistan, if evidence were discovered that Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons or was 
trying to illegally buy nuclear weapons technology.138  
 
3.6 Strategic Outcomes for the US and Pakistan  
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was perceived to be a mutual threat 
to both the US and Pakistan. This specific threat disappeared after Soviet 
withdrawal, but the consequences of withdrawal were different for the two parties. 
The US goals had been substantially achieved. The Soviet army had retreated 
from Afghanistan and the spectre of Soviet expansion to the warm waters of the 
Pakistan coast had been laid to rest. As a result, the oil fields and vital trade routes 
in the Persian Gulf were secured. In addition the long, attritional campaign which 
the US had helped finance was just as painful and difficult for Moscow as Reagan 
had hoped. The Soviet economy and the Soviet system itself had been challenged 
and found wanting. The implications of this went far beyond South Asia and 
helped create the conditions for the break-up of both the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact.  
 It is difficult to imagine a better result for the US. Nevertheless, there had 
been a price. The military and economic aid and supplies given to Pakistan were 
only part of Reagan’s overall campaign to outspend the USSR on military 
capability but the arms race contributed to the overall level of US debt.  The 
reputation of the US had also been damaged when Reagan adopted a more Realist 
approach than his predecessor. Carter’s human rights agenda was shelved as 
Reagan declared the Mujahidin to be “freedom fighters” and the Pakistani 
dictatorship had been legitimised, armed and empowered. More significantly, real 
attempts at preventing nuclear proliferation in Pakistan, and the wider region, had 
also been avoided by the US political establishment.139 As discussed in the 
                                   
138
 Robert B. Oakley, “US-Pakistan Relations: An Agenda for the Future”, Pakistan Horizon, Vo. 
42, No. 1, January 1989, p. 34. 
139
 Bruce, O. Reidel, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad 
(Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2012), p. 41. 
 115 
 
previous chapter the nuclear issue had consequences far beyond South Asia, since 
Pakistan’s bomb could be used against Israel and its nuclear technology could be 
transferred to unfriendly states, which included the newly-hostile Iran. 
 Nor had America’s policy enhanced relations with India, which had taken 
a more pro-Soviet stance over Afghanistan and was, as a result, more isolated in 
the region. China, on the other hand, was opposed to the Soviet occupation, and 
with Deng Xiaoping at the helm was undergoing market reforms which had 
started the process of integrating the country far more into the international 
community. 
 For Pakistan, the feared Soviet expansion into Balochistan had not 
happened. This enabled supporters to say it had been prevented by the partnership 
with the US. In addition, the hostile Soviet presence in neighbouring Afghanistan 
had gone along with immediate fears of Indo-Soviet encirclement. In relation to 
India, military resources had been substantially increased, though India had also 
capitalised on the situation with increased aid from the USSR, so the regional 
arms race was still under way. At the same time economic aid had helped the 
Pakistani economy to grow. GDP growth rates shot up from 3.76 per cent in 1979 
to 10.22 percent the next year and never fell below 5 percent until 1989.140 It is 
less clear, however, who in Pakistani society benefited from the economic upturn. 
Zia himself had moved from being shunned by Carter to being Reagan’s key man 
in the region.  
 This remarkable shift was achieved without changing many of his policies. 
Though he gave up martial law, he still retained overarching constitutional powers 
and personal control of the military. Nevertheless, it was significant that he was 
unable to prevent the Geneva Accord being signed against his express wishes. 
Afghanistan remained unstable and a potential security concern for Pakistan, but 
the nuclear programme was close to being achieved. Technological development 
had proceeded throughout this period to the point where Pakistan had an 
acknowledged nuclear capability, and gave an ambiguous nod to India to suggest 
that it had actually acquired a nuclear bomb. A. Q. Khan argued that Pakistan 
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would never have acquired this capability without the Afghan war and America 
consequently turning a blind eye to developments in the country.141  
 It was in the border regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan that another 
major legacy of this era remained which would shape US-Pakistan relations in the 
future. The joint strategy to support the Afghan resistance had contributed to the 
creation of a pool of seasoned and radicalised fighters who were very well armed. 
Pakistan had been flooded with weapons, most of which had never been returned 
to the US. As Syed Iqbal observed in an interview, there remain sufficient 
weapons in their hands to fight a third world war.142 It would be some years 
before the US had to confront this legacy as a direct security threat but, in the 
meantime, Pakistan was left to suffer the consequences in the shape of rising 
Islamism, weapons culture and drugs, as well as the problem of Afghan refugees 
and the Mujahidin, many of whom turned against their host.143  
 
3.7 Implications for the Relationship 
This era is often understood as the time when the relationship between the 
US and Pakistan improved markedly and the two states were at their closest. 
Professor Tahir Amin put it this way: “probably that was the only time when 
Pakistan-US interests coincided almost one hundred percent. Both wanted to 
contain the Soviet Union. Both wanted to support [the] Afghan Mujahidin.”144 
Former Minister Nawabzada Amad Khan saw it as a time when Pakistan and the 
US enjoyed increased confidence in each other as a result of working together on 
issues of mutual interest.145 The evidence suggests, however, that both these views 
are misplaced and that this era was one where interests were no more aligned than 
any other period under consideration, and that mutual confidence was superficial 
and depended on a mutual suspension of judgement. 
 The view that interests coincided rests on the assumption that because both 
states were jointly orchestrating a proxy war against the Soviet army, they shared 
the same aims and objectives. As the evidence and analysis discussed earlier in 
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this chapter shows, however, this was not the sum total of their respective 
strategic interests. The same could be said for the Mujahidin who, as the conflict 
progressed, developed into a coalition of forces with varying degrees of 
ideological intensity and objectives beyond defeating the USSR. A three-way 
analysis suggests that the interests of the US, Pakistan and the Mujahidin clearly 
overlapped in wanting the USSR out of Afghanistan but beyond that they had 
diverging objectives. US aims were to defeat the Soviet system as a whole and to 
protect Western capitalist economies. Zia’s aims were to maintain his regime and 
territory, to protect Islam and to protect Pakistan against India. The aims of the 
Mujahidin are more difficult to sum up but, as it developed and became more 
internationalised and divided, protecting Islam from foreign injustice as a whole 
became an aim alongside liberating Afghanistan for many of the diverse groups 
that emerged. Once the overlapping element had gone there was little to stop the 
diverging elements pulling the three in different and conflicting directions again. 
 This was also a rich period for wilful blindness on both sides. Although 
Carter had proposed to work with Zia, he was not prepared to do so at the cost of 
all his concerns about the nature of the regime, nuclear proliferation and India. It 
needed the fresh enthusiasm of Reagan to turn a blind eye to all these issues in his 
more single-minded campaign against the Soviet Union. The most obvious 
example is over the nuclear programme but it was also done in relation to Zia’s 
domestic political practices. The United States ignored human rights violations 
and the imprisonment of political prisoners, while still being critical of similar 
violations by unfriendly governments, and implicitly helped Zia government 
consolidate his regime at a time when it was facing increasing domestic 
opposition.146 Thus, Reagan’s plan for a long attritional campaign against the 
USSR suited Zia since the longer it went on the more he could consolidate himself 
and the more time he had to make his nuclear weapons. In this sense they shared a 
tactical objective but for diverging strategic reasons. 
 Reagan’s wilful blindness required him to effectively let Pakistan’s 
nuclear ambitions proceed at the expense of the interests of not just India but also 
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Israel. This emphasises the extent of reverse influence which Zia was able to 
exert. His assets included, as ever, Pakistan’s strategic location, made more 
valuable by now having the America’s Cold War enemy on his border. What he 
also had was an established network of resistance fighters, now augmented by the 
refugees, and a porous border through which it was possible to launch attacks. As 
General Durrani explained, Pakistan had already started its covert campaign from 
there so it might be said that the US sought to join Pakistan’s proxy war rather 
than the other way round, as is often portrayed.147 Ishtiaq Ahmed, speculated, 
however, that the US may have been active in promoting this at an earlier stage as 
a way of enticing the USSR to intervene to prevent Islamic influence spreading to 
its own republics.148 Either way, Zia had the initiative and was able to use it to 
maintain control and influence over the distribution of aid to the groups he 
favoured for his own ends. Zia’s own dictatorial regime may also have been an 
asset to the US since it would have been much more straightforward to pursue a 
drawn-out covert operation, with associated collateral domestic damage, through a 
suppressive dictatorship than an active democracy. This display of reverse 
influence also undermines the view of Pakistan as a consistent victim of US 
policies, as expressed by Tariq Ali for example,149 since Zia clearly made his own 
decisions to manipulate the situation and the US to his own advantage. 
 The abruptness of the US change of attitude is a significant feature of the 
history of the relationship and demonstrates that co-operation rested on short term 
circumstances rather than shared interests. It also demonstrates that reverse 
influence was limited by circumstances rather than permanent features. 
Circumstances included not just events, like the Soviet invasion, but also a 
receptive administration in Washington. The fluctuation of US policies continued 
to reflect the political composition of the presidential administration. The 
Democrat, Jimmy Carter, had been rebuilding trust with India and was reluctant to 
make Pakistan too close an ally, but the Republican, Ronald Reagan, was willing 
to prejudice Indian ties by favouring Pakistan again. Zia was thus able to hold out 
with confidence until Reagan was elected and offered Pakistan considerably less 
constrained terms for his co-operation. 
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 It is likely that this period of closer engagement between the US and 
Pakistan did create confidence, but only about the limitations of trust each could 
expect of the other. What was demonstrated was that under the right 
circumstances, Pakistan could be confident that the US would buy its co-operation 
with financial and military aid. Furthermore it would be prepared to temporarily 
suspend judgement about things it had previously criticised or sanctioned and 
enable the military to be empowered as the dominant political force in the 
country. The US could also be confident that the Pakistani military would take 
advantage of aid and the blind eye to build its resources and strategic advantage 
against India in defiance of Washington.  
 The fact that, once the USSR declared a clear interest in withdrawing, the 
US pressured Zia to agree to a settlement in Afghanistan which left him with 
ongoing security concerns, emphasises that co-operation was partial and 
temporary, and that fundamental interests did not converge in this era any more 
than they had in the previous thirty years. After the Soviet army withdrew General 
Zia’s successors were left to contend with disintegration in Afghanistan and a US 
with a rediscovered appetite for non-proliferation and sanctions.      
 120 
 
CHAPTER 4: EMBARGOS AND SANCTIONS: THE BOMB, 
                    THE TALIBAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1989 – 2001 
 
4.1 Introduction  
As George H. W. Bush took over from Ronald Reagan as US President in 
January 1989, he faced major international change unimaginable to his 
predecessors. In line with the Geneva Accord, the Soviet army withdrew from 
Afghanistan in February 1989 and Moscow began the process of ending its 
dominance of Eastern Europe. This began with the breeching of the border 
between Austria and Hungary in May, culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall 
on the evening of 9 November 1989. Bush and Gorbachev met on 2-3 December 
1989 in Malta to confirm that the Cold War was over. The summit meeting 
represented a formal confirmation that the era of superpower rivalry and 
competition was finally at an end. Arguably, the Cold War had started at the Yalta 
conference in 1945, it had now ended on a boat in Malta.  
 As a result of the end of superpower rivalry, Washington once again 
appeared to lose interest in Pakistan. The USSR was out of Afghanistan and no 
longer posed a threat to American interests in the region. In the absence of the 
Soviet Union, the US began to view Pakistan as a potential destabilising factor in 
the region. Washington was concerned over Kashmir and Pakistan’s sponsorship 
of jihadist ideology,1 but its nuclear programme remained the major irritant in 
relations between the two powers and started another difficult period in its 
relationship with Washington.2  
 
4.2 The Nuclear Programme and the New World Order 
In Pakistan there were also significant political changes which initially 
encouraged the US to continue to engage with Islamabad.  After Junejo’s removal 
from office and Zia’s death in 1988, Ghulam Ishaq Khan had taken over the 
Presidency and Benazir Bhutto was elected Prime Minister on 1 December 1988. 
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Although Ghulam Ishaq Khan came from the civil bureaucracy, he had been an 
integral part of the military regime, or the “establishment” as the military-
intelligence elite came to be known. Benazir Bhutto was the daughter of the 
hanged Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and her election brought her father’s PPP back into 
power.  Unlike the one-man rule of the previous government, Pakistan was now 
collectively governed by a troika of the Prime Minister, the President and the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Aslam Baig.3 However, this was weighted in favour 
of the “establishment” and although the Constitution gave Benazir Bhutto the 
right to form a government, Ghulam Ishaq Khan delayed convening the National 
Assembly for the Prime Ministerial oath until she had given an assurance that she 
would not interfere in specific foreign and defence policy areas which included 
Afghan policy, the nuclear programme, and the budget of the Armed Forces. Her 
ostracism from the nuclear programme was such that she was formally banned 
from visiting the premises where A. Q. Khan’s research was being conducted.4 
She also retained Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the Foreign Minister of the previous 
regime, thus signalling that there would be little change in foreign policy despite 
her previous opposition to General Zia.5 Nevertheless, her election victory was 
largely welcomed by the media and Congress in the US, and she responded by 
emphasising the importance of South Asia to America and urging Washington to 
continue its relationship with Pakistan, particularly now that it was, in her 
description, a democratic country.”6  
By 1989, however, the US was making serious warnings that Pakistan 
could not remain immune from sanctions if it continued with its nuclear 
ambitions. Early that year, General Baig visited Washington where he was warned 
by National Security Advisor, Colin Powell, that if the nuclear programme 
continued, Pakistan would not only forfeit economic and military assistance but 
also its close political and security relations with the US.7 It appeared to 
Washington that General Baig had understood the message. For after his return, 
US intelligence noted that high-level enrichment of uranium was stopped along 
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with some other elements of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.8 However, in 
practice, these changes were of limited value because Pakistan had already 
achieved nuclear weapons capability. With the nuclear issue high on the US 
political agenda, Benazir Bhutto found herself in an exposed but uninformed 
position on her own visit to the US in June. Prior to the visit she had opened a 
new nuclear power plant at Kot Addu in Pakistan and repeated her government’s 
guarantee of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. Now in the 
US she was evasive when, on national television, she was asked whether Pakistan 
could acquire a nuclear device if it wanted to: 
We do not feel it necessary for us to do so in our defence. Well, I am not saying that we 
could do so if we wanted to, or we couldn’t if we didn’t want to, but all I am saying is 
that we are working for peace….9  
 
This convoluted answer reflected her awkwardness and ignorance on the 
issue. It was reported that CIA officials spelled out to her the details of Pakistan’s 
programme and even showed her a mock-up of the weapons in order to 
demonstrate that they knew more than she did and could monitor her country’s 
nuclear activities in detail.10 However, if US intelligence understood the reality of 
the nuclear programme they may not have fully understood the reality of her 
influence over it. For Bush warned her that he would not issue the annual 
certificate without assurances that Pakistan would not enrich uranium above five 
percent and would not develop cores for nuclear weapons. However, the US 
already knew the five per cent threshold had been crossed and believed that 
Pakistan had successfully manufactured at least one core. So, Bush’s warning was 
actually an implied demand for a freeze and a hope that the existing core would 
be destroyed.11  
For her part, Benazir Bhutto assured Bush that Pakistan was not interested 
in developing nuclear weapons and favoured a nuclear test ban treaty with other 
countries of the region of South Asia.12 She also told a Joint session of the US 
Congress that, “I can declare that we do not possess, nor do we intend to make, a 
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nuclear device. That is our policy.”13 Her US tour was successful and generated 
much goodwill for Pakistan and, in the wake of her fresh assurances, Bush issued 
the 1989 Pressler certification, accompanied by the much repeated warning of the 
US Ambassador to Islamabad, Robert Oakley, that, “If you take any action on the 
nuclear program and you go past that line … He [Bush] will blow the whistle and 
invoke Pressler.”14 Bush also promised the sale of sixty F-16 fighter aircraft as an 
inducement to the Pakistan military to co-operate on the nuclear issue. Despite 
Benazir Bhutto’s claims regarding Pakistan’s nuclear programme, its reluctance 
to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty was evidence of her limited influence on the 
issue.  
 Benazir Bhutto represented a more acceptable face of Pakistan for the 
US, but she did not last long. On 6 August 1990, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, with the 
full support of General Baig, dismissed her government on charges of corruption 
and mismanagement and called for fresh elections the following October. The 
following day, she blamed her dismissal on the Military Intelligence (MI) which 
she claimed had been conspiring against her government from the first day.15 
Given the historical conflict of both her family and party with the establishment 
her claim may have been partially correct, but there were other factors, such as 
economic mismanagement and a lack of experience in governance, which also 
played an important role in her dismissal. A. Q. Khan, also disclosed later, in his 
lecture at the University of Science and Technology in Rawalpindi, that he had 
repeatedly advised General Baig to get rid of her because she was creating too 
many hurdles to the further development of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.16  
After she was dismissed from office, she claimed that during the 1990 
Kashmir crisis, the military had already crossed Bush’s red line without keeping 
her informed.17 She also later claimed that she was unaware of the extent of the 
country’s nuclear capability during her time as Prime Minister and that the 
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Pakistan President had kept her in the dark about it.18 However, this raises the 
question of whether she was also being wilfully blind. Her statement to Congress 
looks unconvincing in the light of the briefing she had been given by the CIA, 
and she appeared to be able to make knowledgeable claims after leaving office 
whilst purporting ignorance when in post. In addition, the military would not be 
the only avenue of intelligence on the matter, since the Prime Minister had access 
to alternative sources through the Intelligence Bureau (IB) which reported to the 
civil government. 
By this time, the next Pressler Certificate was due. US Secretary of State, 
James Baker, warned the Pakistani Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Khan, that further 
economic and military assistance would be continued only if the President of 
Pakistan presented new, credible and convincing evidence that his country did not 
possess nuclear weapons. Caretaker Prime Minister, Mustafa Jatoi, replied that he 
had already given written assurances that Pakistan had no intention of producing 
nuclear weapons.19 However, documents leaked to the Washington Post revealed 
yet more Pakistani attempts to acquire banned equipment. This time, Pakistan 
sources had sought to obtain high temperature furnaces used for the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons through its embassy in France and intermediaries in Canada 
and Switzerland.20 There was also evidence that both the Chinese and French 
governments were contributing to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Throughout the 
1980s, China had transferred equipment and technology for Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles programmes to the alarm of the US and India.21 In 
November 1989 Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng, announced that China would 
sell Pakistan a 300 megawatt nuclear power reactor. The following February, 
France President, François Mitterrand, visited Pakistan and agreed to sell another 
nuclear power plant to meet its electricity needs, but which was interpreted as 
assistance for the weapons programme.22 A statement from the US State 
Department said, “France has apparently agreed to sell a nuclear power reactor to 
                                   
18
 Rajput Budania, India’s National Security Dilemma: The Pakistan Factor and India’s Policy 
Response (New Delhi: Indus Publishing Company, 2001), p. 143. 
19
 Pakistan Horizon, Volume 44, Issues 1-2, April 1991, p. 3. 
20
 Keesing’s Records of World Events, Volume 36, 1990, p. 3764. 
21
 Lisa Curtis, China’s Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan, The Heritage Foundation, 
<http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/chinas-military-and-security-relationship-with-pakist 
an> [Accessed 9 October 2013].  
22
 See Aileen, “The Significance of the French Offer”, The Muslim, 1 March 1991; Rafique 
Akhtar, Pakistan Year Book, (Lahore: East & West Publishing 1990), p. 330. 
 125 
 
Pakistan without requiring that Pakistan accept full-scope International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards, i.e., safeguards on all nuclear activities in Pakistan, 
not just on the item being exported.”23 Here it is important to note that France had 
already sold nuclear reactors to China, India and Korea but at that time the US did 
not raise any objection.24 In addition there was evidence of Chinese help with 
missile technology. From the late 1980s, there were reports that China began 
discussing sales of M-11 missiles and related technology to Pakistan with a formal 
contract being signed in 1988. In April 1991, Washington would reveal it had 
discovered that China had transferred these missiles to Pakistan, though this was 
denied by Beijing.25  
In October 1990, non-proliferation campaigners in Congress, McCurdy 
and Solarz, wrote to Bush with their concerns and urged him to end all aid.26 US 
Ambassador in Pakistan Oakley then ended eleven years of pretence by informing 
Pakistan’s caretaker government that Bush had decided not to issue a Pressler 
certificate.27 Up to that point, Pakistan was the third highest US aid recipient after 
Egypt and Israel, and another six-year aid package had been signed in 1987. But 
economic and military aid worth $564 million for the fiscal year of 1990 was now 
stopped. Washington insisted that if Pakistan wanted US assistance to resume it 
should roll-back its nuclear programme to its status pre-April 1990.28 Within the 
embargoed aid was $300 million of military supplies which were stopped along 
with the delivery of 28 F-16 air-fighters for which Pakistan had already paid.29  
Bush’s decision not to issue the certificate automatically invoked the 
Pressler Amendment which had a particular effect on relations because it applied 
uniquely to Pakistan. This meant that aid could continue uninterrupted to India, a 
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Soviet ally, which had already demonstrated its own nuclear capability as long 
ago as 1974.30 In Pakistan, this was seen as unfair and discriminatory.  Reaction 
was bitter and focussed on what was perceived as US hypocrisy with much 
indignation that only Pakistan was being punished.31 An often repeated sentiment 
was, “now that the Afghan War is over, the United States no longer needs 
Pakistan. You Americans have discarded us like a piece of used Kleenex.”32 
Maleeha Lodhi, former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, explained Pakistani 
sentiment about the unfairness of sanctions: 
The irony about US non-proliferation policy in South Asia was that while the impetus for 
proliferation at every step came from India, it was Pakistan, and not India, that was 
subjected to penalties, embargoes and sanctions. Perversely Pakistan became the victim 
of penalties for what India had done in 1974 with its explosion of a nuclear device.33  
 
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Khan, complained that the, 
“Pressler law was not just ‘outmoded’ but could end up defeating the very 
purpose of discouraging nuclear proliferation: it could actually promote it.”34 This 
sense of resentment was not restricted to the political elite, and it also had 
resonance amongst the people. Brigadier Gul explained: “In Pakistan, a common 
person thought that American is a great friend but this sense of betrayal was so 
strong that this … started changing into amazement, wonderment and then 
tragedy: a great dislike for a country which does not value another country’s 
sacrifice.”35 The sacrifices that Gul was referring to were a so-called Kalashnikov 
culture, narcotics smuggling and USSR attacks on Pakistan. “So we have paid a 
very high price. But America totally neglected that.”36 General Duranni summed 
up how it now appeared to Pakistan that the Cold War had ended - the Afghans 
had won against the Soviets and Pakistan had claimed victory; India was unhappy 
at what Pakistan had achieved; but the US now looked like “enemy number 
one.”37 Whilst this assessment appears a little exaggerated, since India clearly 
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remained Pakistan’s prime enemy, it emphasises two points that mark this as a 
significant turning point in relations. First, it underlines the strength of feeling in 
Pakistan, not just that the Pressler sanctions were unjust and discriminatory, but 
also that the US was abandoning its former ally once again. Second, by not 
targeting India with sanctions in an even-handed way the US was, once again, 
favouring and empowering Pakistan’s original enemy number one.     
There was also criticism in the US that the sanctions had left their Cold 
War ally out in the cold. The Pressler Amendment had originally attracted 
criticism by some US analysts, including Rosenfield, that it had been written to 
ignore and provide special exemption for India and Israel, both of which had 
nuclear programmes far more advanced than Pakistan’s.38 The Washington Times 
held India responsible for the South Asia nuclear arms race and argued that 
Pakistan’s programme did not threaten the US but, “if the moralist guiding our 
[US] policy still feels compelled to eliminate it, they should put the screw on pro-
Soviet India, whose nukes make Pakistan’s necessary and leave allies in 
Islamabad alone.”39 However, the originator of the amendment, Senator Pressler, 
defended the action to the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on the basis 
that he had hoped it would never have to be applied in the first place. “It is my 
hope today that the sanctions can be lifted. However, I cannot support any effort 
to lift sanctions at the expense of our nation’s non-proliferation goals ….”40 
Where Pressler justified sanctions on high-minded policy grounds, Director of the 
State Department South Asia Bureau, Malott justified it on more pragmatic 
grounds.  
We kept our part of the bargain but Pakistan let us down by crossing the line in 1990. We 
had promised Pakistan billions and billions of dollars if that line was not crossed. In so 
many words, the President was signalling his desire to continue the close security 
relationship with Pakistan provided Islamabad froze the nuclear program.41 
                                
The Republican majority in the US Congress accepted these arguments 
and President Bush was able to tell Pakistan’s new Ambassador to the US, Syeda 
Abida Hussain, in March 1992 that the nuclear issue was still the major obstacle 
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to a good relationship between the two countries. Senior Fellow for India, 
Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Daniel 
Markey’s later analysis also placed the blame on Pakistan for reneging on a deal 
and creating distrust:  
They say we abandoned them in 1990, once the Cold War was over and we no longer 
needed them to combat the Soviet threat. Against our express wishes, they went ahead 
with the nuclear weapons program, no longer making it possible to cooperate with them 
in quite the same way.42  
 
However, Markey’s conclusion appears to ignore the eleven years of US 
wilful blindness which facilitated this state of affairs. What made co-operation 
less easy in 1990 was not the nuclear programme, which had been fast-tracked by 
the supply of Pressler certificates, but the evaporation of Washington’s need to 
pretend it was not happening. 
After Benazir Bhutto’s overthrow, Nawaz Sharif was elected Prime 
Minister in November 1990, but he still had to work with Ghulam Ishaq and 
General Baig as part of the troika. Despite the sense of betrayal felt over the 
Pressler sanctions, the new government continued to look for other ways to 
reconnect with the US. Although Pakistan’s military and economic aid had 
ceased, humanitarian assistance was still distributed through the Catholic Relief 
Services and CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere), and formal 
assistance continued for the control of narcotics and drug programmes, allowing 
some communication and co-operation to be maintained.  
A better opportunity for Nawaz Sharif to rebuild relations came with 
Saddam Hussein’s seizure of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf 
War in 1991. President Bush worked through the UN to gather a multi-national 
force to drive Saddam out of Kuwait. Pakistan joined the US-led coalition with a 
contribution of 5,000 troops stationed in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia. This was appreciated by the US,43 but Pakistan was just one of over thirty 
nations in the coalition so its impact may have been somewhat reduced. In the 
years that followed, Pakistan showed itself willing to a play an increased role in 
humanitarian operations in Somalia and peacekeeping efforts as far apart as East 
                                   
42
 Daniel Markey, Complex US-Pakistan Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2007), <http:// 
www.cfr.org/pakistan/markey complex us pakistan relations/p12720> [Accessed 29 October 
2013]. 
43
 Schaffer and Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States, p. 8; Kux, Disenchanted 
Allies, p. 323. 
 129 
 
Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and the Congo.44 In helping with Bush’s 
aim to involve the world community in fighting despotism, and with Clinton’s 
later aim of democratic enlargement, it was important for the US to have the co-
operation of Pakistan as a leading Muslim nation.    
Nevertheless, US-Pakistan relations remained deadlocked over the nuclear 
issue for the remainder of the Bush presidency. In June 1991, after the end of the 
Gulf War, Nawaz Sharif sent a delegation headed by the Pakistani Senate 
Chairman, Waseem Sajad, to the US. Sajad reiterated Pakistan’s position that it 
was ready to stop production of weapons-grade uranium but would not destroy its 
existing stock. The US, however, insisted that the resumption of aid, and most 
particularly military aid, was dependent on Islamabad abandoning its nuclear 
programme completely.45 In November, US Under-Secretary of State, Reginald 
Bartholomew, went to Pakistan to keep the pressure on the government. However, 
President Ghulam Ishaq refused to abandon his nuclear programme and, by so 
doing, earned the nickname “Mr Nuke” by the US. 
US attitudes actually hardened further when Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary, 
Shehryar Muhammad Khan, officially dropped claims that Pakistan neither had, 
nor was developing, weapons. In an interview to the Washington Post in February 
1992, he admitted that, “…the capability is there. Pakistan possesses elements 
which, if put together, would become a device”. He added that in 1990 Pakistan 
had frozen its production of highly enriched uranium and bomb cores but would 
not destroy its existing nuclear capabilities unless and until India did the same.46 
A few days later, the Ambassador Syeda Abida Hussain addressed George 
Washington University and confirmed Khan’s position, “We have achieved the 
ability and we imposed a restraint. We do not roll back; we do not advance.”47 
What prompted these statements was rising tension with India over the Kashmir 
insurrection. Islamabad feared the crisis might escalate and, therefore, felt the 
need to remind India that it had a nuclear deterrent. This highlights the continuing 
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priority of India above all other security threats since these statements effectively 
undermined previous efforts to get a resumption of US aid.  
 
4.3 Kashmir 
The frozen conflict in Kashmir left the province divided into two parts 
controlled by India and Pakistan respectively, separated by a Line of Control 
(LoC) which was the de facto border between the two. It had also given rise to 
opposition parties and resistance groups, some of which favoured union with 
Pakistan and others that campaigned for complete independence. For forty years 
the Indian and Pakistani intelligence services had also been active there and the 
ISI had supported the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which fought 
for independence. Disputed elections in 1987 in Jammu (the Indian-controlled 
part) prompted agitation which was also inspired by Mujahidin success in 
Afghanistan and the Palestinian intifada. The Indian government responded with 
brutal repression, prompting an insurrection which started with a series of 
powerful explosions in Jammu on 31 July 1988 and developed as more militants 
entered from the Pakistani side to fight with the JKLF.48 Tension between 
Pakistan and India rose and the Indian government blamed Pakistan for 
supporting and training the militants.49 The US also blamed Pakistan for 
supporting the insurgency and in April 1990, the US Under-Secretary warned 
Pakistan that this could be considered to be aiding terrorism. 
Pressure built in India for the government to take retaliatory military 
action against Pakistan and it positioned 200,000 troops along the borders as well 
as in Kashmir. In response, Pakistan deployed armoured tanks. This locked both 
sides into a political and military stand-off that made it difficult for either to back 
down without appearing weak.50 Thus, by May 1990, the tension had become so 
serious it threatened a wider Pakistan-India war. Both sides conducted military 
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exercises and there were mounting fears that nuclear weapons might be used.51 In 
May, Bush sent Deputy National Security Advisor, Robert Gates, and Assistant 
Secretary of State, Richard Haas, to mediate between the two countries.52 At a 
meeting, Gates did not accuse Pakistan of initiating the conflict, but did suggest 
that Islamabad was supporting the Kashmiris.53 General Duranni explained that 
America’s role was interpreted in Pakistan as the start of a new phase in Indo-US 
relations. America was believed to be anxious to capitalise on the fact that India 
needed new allies now that the USSR no longer existed.54  
The Pakistanis, for their part, denied supporting the insurgents but were 
nervous about losing control of the situation, so they undertook to clamp down on 
the activities of militants in their part of the disputed territory. This resulted in the 
army opening fire on militants crossing to the Indian-controlled side and blocking 
the road leading to the LoC. It was reported by Pakistani forces that at least twelve 
supporters of JKLF were killed and about 150 were injured as a result of their 
action.55 The President and the General also promised to close the militants’ 
training camps in their territory whilst India agreed to confidence-building 
measures designed to reduce the risk of border incidents getting out of control.56. 
Burke claims, however, that by this time the ISI had already switched its support 
away from the JKLF, which favoured independence, to groups linked to Jamaat-e- 
Islami (JI) which fought for union with Pakistan.57 
An indication of the conflict within the Pakistani troika at this time was 
that, while these negotiations were taking place, Benazir Bhutto was away on an 
official tour to Middle Eastern countries to win support for Pakistan’s position on 
Kashmir. There were suggestions that she sought to avoid having to discuss the 
Kashmiri issue with American officials. One member of the US mission claimed 
they tried to meet her on three occasions, but she failed to turn up. There was a 
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suspicion she was avoiding direct talks with Gates so that President Ghulam Ishaq 
and General Baig would bear responsibility for subsequent actions. Later, she 
asserted that the Foreign Ministry withheld information from her and that she 
actually wanted to meet Gates. Whatever the truth of such assertions, the fact 
remained that both the Prime Minister and Defence Minister were out of the 
country when India and Pakistan were negotiating on Kashmir.58  
Although the immediate crisis of another Indo-Pakistani war was averted, 
armed resistance in Jammu continued through the 1990s and attracted violent 
militants from Afghanistan. They had little in common with the indigenous 
struggle of the Kashmiri people and were intent on implementing radical Islam 
among the moderate local Muslims as well as fighting Indian oppression. Thus, 
what had started as an insurgency over human and religious rights became 
dominated by a violent form of Islamic activism.59 ISI support would bring 
Pakistan into US sights as a state sponsor of terrorism and attempts to bring them 
under control would direct the attentions of the militants onto Pakistan itself. 
 
4.4 Iran 
According to General Duranni, doubts about Pakistan’s relationship with 
Iran were another principal reason for the deterioration in relations with 
Washington after the Cold War. Islamabad was told to abandon its relations with 
the Islamic regime. Pakistan refused. It had a large Shia population of fifteen to 
twenty percent, and the leader of the revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, was 
popular not just among the Shias but also among the non-Shia population in 
Pakistan.60 Here it is helpful to briefly reflect on Pakistani relations with, and 
attitudes to, Iran and how these affected relations with the US. Before the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, the Shah of Iran had sided with Pakistan to counter India, 
because of Delhi’s support for the pro-Soviet Nasser regime in Egypt, and had 
supported Pakistani repression of Baloch separatists as well as giving aid and 
energy on preferential terms. In addition to this, it was, and still is, strategically 
important for Pakistan to maintain a peaceful border with Iran so as not become 
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sandwiched between two hostile neighbours. Such co-operation was also helpful 
to US containment strategy.   
 After the revolution, however, the US came to view Iran as a prime 
security threat, so Pakistan’s border strategy became yet another area where 
interests diverged. Despite the potential which the revolution held for political 
destabilisation in the region, Pakistan was anxious to maintain peaceful relations 
with the new regime. On the eve of the revolution Cabinet Minister Khurshid 
Ahmed met Khomeini in Paris to assure him Islamabad would work with him, and 
Pakistan was first in recognising the new Islamic Republic of Iran. After the Iran-
Iraq War broke out in 1980, General Zia withstood considerable pressure from his 
two principal backers, the US and Saudi Arabia, and withheld support for Iraq. He 
also firmly rejected US proposals in 1984 to train Baloch-based Mujahidin to 
destabilise Iran.61 It became clear later that Pakistan had been transferring nuclear 
technology to Iran throughout the 1980s and in early 1990 General Baig visited 
Tehran where it is claimed he negotiated a nuclear deal with Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guard saying, “Iran is willing to give whatever it takes, $6 billion, $10 billion. We 
can sell to Iran at any price.”62 This did not help Pakistan’s cause in the run-up to 
the imposition of sanctions.  
General Baig, who had opposed intervention in Kuwait and predicted US 
defeat in the Gulf War, also proposed a policy of “strategic defiance” in which 
Iran, China and Pakistan would collaborate to meet the menace of US global 
hegemony.63 Whilst this was provocative at the time, the idea of a tripartite 
relationship was not entirely new. Just as Pakistan had mediated between Mao and 
Nixon in 1974, it did the same between Deng Xiaoping and Khomeini after 1979. 
China had misread developments in Iran and supported the Shah in his anti-Soviet 
stance. Premier Hua Guofeng then paid an ill-judged visit to the Shah as his 
regime was crumbling in 1978 drawing condemnation from Khomeini and leading 
to a breakdown in relations. Agha Shahi, Zia’s foreign policy advisor, then 
mediated an apology and a gradual rebuilding of Tehran-Beijing relations which 
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led to the Chinese supplying arms to Iran in its war with Iraq along with 
technology for its nuclear programme. Thus, during the 1980s, a strong Pakistan-
Iran-China relationship developed.64 This was useful to Pakistan since it brought 
together three allies against India and kept the Iranian border free from threat. 
Whilst it was clearly against US interests in relation to Iran it did have the 
advantage of being wholly anti-Soviet and all three collaborated with the US in 
the proxy war in Afghanistan. However, Baig’s proposal was anti-US and 
increased Washington’s concerns considerably, but he had overplayed his hand 
and was forced to retire in August 1991. He was replaced by the moderate and 
pro-Western, General Asif Nawaz who immediately cancelled the deal with Iran 
and ruled out future nuclear co-operation. These moves calmed nerves in 
Washington, but did not altogether remove concerns about Pakistan’s reliability in 
America’s eyes as far as Iran was concerned.65  
After Kabul fell to the Mujahidin in 1992 Iran and Pakistan found 
themselves increasingly at odds competing for influence in the anarchy of 
Afghanistan. This intensified after the Taliban took Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998 killing 
Iranian diplomats and thousands of Hazara Shiites. Despite this Iran welcomed 
Pakistan’s nuclear tests as a demonstration that an Islamic nation could build 
nuclear weapons. However, the sectarian violence in Pakistan in which hundreds 
of Shias, including Iranian diplomats and nationals, have been killed, went on to 
inflame rivalries. In the aftermath of the US invasion of Afghanistan Iran would 
start to form a strategic partnership with India.66  
Despite the sectarian violence it would be wrong to conclude that popular 
opinion in Pakistan was wholly against Iran. The Islamic Revolution had much 
wider appeal beyond Iran and the Shia community. As Mandaville points out, it 
was seen as a Third World victory in which a popular rising had replaced 
Western-backed, neo-imperialists with an indigenous alternative regime.67 In 
Pakistan and other Muslim countries, it had the added appeal of being an Islamic 
alternative at a time when Shia-Sunni rivalry had not developed to the proportions 
it would later assume. It is also likely that it would have resonated with Pakistani 
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anti-Americanism which was growing in the population as a whole through the 
1970s and 1980s for a variety of reasons, which included American support for 
Zia’s dictatorship.68 This sentiment increased after the Pressler sanctions were 
imposed. Even after the upsurge of sectarian violence, Iran still continued to gain 
the approval of the majority of Pakistanis. Opinion polls showed that from 2006 to 
2012 the proportion of Pakistanis expressing a favourable view of Iran ranged 
between 67-76 per cent.69  
This short review of Pakistan-Iran relations suggests that whilst the main 
divergence between Pakistani and US interests was about India there was also 
considerable divergence over Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979. However, 
it can also be claimed that Pakistan’s interests in relation to Iran are still 
substantially India-centric. In this light, Duranni’s claims that Pakistan’s 
relationship with Iran was an added reason for the downturn in relations with the 
US, and that Khomeini was popular with both Shias and non-Shias, appear 
credible. 
 
4.5 Clinton and Benazir Bhutto: A Partial Thaw 
From a position of apparently unassailable popularity at the time of the 
Gulf War, Bush’s approval ratings steadily declined, and he failed to get re-
elected for a second term. Despite steering the world through the end of the Cold 
War and the first post-Cold War conflict, he was replaced by the Democrat, Bill 
Clinton, who had a long domestic agenda but less clarity about how to deal with 
the new world shaped by his predecessor.70 The US was now the world’s greatest 
military and economic power, but Clinton was soon confronted with a diverse 
range of foreign policy problems, which included bloody civil wars in 
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda. These crises prompted calls for US 
humanitarian intervention. This was fuelled and complicated by the extensive 
reach of media coverage which caused an anonymous US official to observe, “Mr 
and Mrs Couch Potato want us to stop civil wars and save the hungry. They see 
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the military as the best way to do that, but when people get killed they won’t stand 
for it.”71 Then, just a few weeks after Clinton’s inauguration, a foreign terrorist 
attack on the World Trade Centre, killed six people and caused extensive injuries 
and disruption, thus bringing international terrorism to US soil and adding this 
problem to Washington’s mix of pressing foreign policy and security issues. 
It was over the more familiar nuclear issue that the new US administration 
first had cause for concern. In January 1993, US intelligence reported that China 
had supplied nuclear capable M-11 missiles to Pakistan in violation of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime.72 This was an informal, voluntary association of 
countries which agreed to the non-proliferation of WMD delivery systems by 
coordinating international export licensing.73 This time the US applied sanctions 
on China which affected $1 billion worth of Chinese exports but had no impact on 
Pakistan.  
However, it was not long before Clinton seriously took up the issue of 
international terrorism with Pakistan in a way which also suggested the 
Democrats might be returning to their pro-India disposition. The US was aware 
that Pakistan was supporting the insurgency in Kashmir. Warnings were given 
that Pakistan was in danger of being declared a state which sponsored terrorism, 
and put in the same category as Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Libya. This would 
have seriously damaged Pakistan’s status and reputation all around the world and 
would have further limited its access to aid from international organisation like 
the World Bank and the IMF, never mind the US and the West more generally.74  
However, Clinton held back from fully blacklisting Pakistan and, instead, 
put it on a “watch list” of suspected state sponsors of terrorism for six months 
without formally admitting this had been done.75 The director of the ISI, Javed 
Nasir, was also singled out for special attention. The CIA had developed a dislike 
for him because they suspected him of not co-operating in efforts to get the 
Afghan mujahidin to return the Stinger missiles provided by the US in the fight 
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against the Soviet occupation.76 In addition, Nasir was accused of breaking an 
arms embargo in Bosnia by supplying arms and weapons to the Bosnian Muslim 
resistance.77 Since the US was also backing the Bosnian Muslims by this time, 
Nasir largely escaped recriminations for the latter.  
Nevertheless, the US insisted that Nasir be removed from office if 
Pakistan wanted to avoid being declared a terrorist state. These warnings had a 
galvanizing effect on Nawaz Sharif who sent Akram Zaki, of his Foreign 
Ministry, to Washington with assurances that his government would put an end to 
extremism and terrorism inside Pakistan. The new Secretary of State, Warren 
Christopher, made it plain that the US expected Pakistan to back this assurance 
with action and, accordingly, Islamabad cracked down on the Arab militants 
operating on its territory. As a result, many of them crossed the border and went 
to Afghanistan looking for sanctuary.78 In addition, Nawaz Sharif removed Nasir, 
along with some other ISI officials, from their posts in May 1993. These actions 
were sufficient for Clinton to remove Pakistan from the “watch list” the following 
July. This was, however, against the advice of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism 
Division.79  
There was further instability in Pakistan which resulted in the resignation 
of both Nawaz Sharif and President Ghulam as under heavy pressure from the 
military. This paved the way for fresh elections - the third in five years - which 
brought Benazir Bhutto back to power as Prime Minister.80 With fresh leaders in 
both countries, US-Pakistan relations began to show some signs of improvement. 
Benazir Bhutto introduced some measures which won approval in Washington. 
One of the more important of these was the renewed targeting of drug traffickers. 
This was important in the US where the “War on Drugs” had been steadily 
promoted up the political agenda and had taken on an international dimension. 
Afghanistan was a major producer of opium and the porous border with Pakistan 
made it a prime smuggling route for onward distribution to the West.  
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Relations also improved through a succession of reciprocal visits by top-
ranking military leaders throughout 1994-95.81 Yet the nuclear issue remained a 
stumbling block. This prompted the Clinton administration to devise a new 
gradual strategy to deal with nuclear proliferation in South Asia which was to first 
cap WMDs, then reduce them over time, and eventually to eliminate them 
altogether. For Pakistan this meant that the US was not now aiming at abolishing 
existing capabilities or devices but simply hoping to stop any further 
development.82  
With this in mind, Strobe Talbott discussed with Pakistani officials the 
delivery of 28 F-16 fighter aircraft, which Pakistan had already paid for but which 
had never been delivered because of the Pressler sanctions. Talbott sought to use 
these aircraft as a means to persuade Islamabad to cap its programme and allow 
inspection of its nuclear facilities. However, Benazir Bhutto rejected the offer. “If 
we are unilaterally pressed for the capping, it will be discriminatory, and Pakistan 
will not agree.”83 Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff also rejected the proposal on the 
grounds that it was not possible to bargain over Pakistan’s nuclear programme 
with F-16s or anything else. India was at the heart of this stand. Because the US 
did not force India to roll back its nuclear programme, this was seen by Pakistan 
as outright discrimination. 
Pakistan’s policy-makers also linked the nuclear programme with 
Kashmir. Benazir Bhutto emphasised the link and argued that Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme was not the main source of instability in the region. “There cannot be 
peace in the region,” she said, “without the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir 
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issue.”84 The US proposal thus failed as neither Pakistan nor India was willing to 
abandon their nuclear programme and allow international inspection of their 
nuclear facilities.85  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, new geopolitical considerations 
were emerging in Central and South Asia in which Pakistan again potentially 
fulfilled a strategic role for the US. The five former Central Asian Republics of 
the USSR had become independent states at the very end of 1991 and were 
attracting interest because of the oil and gas there, notably in Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan. Being landlocked, it would be necessary to construct pipelines to get 
the oil and gas out to the world market. As a result, Pakistan, with its deep sea 
port at Gwadar, was perceived to be a key part of such a network. In addition, 
Pakistan appeared to be balancing the principles of Islam with secular democracy 
so it might act as successful model of moderation for other Muslim countries, 
particularly the Central Asian states, in preference to the more extremist Iranian 
model.  
The US was also encouraged to work with Pakistan because it had been a 
partner on several peacekeeping operations around the world and co-operated in 
fighting terrorism and drugs trafficking. These factors, combined with the 
realisation that sanctions were not preventing nuclear proliferation, prompted the 
Clinton administration to work with Congress to undo the restrictions placed on it 
by the Pressler Amendment.86 US Defence Secretary, William Perry, 
demonstrated this shift in thinking when he visited Pakistan in January 1995 and 
observed that the Pressler Amendment had failed to achieve its objective and 
instead had been counter-productive.87 He also illustrated how it had created 
frustration and anti-American sentiment among the Pakistani population at large: 
“I have never been to a country where even the taxicab drivers and the school 
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children know in detail about a law passed by the US Congress.”88 The following 
April, Benazir Bhutto visited the US and put the case for changing the Pressler 
Amendment. She argued that it had frozen the US-Pakistan relationship and 
“rewards Indian intransigence and punishes Pakistani loyalty and friendship.”89  
This loyalty had been clearly shown only two months earlier when 
Pakistan and the US had successfully co-operated in a joint operation in 
Islamabad to apprehend Ramzi Yousef, the suspected mastermind behind the 
1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Pakistan had also speeded up the 
arrangements for Yousef’s extradition to the US.90 This enabled Clinton to give 
warm words of appreciation at the press conference concluding Benazir Bhutto’s 
visit, not just for Yousef’s capture but also for Pakistan’s help in peacekeeping 
operations. On the question of sanctions he said, “I plan to work with Congress to 
find ways to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to preserve the aims of 
the of the Pressler amendment, while building a stronger relationship with a 
secure, more prosperous Pakistan.”91 Benazir Bhutto expressed her pleasure over 
Clinton’s remarks and hope for a resolution to the issue of the F-16 aircraft which 
she felt should either be delivered to Pakistan or the money reimbursed. However 
Clinton’s reference to this issue stressed the complications and limitations 
involved and was in stark contrast to Reagan’s bland assurances accompanying 
his annual certificates throughout the proxy Afghan campaign: 
I intend to consult with [Congress] about what we ought to do about the airplane 
sale……. We cannot release the equipment. However Pakistan made payment. The 
sellers of the equipment gave up title and received the money, and now it’s in storage. I 
don’t think what happened was fair to Pakistan in terms of money. ...  So, I intend to 
consult with Congress on that and see what we can do.92  
 
Where Reagan had been able to soothe Congress to allow aid to flow 
uninterrupted to Pakistan, Clinton now had to struggle to persuade it to ease 
restrictions. His aim was not to abandon Pressler but merely to negotiate revisions 
which would allow commitments entered into prior to the 1991 sanctions to be 
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honoured. In addition he hoped to resume economic aid and military training.93 To 
do this, he needed to work with the Republican Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Sub-Committee for South Asia, Senator Hank Brown, who held a series of 
hearings to examine the effects of the Pressler Amendment. Some Cold War logic 
was revived which portrayed India as linked to Russia and Pakistan to the US, and 
that sanctions had produced a conventional imbalance of forces favouring India.94  
The evidence given on 14 September 1995 by Assistant Secretary of State 
for South Asian Affairs, Robin Raphel, was more telling in terms of how Pakistan 
was needed in the cause of post-Cold War US objectives. She stressed that while 
the Administration strongly supported the goal of curbing Pakistan’s nuclear 
weapons programme, the legislation needed to be revised to fit current global 
realities: 
Of most immediate concern are the Pressler roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's 
Government in areas such as combating terrorism and furthering U.S. commercial 
interests in a lucrative market, where U.S. firms need … to level the playing field with 
their European competitors. … Pressler sanctions have also changed Pakistani 
perceptions of their role in the world. For most of the past 40 years, Pakistan's strong, 
Western orientation has been continually reinforced by a broad range of contacts with the 
United States. Five years of sanctions have cut off contacts, training, and cooperative 
projects that reinforced this orientation. No one should be surprised if Pakistani military 
officers and civilians look elsewhere for training and contacts, and for inspiration and 
friendship. Given its troubled neighbourhood, Pakistan stands in danger, over time, of 
drifting in directions contrary to our fundamental interest and its own.95  
 
Senator Brown then introduced yet another amendment which was 
approved by 55 to 44 votes in the Senate and was signed into law by Clinton on 
27 January 1996. The arguments in favour emphasised the loyalty of Pakistan to 
the US, the discriminatory nature of Pressler and the unfairness of its application. 
Brown claimed that waiving restrictions to sell Pakistan $368 million of out-dated 
and old-fashioned equipment would not disturb the military balance in the 
subcontinent and suggested the US refusal to deliver aircraft or return money to 
Pakistan a breach of contract.96  
                                   
93
 Haass, Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, p. 167. 
94
 Lloyds I. Rudolph and Sussane H. Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy towards South Asia: 
Regional Imperatives and the Imperial Presidency (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2008), p. 
194. 
95
 Dispatch Magazine, “Robin Raphel’s Statement before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC, September 14, 
1995”, US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 6, No. 39, 25  September 1995, <http://dosfan .lib. 
uic.edu/ERC/briefing/ dispatch/1995/html/ Dispatchv6no39.html> [Accessed 13 November 2013. 
96
 Rudolph and Rudolph, Making US Foreign Policy towards South Asia, pp. 193-194.  
 142 
 
The original anti-proliferation campaigners also came out in favour of the 
new amendment, including Pressler, Glenn and Lugar, who had helped steer the 
Pressler Amendment through Congress.97 The Brown Amendment removed non-
military aid from the provisions of Pressler and gave the President authority for a 
one-off waiver to release military equipment embargoed since 1991. As a result, 
Clinton released $368 million worth of military equipment, but was barred from 
releasing the F-16s since Congress had opposed this on the grounds that they 
could be used to deliver nuclear weapons.98 New military aid would also continue 
to be barred, but limited assistance in key areas, such as peacekeeping, counter-
terrorism and counter-narcotics, was resumed.  
The Symington Amendment was still in place, however, and continued to 
embargo military training, investment guarantees and economic assistance from 
the US, particularly since intelligence reports revealed Pakistan had obtained ring 
magnets for enriching uranium from the Chinese, in addition to the M-11 missile 
launchers they had got in 1993.99 Despite the warm rhetoric and the Congressional 
struggle, however, the Brown Amendment was a disappointment. Because the F-
16s could not be released Clinton planned to sell them to a third party and 
reimburse Pakistan from the proceeds but the US was unable to persuade any 
eligible buyer to make a purchase. Although the remaining military hardware was 
released, the rest of the provisions of the Brown Amendment, such as the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Trade and Development 
Assistance (TDA), and International Military Education and Training (IMET), 
were not be implemented. As a result, the overall significance of the passing of 
the Brown Amendment proved to be rather limited.100  
Although this period of comparative thaw did not revive strong bilateral 
relations, Pakistan continued to help the US in its struggle against terrorism and 
drug trafficking. For example, a joint FBI-Pakistan operation caught Mir Aimal 
Kasi who was accused of killing two CIA agents outside their US headquarters in 
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January 1993, apparently in retaliation for US actions against Muslims. Kasi fled 
the US to shelter on the Afghan-Pakistan border where he was handed over to the 
FBI in June 1997 and flown to the US to be subsequently tried and executed.  In a 
precursor of later incidents, there was widespread protest in Pakistan and the rest 
of the Muslim world because the proper extradition process had not been gone 
through. Four US oil workers in Pakistan were shot by gunmen in suspected 
revenge for what was widely seen as the “illegal abduction” of Kasi.101 These 
events caused tension between the US and Pakistan governments which were only 
exacerbated by the removal of Benazir Bhutto from power once again and the 
return of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister after elections in 1997.  
The US-Pakistan thaw had another severe setback in May 1998 when, in 
response to five nuclear test explosions by India, Pakistan detonated six of its own 
and thus removed any doubt whatsoever about its capability. The US re-imposed 
economic sanctions but still tried to remain engaged with Pakistan. Clinton’s new 
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, considered that engaging with Pakistan, 
rather than just imposing sanctions would best serve US interests.102 Instead, she 
set out three main aims for the US in South Asia: to prevent nuclear competition; 
to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime; and to improve the 
relationship between Pakistan and India by promoting dialogue between them. As 
part of this policy, the US offered to resume conventional military aid to Pakistan, 
it actively sought dialogue with India and the two countries signed formal 
agreements, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to restrict the 
development of their nuclear weapons. Whilst expressing clear disapproval of 
Pakistan’s exploding a nuclear device in May 1988, Strobe Talbott said: “... the 
US understood and continues to understand your concerns with a nuclear-capable 
India and your desire to ensure that your vital security interests are protected”.103 
In the event, neither country signed the Test Ban Treaty, but they did declare a 
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suspension of further nuclear testing.104 Thus, with the exception of the brief and 
limited respite of the Brown Amendment, the US Congress continued to support 
the Pressler Amendment right up to 22 September 2001. 
 
4.6 After the End of the Soviet War in Afghanistan 
 While Washington and Islamabad were engaged in manoeuvring over 
sanctions, the situation in Afghanistan was evolving in a way which would come 
to have profound effects on global politics – and with specific implications for 
both the US and Pakistan. After the Soviet troops left Afghanistan in February 
1989, the US had achieved its primary objective.  The new CIA Director, William 
Webster, hosted a champagne party to celebrate and he received a congratulatory 
two-word cable from the US embassy in Islamabad which summed up the 
triumphal sentiment of the occasion. It said simply: “We won”105  
 However, from the moment of American victory, Afghanistan lost its 
strategic importance to US policymakers. The former Director of the CIA, Robert 
Gates, observed that, “Afghanistan was a battlefield between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, now that the battle is ended, we have other agendas and 
other countries in mind and Afghanistan is not one of them.”106  However, 
subsequent events demonstrate that Gates’ interpretation of the conflict was 
narrow, simplistic and misplaced. The war was clearly not just a Cold War 
struggle between the superpowers. It also encompassed a range of Islamic causes 
and regional security interests, many of which were contradictory and 
independent of the US and USSR. Gates was correct, however, in stating that the 
US had moved on to other things. President George Bush appointed an 
ambassador in Kabul, but he remained in Washington for security reasons. 
Clinton went even further and left the post unfilled when he took office.  
 Apart from the Soviet army, the belligerents had not left the battlefield and 
their battles were not over. Najibullah’s PDPA government did not fall 
immediately after the Soviet withdrawal. Instead, it remained in power until 
Soviet aid was withdrawn after the collapse of the USSR in December 1991. The 
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Mujahidin, for its part, continued to receive aid from the ISI.107 Finally, in 1992, 
the Mujahidin entered the Afghan capital of Kabul to overthrow the PDPA 
government. Najibullah was brutally murdered, and Burhanuddin Rabbani was 
installed on 28 June 1992 as President of the newly declared Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan.  
 However, Rabbani was an unsatisfactory choice as far as Pakistan was 
concerned. He was a Tajik supported by Pakistan’s rivals, Iran, Russia and India. 
Islamabad favoured the Pashtun, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-i-Islami 
group, which had undertaken to recognise the Durand Line between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.108 After the fall of the PDPA, the different Mujahidin groups turned 
on each other as they struggled for power. Warlords added to the chaos as the 
country was engulfed in a long and bloody civil war which was fuelled by outside 
powers supporting their own chosen faction and group.  
There has been much criticism of the US for the chaos which 
overwhelmed Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Brigadier Gul and Colonel 
Hanif both felt that US managed the end of their involvement in the conflict 
poorly and too abruptly. Hanif considers it was their duty to deal with the groups 
which they had made powerful, to disarm them and to work for a stable 
government. Gul was unsure if this apparent oversight was deliberate or down to 
lack of political insight.109 The political scientist Mehmood Ali Shah had no 
doubts and characterised it as “foolish and immature”. He thought the US should 
have remained “until the formation of stable government in Afghanistan and then 
slowly and gradually evacuated.”110  
However, it is unclear how the US could have rebuilt the country. This had 
been a proxy war and the US had no presence of regular forces in the country 
when the Soviet war came to an end. Their influence on the different factions of 
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the Mujahidin was largely indirect and relied on Pakistan as the intermediary. In 
any case, Washington was not the only source of military and economic aid to the 
rebels. It would also have been difficult for the US to intervene militarily after the 
Soviet withdrawal. The Geneva Accords recognised the legitimacy of the 
Najibullah regime and did not demand its overthrow.111 This was generally seen 
as a major problem with the accords, but they did not appear to legitimise the idea 
of forcible regime change.  Supporters of the PDPA government, most notably the 
USSR, India and Iran, would have strongly opposed any military intervention 
from America.  
It is also unclear how the US could have equitably disarmed the various 
factions since Pakistan had insisted on controlling the distribution of weapons and 
equipment. Proof that this flow could not be reversed lay in the fact that the US 
had been unable to retrieve the Stinger missiles which had been so decisive in the 
guerrilla campaign and that the Mujahidin were now determined to keep. This 
particular case highlights America’s lack of influence in Afghanistan at the end of 
the war. This also casts doubt on America’s claim to have won the war. On the 
contrary, Lieven claims that the ISI saw victory over the USSR as its own 
achievement.112 The extent to which Pakistan could claim victory was also a 
matter of debate. Zia had played a leading role in the war, but he had been unable 
to determine the peace terms, which his successors found far from ideal from 
Pakistan’s perspective.  
General Duranni, was not critical of America’s departure from 
Afghanistan. He argued that, “Wrapping up things in Afghanistan was the job of 
Afghans and then Pakistan and also to some extent the Iranians.” However, the 
way Pakistan then went about “wrapping up”, in the absence of the US, became 
very contentious. General Zia had obstinately opposed the Geneva Accord on the 
grounds that Afghanistan needed a government acceptable to the majority of its 
people and he had accordingly proposed an inclusive interim regime. Inclusivity 
was perceived to be as much a pragmatic as idealist matter.113 General Duranni 
emphasised the fact that Afghan society was highly disparate with independent 
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tribes spread far and wide and in such a way that even a small faction could cause 
widespread destabilisation.  
...if you want to bring back stability then the basic principle is a simple one: all the major 
factions in Afghanistan have to be agreed. Even the small factions … So right from the 
beginning, all of us had just one thing in mind, how do you put these people together, 
how do we make that big Jirga. In those days we used to say ‘broad-based 
government’.114  
 
Colonel Hanif conceded that Pakistan had initially been in a good position 
to mediate because it had the confidence of many of the factions, but he felt it 
failed to take advantage of this. 
No faction in Afghanistan was against Pakistan because we were supporting all those 
factions in Afghanistan against the USSR. Those factions became anti-Pakistani when 
later on Pakistan started supporting the Pashtun faction and then the Taliban. It was at 
that time, the Northern Alliance and other anti-Taliban elements became hostile to 
Pakistan.115  
 
Hanif was not alone in criticising the strategy of supporting the Pashtun-
based Hekmatyar at the expense of inclusivity. Ambassador Naqvi says this would 
only have worked if Hekmatyar had been acceptable to the rest of the Mujahidin 
which, of course, he was not. Naqvi also considered the basic assumption that 
Pakistan needed to side with the Pashtuns to be at fault. Afghanistan was a mix of 
Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras as well as Pashtuns, and the Pashtun element was big 
enough to look after its own interests without Pakistan trying to fight battles on 
their behalf.116 In addition to his criticism of the US, Mehmood Shah was also 
critical of Pakistan which he felt should have treated Afghanistan as a sovereign, 
independent and respectable state and helped it become a stable, progressive 
country. For this to work, however, Shah added that all the neighbouring 
countries, Iran, India and the Central Asian states, would have to have done 
likewise. Otherwise, he argued, “... Afghanistan will remain unstable and if 
Afghanistan is unstable then the whole of Asia will be unstable, both Central and 
South Asia.”117   
Hanif argued that Pakistan and Iran should be singled out for particular 
blame. Instead of working jointly for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan they did 
the opposite and tried to dominate events to suit their own interests.  
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That was quite unfortunate for us. We interfered in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs a lot.  
Therefore, I think it was a great mistake of both Iran and Pakistan that they didn’t 
struggle for the establishment of peaceful and stable government in Afghanistan.118  
 
Despite Zia’s obstinacy in the cause of an inclusive regime, his successors 
appear to have gone in the opposite direction by backing their favoured faction 
against the others. This suggests the military concept of strategic depth was still 
paramount in the minds of the Pakistan leaders at the time. They mistakenly 
believed that the best way to maintain Pakistan security was through military 
proxies rather than promoting political stability in Afghanistan through diplomacy 
and compromise.  
 
4.7 The Rise of the Taliban 
 The Taliban, an extreme Muslim movement following strict Islamic Sharia 
law, emerged out of the anarchy that gripped Afghanistan at this time. Led by 
Mullah Omar, the Taliban was founded in the Pashtun province of Kandahar, in 
the south of Afghanistan, where people were tired of endless hostilities among 
different warlords. There, the Taliban dispensed quick justice based on a mixture 
of Islamic laws and Pashtun practices. It is said the Taliban first came to 
prominence in spring 1994, when a warlord in Kandahar kidnapped and raped two 
girls. Mullah Omar led a band of 30 religious students (Talibs), armed with just 16 
rifles, who freed the girls and hanged the warlord from a barrel of a tank. A few 
months later, a boy who two commanders wanted to sodomise was freed by 
Mullah Omar and his band of Taliban. As these stories became known, appeals 
started coming in from different parts of the country asking for the Taliban to help 
out in other local disputes. Thus, Mullah Omar emerged as a heroic figure who 
helped the poor against the cruel and the powerful. To add to his quickly growing 
reputation, Mullah Omar never asked for any kind of reward from the people he 
helped.119  
Mullah Omar soon became Ameer (Head) of Kandahar. This is perceived 
to be a very significant position because other holders have often gone on to 
capture the whole of Afghanistan, the most prominent being Ahmed Shah Abdali.  
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Mullah Omar was determined to follow this historic path, and he went out of his 
way to increase the number of his Talib followers.  Over time, Taliban forces 
subdued provinces and captured the major cities of the country - Jalalabad, in 
1995, Herat, and Kabul in 1996, and Mazar-i-Sharif, in northern Afghanistan, in 
1997. Soon after this, the Taliban regime was formally recognised by Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.120  
Because of the later importance of the Taliban in US-Pakistan relations, it 
is important to consider the origins of the movement and the extent to which 
American or Pakistani agencies were instrumental in its creation. The political 
scientist Rasool Rais is clear that the Taliban emerged in the “vacuum of 
statelessness and hopelessness” that Afghanistan had become and in which the 
people craved security.121 Ambassador Ayaz Wazir, in an interview, stressed that 
Afghanistan at that time was highly chaotic, riven by uncontrolled and 
unaccountable warlords who took taxes and imposed disruptive tolls and that 
“everybody’s life [was] at risk, everybody’s honour [was] at risk, nobody was 
safe, nobody’s property or family was safe.” In these conditions the, “people of 
Afghanistan were ready to give their support to anyone, whether that was Mullah 
Omar or some other leader, who promised to bring peace and stability.”122  
The Taliban was a product of indigenous struggle which grew through 
promoting peace and stability in one province after the other.123 General Duranni 
was clear that external forces, including Pakistan and the ISI, could not create 
such groups or even the environment in which such groups emerge. This was 
probably true, but the Taliban was largely welcomed as a force by fellow 
Pahstuns.124 However, as Wazir pointed out, they faced greater problems when 
they marched north, out of the Pashtun areas and confronted the Tajiks, Uzbeks 
and Hazaras. It was at this point that the Taliban looked for assistance from 
external forces, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.125 Despite this outside 
support, Brigadier Gul emphasised the Taliban’s independent and inward looking 
perspective. Mullah Omar was unwilling to take orders from others and had little 
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idea how his regime would interact with the rest of the world. This failure 
contributed significantly to Afghanistan’s isolation. 
They controlled almost 94% - 95% of the total Afghanistan, but Mullah Omar did not 
have a geo-strategy, any geo-political or military knowledge. ... The only thing they were 
able to do significantly was [secure] peace in Afghanistan. Narcotics cultivation had been 
stopped but other than this, their diplomacy was awful .... All the countries of the world 
need alliances for commerce, for trade and for your economic well-being, but the Taliban 
government didn’t have any such policy.126  
 
Pakistan abandoned Hekmatyar when it became clear in 1994 that he was 
losing ground to other groups and transferred its support to the Taliban.127 Mullah 
Omar was already well known to the ISI because he had trained in their camps in 
the 1980s and fought against the USSR in Afghanistan.128 Indeed, most of the 
Taliban were children of the anti-Soviet jihad, and many were born in refugee 
camps in Pakistan and educated in Madrassas.129 Practically all members of the 
Taliban were from Afghanistan’s main ethnic Pashtun group. They were Sunnis, 
following strict Islamic Sharia law.  
Pakistan favoured the Pashtun because they made up the majority in 
Afghanistan and enjoyed significant support in the Pakistan military and the ISI. 
At least twenty percent of the military were of Pashtun background whilst the ISI 
tended to favour the Taliban’s radical view of Islam.130 A sympathetic 
government in Kabul was seen by these groups as essential for security reasons, 
even if the Taliban never supported Pakistan on what the government saw as the 
vital issue of the Durand line. Nevertheless, Islamabad hoped that the Taliban 
might improve Pakistan’s relations with the newly independent states of Central 
Asia.131 The Afghan civil war was preventing trade and the supply of oil and gas 
from those areas.132 If a sympathetic Taliban regime could succeed in re-
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establishing stability in Afghanistan, this could have significant economic and 
political benefits for Islamabad.133  
The ISI was the main conduit for aid to the Taliban, and the agency’s 
officers also served as military advisers.134 Several Taliban offensives were 
extremely well planned and executed with a swift, effective style of warfare that 
could only have been possible with the assistance of the Pakistani military and the 
ISI.135 The future military dictator of Pakistan, General Musharraf, explained why 
it had been essential to maintain support for the Taliban even after it had taken 
power. “If we had broken with them, that would have created a new enemy on 
our western border, or a vacuum of power there into which might have stepped 
the Northern Alliance comprising of anti-Pakistan elements.”136 Musharraf had 
India in mind when he talked about anti-Pakistan elements. Delhi had perceived a 
victory for the Taliban as a victory for Pakistan. It had, therefore, airlifted fuel 
supplies to the Northern Alliance which was the only military opposition to the 
Taliban on the ground in Afghanistan.137  
There is also evidence to suggest that Washington also backed the 
Taliban. The official US line was that it supported the UN mission which sought 
to negotiate with the warring factions and establish an Interim Council. However 
Brigadier Gul recalled that the CIA started taking an interest the Taliban in 1995, 
at the time they were taking Jalalabad and Herat.   
Once I was asked by the US defence attaché in Islamabad, “Who are the Taliban?” My 
answer to him was, “you tell me who the Taliban are”. And he started laughing and said 
that I hear the ISI is supporting them. I said that I hear that CIA is supporting them too. 
So there was a climate of doubt and suspicion.138  
 
Also in 1995 there were signs that the Clinton administration favoured 
Mullah Omar’s movement. Assistant Secretary of State, Robin Raphel, reported 
to Congress on the Afghan situation and picked out the Taliban as the one group 
that favoured a peaceful solution. 
The reluctance of factional leaders to relinquish their personal power for the overall good 
of Afghanistan remains the major obstacle [to peace and stability in Afghanistan]. While 
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the intentions of the Taliban movement are unclear, its leadership has expressed support 
in principle for a peaceful political process.139  
 
Taliban intentions became clearer in 1996 when they captured the Afghan 
capital and began to impose repressive laws which their religious police (the 
Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppression of Vice) implemented with 
violent measures which included the frequent use of the death penalty. The 
Taliban banned television, music and dance and forced every male in Afghanistan 
to wear a beard. Their code also prohibited women from attending schools or 
working outside their homes except in some aspects of health care.140 Despite 
these repressive laws, the US seemed reluctant to raise objections.  
Raphel later noted that there were “misgivings” at the time, but stressed 
that the Taliban was an “indigenous” movement that had fought legitimately to 
“stay in power”.141 A State Department spokesman, Glyn Davies, said that, “the 
United States finds nothing objectionable in the policy statements of the new 
government, including its move to impose Islamic law.”142 Although there was 
growing evidence of the Taliban’s suppression of women and its increasing 
cruelty towards the people of Afghanistan, and most particularly non-Pashtuns, it 
was argued that the US did nothing because the Taliban was perceived to be anti-
Iranian, anti-Shia, and apparently pro-Western.143  
General Aslam Baig claims the US went beyond just tolerating the 
Taliban and was far more pro-active. Indeed it is doubtful that the Taliban would 
have been so successful without US support.144 It was not possible for Pakistan, 
with its weak economy, to finance such a costly adventure on its own. The 
Taliban was getting some of its finances from tolls on transport and the drug 
trade, but this was not enough to pay for their expensive and long-term military 
expeditions against powerful rival forces. Meher claims that Pakistan had 
continued to act as a conduit for substantial financial assistance from Saudi 
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Arabia in a triangular relationship with the US.145 Officials in Washington deny 
that they supported the Taliban and point to the fact that the US government 
spoke against the violation of human rights in Afghanistan, including those of 
women, and also supported the UN effort to build a broad-based transitional 
government in Afghanistan.146 However, this position was undermined by 
Benazir Bhutto when she told the BBC on 14 October 1996 that “the United 
States and Britain supplied weapons to the Taliban on money provided by Saudi 
Arabia.”147 Further support for the idea of the US backing the Taliban was 
provided by Congressman Rohrabacher who had tried to arrange the supply of 
humanitarian aid for a non-Taliban area, but claimed he was blocked by Clinton’s 
Assistant Secretary of State, Karl Indefurth (who had replaced Raphel on South 
Asian Affairs). Rohrabacher told the House of Representatives on 19 July 2004:  
We knew it was clear that the United States was supporting the Taliban, but what is even 
more poignant, most Afghans believed that the Taliban were created by the United States 
of America and that they had our support. ... If there was any doubt about my suspicions 
about U.S. policy, it was confirmed in 1997 when high-level executives from the Clinton 
administration saved the Taliban from total defeat and extinction.  ... We knew by that 
time that the Taliban were evil. Yet we helped save them because we had made a deal 
with Pakistan and with Saudi Arabia to create the Taliban and to keep them in power.148  
 
Thus the claims of Gul, Baig and Benazir Bhutto, from the Pakistani side, 
and of Rohrabacher, from the US side, suggest that some elements of the US 
security establishment were actively involved in supporting the Taliban. Whether 
Raphel knew or approved is in doubt. In 1995, she told Congress:  
Outside assistance to individual faction leaders has only strengthened their intransigence. 
We have worked hard with like-minded states to stop material support and funding for 
the belligerent factions, and to support the UN efforts to foster a return of peace and 
stability to Afghanistan.149  
 
If the rich natural resources of Central Asia were attracting regional 
interest they were also attracting strong interest from international energy 
corporations, including those in the US. A primary problem all had to address, 
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though, was how to get physical access through these landlocked states. This, in 
turn, raised problems of political access and support in transit states as well as 
governments in the Central Asian states themselves. The only access options for 
the West were through Russia, Iran or Afghanistan. The Russian route was 
expensive and Moscow could not be relied upon to give an easy entry to the US. 
The most economical option would have been through Iran but hostile relations 
made this mutually unacceptable to both Tehran and Washington. Therefore the 
only remaining option was through Pakistan and Afghanistan.150  
Thus, US policy makers were now pressured by energy companies, 
particularly the Unocal Corporation, over the need for a stable authority with 
whom they could make a sustainable deal. Some of the most significant energy 
resources were in South Turkmenistan where vast gas fields were discovered near 
Daulatabad in the early 1990s. The newly independent government of 
Turkmenistan was still largely dependent on Soviet infrastructure which included 
a heavily used pipeline system which took existing supplies of natural gas to 
Russia, so alternative routes for new pipelines had to be explored. An 
Argentinean company called Bridas proposed to build such a pipeline but, in 
1995, Turkmenistan broke with them in favour of a deal with the US Unocal 
Corporation.151  
By 1997 the Taliban had taken Mazar-i-Sharif and were in control of 
much of the country so Unocal invited three of its representatives to the US in 
December 1997.152 They stayed for five weeks in a five star hotel in Texas where 
future President, George W. Bush, was Governor at the time. They visited 
Unocal’s headquarters and met US officials including Thomas Gouttierre, a 
consultant with Unocal, who was also paid by the US for his services in 
Afghanistan.153 They had dinner with Martin Miller, the vice-president of Unocal, 
who served them halal food. Unocal promised that despite instability in 
Afghanistan, it would start building the pipeline very soon. Unocal was assured 
by the Taliban that its pipeline and workers would be safe. In the last days of their 
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stay, the Taliban representatives were invited to Washington to meet State 
Department officials, which prompted Lees to observe: 
The US government, which in the past has branded the Taliban's policies against women 
and children “despicable”, appears anxious to please the fundamentalists to clinch the 
lucrative pipeline contract. The Taliban is likely to have been impressed by the American 
government's interest as it is anxious to win international recognition.154  
 
International recognition was indeed an important bargaining point and the 
Taliban agreed to a $2 billion pipeline deal with Unocal only on the condition that 
the US officially recognised its government in Afghanistan. The Clinton 
administration started debating the possibility of de facto and de jure recognition 
of the Taliban government. Although Assistant Secretary of State Indefurth had 
expressed concern to the Taliban representatives about human rights and drug 
trafficking, their policies towards women hardened even further the following 
year and became a block to US recognition.155 There is evidence that Pakistan was 
also pressuring the Taliban to agree the deal. Brigadier Gul was under no illusion 
that Pakistan had told them to let Unocal lay the pipeline from Turkmenistan but 
blamed their intransigence for the collapse of the deal. “They had their minds set, 
and they didn’t want to listen to others.”156  
Where the government was constrained by human rights issues, Unocal 
itself was less fussy. It donated $900,000 to the Centre of Afghanistan Studies at 
the University of Omaha, Nebraska. This was the same institution that Ishtiaq 
Ahmed claimed had been instrumental in establishing the jihadi curriculum for the 
madrassas (see the previous chapter). This time the Centre set up a training and 
humanitarian aid programme for the people of Afghanistan and opened a school in 
Kandahar. It was run by Gerald Boardman who had formerly headed the US 
Agency for International Development in Peshawar which had provided cross-
border assistance to the Mujahidin. The school trained some 400 Afghan teachers, 
electricians and pipe-fitters to help Unocal lay the pipeline. This made the anti-
Taliban elements, including Russia and Iran, convinced that Unocal was funding 
the Taliban.157  
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The Taliban delegation to the US also met with Michael Malinowski, 
Director of the Pakistani, Afghanistan and Bangladesh Bureau. They discussed the 
Saudi terrorist financier, Osama bin Laden who, Malinowski argued, had 
damaged the image of Afghanistan to the world. The Taliban delegation assured 
Malinowski that bin Laden was simply a guest and would not cause any 
trouble.158 However, when al-Qaeda bombed US embassies in Tanzania and 
Kenya on 7 August 1998, the Taliban’s hospitality to al-Qaeda began to back-fire. 
In response, the US bombed terrorist training camps in the Afghan border areas 
where they believed bin Laden was located. Mullah Omar claimed the camps had 
already been closed and said the attacks showed America’s enmity towards the 
Afghan people. He was defiant that bin Laden would never be handed over to 
America.  
Pakistan announced that one of the US missiles hit a Pakistani border 
village killing five people which sparked anti-US demonstrations by the JUI and 
other Islamist parties. This also led to contradictory claims between the Pakistani 
government and the military about who knew what before the attack. Foreign 
Minister Sartaj Aziz said they had received no warning and had provided the US 
with no facilities for the attack. He still did not condemn the attack and only 
described it as unfortunate. The Pakistani military seemed to challenge this view 
of events. It was admitted that US General Ralston was in Islamabad at the time of 
the attacks and that the military was aware of imminent attacks against the Afghan 
terrorist camps. The military later said that they had objected to the attacks and 
wrote to that effect to Nawaz Sharif. The report of the explosion in the border 
village was later retracted, though two unexploded missiles did land on Pakistani 
territory.  
In the days that followed, aid agencies started withdrawing from 
Afghanistan and Unocal suspended its pipeline project indefinitely.159 UN 
sanctions were imposed on Afghanistan, and Pakistan was left to wrestle with an 
influx of yet more refugees and illicit smuggling in its volatile border regions. 
Foreign Minister Abdus Sattar observed, “United Nations agencies, bilateral 
donors, the United States, the United Kingdom and others have simply walked 
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away since 1989. But we can’t do that.”160 Osama bin Laden escaped the 
American bombs and it would be more than another twelve years before the US 
finally dealt with him.  
 
4.8 Musharraf: Another Military Coup 
 There was another crisis in relations between Pakistan and the US when 
Nawaz Sharif was overthrown by the military in October 1999. Pakistan’s Chief 
of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf, suspended both the constitution and 
parliament and named himself as the Chief Executive of Pakistan. He justified his 
coup by claiming that Nawaz Sharif’s recent interference in the affairs of the 
armed forces had contributed to turmoil and uncertainty in the country.161 
President Clinton urged Musharraf to quickly return the country to democracy. 
“Pakistan’s interests,” he said, “would be served by a prompt return to civilian 
rule and a restoration of the democratic process. I urge that Pakistan move quickly 
in that direction.”162  
 Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Thomas Pickering, 
expressed his country’s disappointment at the suspension of democracy in 
Pakistan. At a Foreign Policy Forum at George Washington University on 6 
December 1999, he stated that the only option open was the re-imposition of 
sanctions.  
Until we see a restoration of civilian democratic government in Pakistan, we have made 
it clear we would not be in a position to carry out business as usual with Pakistani 
authorities. Section 508 of the Foreign Operational Appropriations Act contains a 
prohibition against a broad range of assistance for any country whose democratically 
elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree. We are now in a 
process of making a legal determination that such sanctions should be applied.163  
 
Congress approved the sanctions, but since Pakistan was already suffering 
under the Pressler, Symington and Glen amendments, the new sanctions had little 
impact.  
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A tour of South Asia had already been planned for Clinton in March 2000. 
Because of the coup he was initially unwilling to keep his commitment to visit 
Pakistan, but ultimately decided to go. During this landmark tour, Clinton spent a 
glorious five days in India and a tense five hours in Pakistan.164 The obvious 
contrast between the two visits illustrated the President’s complete 
disenchantment with Pakistan and his country’s tilt towards India.165 Clinton even 
refused to shake hands with Musharraf in front of the cameras.166 In Islamabad, 
Clinton met General Musharraf and urged him to develop a time-table for 
restoring democracy. He also encouraged him to use Pakistan’s good relationship 
with the Taliban government to persuade them to close down the terrorist training 
camps in Afghanistan. Musharraf agreed to take up the issue of terrorist camps 
with the Taliban but gave no time-table for national elections.167 However, as a 
result of an earlier visit in 2000 by US officials, the FBI was committed to 
training Pakistani police officers in counter-terrorism.168 This proved far-sighted 
in the light of 9/11 which occurred less than a year after the agreements were 
made.  
 
4.9 Strategic Outcomes for the US and Pakistan 
 Assessing the consequences of the relationship for the US in this period is 
complex because its strategies and interests were being reformulated and were no 
longer driven by the Cold War. First, Bush (Senior) and then Clinton had to work 
out what America would do with its undisputed power now that its central focus 
had collapsed and world politics began to fragment into a variety of more 
ambiguous problems with varying degrees of relevance to US security. Bush’s 
first preoccupation was with steering the Western alliance safely through the 
potential dangers of the Soviet collapse. Thereafter he veered between 
intervention against Iraq, where oil supplies were threatened, and minimal 
intervention to support freedom and democracy elsewhere, such as in 
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Yugoslavia.169 Once it was clear the USSR was under strain and seriously wanted 
a way out of its Afghan debacle, Pakistan became a problem again. Zia’s obstinate 
opposition impeded negotiations over the Geneva Accords but, for whatever 
reason, the US got its way by the required deadline. After that Pakistan became a 
problem in two more ways. First was the nuclear programme where, after years of 
indulgent wilful blindness, the US could once again condemn and sanction 
Pakistan in the cause of non-proliferation. However, the Afghan interlude had 
been long enough for Pakistan to cross all America’s thresholds and red lines, so 
sanctions had little effect other than to vindicate the pro-sanctions lobby in 
Congress and to make Pakistan feel betrayed yet again. At the same time, it is 
unlikely that this would have gone unnoticed in India where, with the USSR gone, 
the possibilities for that “first choice” relationship were brighter. The second 
problem Pakistan posed for Bush’s foreign policy was over Kashmir, not just in 
relation to potential nuclear war, but because of the infiltration of former 
Mujahidin freedom fighters who now became labelled as terrorists. Though the 
US pressured Pakistan into taking action in this instance it was unable to address 
the bigger issue of what to do with the heavily armed and radicalised irregular 
forces that had won one conflict in the cause of Islam and were looking for others. 
Like Bush, Clinton had unfinished Cold War business to conclude in 
dismantling the Soviet nuclear stockpile outside Russia. Beyond that he set out to 
focus foreign policy on elevating the role of economics, along with US business 
interests, and enlarging the reach of democracy around the world.170 Although he 
had pledged to concentrate on domestic policies, Clinton was drawn into a range 
of foreign interventions as global politics became increasingly complex through 
technology, nationalisms, uneven economic development and religious 
fundamentalism.171 Pakistan had contributed to US efforts in humanitarian 
interventions and the continuing “War on Drugs”, but it had worked against them 
on nuclear proliferation. Just as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus had been 
cleared of nuclear weapons, Pakistan showed India and the world that successive 
US sanctions and inducements had been a complete failure and that it now had its 
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own nuclear arsenal. This not only increased the risks of nuclear war in the region 
but became a role model for the likes of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. A big 
fear had been that Soviet nuclear weapons would find their way to less stable 
states or non-state activists. Pakistan now added another fear that their proven 
technology and know-how could be easily exchanged.  
However, for much of Clinton’s term, Pakistan appeared to be contributing 
positively to his aspirations for democratic enlargement. Although the Pakistani 
model of democracy was imperfect by US standards, it illustrated how Islam and 
democracy could be combined. Benazir Bhutto’s positive reception in the West 
may have obscured the realities of Pakistani politics but it encouraged continued 
engagement. This then collapsed with Musharraf’s coup as another military 
dictator arose in an Islamic state, this time armed with nuclear weapons and 
exportable technology. On these issues alone Pakistan’s actions had made the 
world a more dangerous place for the US. 
More dangers arose out of Afghanistan and the evolution of the Mujahidin, 
in which both Pakistan and the US played key roles. Inclusive politics gave way 
to chaos and armed anarchy which gave birth to the Taliban, first as a welcome 
provider of justice and stability but later as an abhorred provider of hospitality to 
the vehemently anti-US Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda training camps. There 
is clear evidence that Pakistan, along with others, strongly supported the Taliban 
and more contested evidence that the US did likewise. At first, this looked as 
though it would help US economic expansion by providing stability for the trans-
Afghan pipeline and North-South trade routes to Central Asian resources and 
markets, but this collapsed as increasing Taliban repression made them 
unacceptable partners. The commercial implications of this were significant since 
it handed the initiative to China to claim much of the Central Asian energy, raw 
materials and trade to fuel its expanding economic power. Then, nine years after 
the Soviet withdrawal, the US realised it had a different enemy in Afghanistan 
when al-Qaeda blew up its embassies. The only positive which the US could draw 
from Afghanistan was that the Taliban had kept Iranian influence there at bay. 
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However, by the time Clinton visited South Asia in 2000 he remarked that it was, 
“the most dangerous place in the world today”.172  
For Pakistan, over twenty-five years of perseverance had paid off and it 
had finally come out of the nuclear closet. This had not given them an advantage 
over India, who had got there many years before, but it compensated for their 
comparative weakness in conventional forces and the prospect of mutually 
assured destruction evened the score considerably. Here it is helpful to consider 
the extent to which nuclear deterrence increased or decreased the propensity for 
conflict between the two states. Pakistan’s former Army Chief, General Baig, was 
clear about the benefits: “Far from talk of nuclear war, there is no danger of even 
a conventional war between India and Pakistan.  ... As compared to previous 
years, there is no possibility of an India-Pakistan war now.”173  
Even before Pakistan’s public tests it was being argued that its nascent 
nuclear capability had made an indispensable contribution to deterring aggression 
and maintaining peace and stability.174 The case for this rests on the fact that, 
despite tensions and incidents, outright war had been avoided during the 1990’s 
and beyond. During the 1990 Kashmir crisis, Mushahid Hussain claims that 
Pakistani policy makers and defence planners were convinced that it was the fear 
of nuclear retaliation that stopped India from attacking Pakistan even though its 
ground troops were apparently poised for a surgical strike.175 This is supported from 
the Indian side. Subrahmanyam concluded that mutual nuclear capability induced 
mutual caution by comparing 1965, when India launched an invasion in response 
to Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir, to 1990, when Pakistan once again infiltrated 
Kashmir but India chose to deal with the problem just on its own territory.176  
Indian nuclear strategists also argued that atomic capabilities on both sides 
had moderated actions between the two states.177 However, Sasikumar contended 
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that Pakistan was engaging in nuclear brinkmanship in 1990 and that acquiring 
nuclear capability had encouraged it to engage in low-intensity conflict.178 This 
interpretation portrayed India and Pakistan as a miniature of US-Soviet 
confrontation in which nuclear weapons deterred direct war but encouraged 
indirect, proxy conflicts. These arguments were weakened by the later 1999 
Kargil War, in which Indian and Pakistani militaries made incursions and did 
confront each other directly, but India still held back from the kind of full scale 
invasions it had made prior to nuclear deterrence. This, together with evidence of 
India’s and Pakistan’s use of proxies in Afghanistan, as well as Kashmir, suggests 
that Sasikumar was largely correct. 
If nuclear deterrence had reduced the intensity and directness of Indo-
Pakistan conflict it had not solved the underlying problems of the Kashmir crisis. 
This raises the question as to whether it might have been possible for the US to 
use its global leadership to help resolve this conflict. Clinton had devoted 
considerable time and political influence to Northern Ireland where the dangers to 
US security were insignificant compared with South Asia. Kashmir had become 
not just a potential nuclear flashpoint but was also developing into a pan-Islamic 
grievance which both attracted and inspired fundamentalism.179 However, there 
appear to be two particular reasons why Clinton could not use his influence here. 
First was the intransigence of both sides, particularly their respective militaries, 
which was reinforced by the sacrifices each had made to the cause. Excluding the 
thousands killed in 1947, over 16,000 soldiers had died there along with 50,000 to 
100,000 civilians, insurgents and Indian security personnel.180 Second, neither 
side viewed the US as impartial. India rejected international mediation, because 
the 1972 treaty committed the two countries to resolving their disputes between 
themselves, and Delhi mistrusted Washington which it saw as being closer to 
Islamabad on regional issues.181 Islamabad, on the other hand, was suspicious that 
the US would favour Delhi in its attempts to make India its regional partner. Thus 
Clinton was unable to ease tension in 2000. India firmly refused American 
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mediation and its Defence Minister predicted another hot summer on the LoC. 
Nevertheless, the visit appeared to leave a legacy of renewed engagement between 
India and the US which Clinton’s successors could build on.182 By contrast, 
Clinton refused to shake Musharraf by the hand.  
 
4.10 Implications for the Relationship 
 The discussion in the previous section about how far Pakistan contributed 
to America’s shifting aims and objectives in this period demonstrates there was 
little convergence of interests. Differences over the Geneva Accords highlighted 
the fact that the US and Pakistan wanted different futures after the war. Pakistan 
wanted a stable Afghanistan with a sympathetic regime for strategic depth against 
India. The US wanted the Soviet army out, and for the USSR to be weakened, 
with little regard for what remained in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s interests took them 
in the direction of a continuing partnership with the Mujahidin, Saudi Arabia and 
Muslim donors to see off Najibullah and thereafter to sponsor their proxies, the 
Taliban, in the civil war. US interests took them in the direction of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet world, and then to lead a multilateral New World Order to 
confront Iraq rather than communism. Pakistan was now only a minor part of this 
global mission but its nuclear interest was still stubbornly at odds with US non-
proliferation and when the Mujahidin moved to Kashmir, Pakistan’s sponsorship 
and refuge for them came to be at odds with US interests in containing terrorism. 
There was, however, a moment when American and Pakistani interests did 
converge. This was in relation to the proposed trans-Afghan pipeline which would 
have benefitted both and it caused them both to back the Taliban, but the moment 
passed, because of the Taliban’s deadly hospitality, and Pakistan’s continued 
backing of them came to be at odds with the US. 
The consequences of previous wilful blindness became apparent in this 
period, notably in the shape of the Pakistan military’s treasured nuclear bombs, 
but this did not stop it continuing to be a feature of the relationship. Benazir 
Bhutto appeared to be selective over what she claimed she knew, and when she 
knew it, in relation to the extent of progress on the nuclear programme. Despite 
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having had his intelligence services brief her about what was going on, Bush then 
suspended judgement for another year. However, when he finally acknowledged 
reality, the US had to turn a blind eye to its own wilful blindness in order to 
maintain moral standing on the issue. There are also grounds to suggest that wilful 
blindness was occurring over another issue which would come to dominate US-
Pakistan relations in the future: the Taliban. Whilst Robin Raphel of the State 
Department told Congress the US was working to stop support to the warring 
factions in the civil war there is evidence on both sides that the US did support the 
Taliban. Brigadier Gul’s evidence also suggests that both intelligence services 
were turning a blind eye to each other’s support for Mullah Omar. 
Pakistan had very little reverse influence in this period, strengthening the 
view that this was circumstantially limited by events and politics in Washington. 
The US was initially preoccupied by events elsewhere in which Pakistan played a 
minor role. Pakistan had more cause to attempt to win the favour of the US with 
peacekeeping, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism which was marginally 
successful until the 1998 nuclear test explosions. However, this did not 
substantially change its behaviour as nuclear brinkmanship, terrorist infiltration of 
Kashmir and sponsorship of Hekmatyar and the Taliban contributed to making the 
region a dangerous place. The pattern of US political bias in favour of Pakistan or 
India was not as clear during this period as there was no significant shift in either 
direction. Under the Republican Bush sanctions were applied discriminately to 
Pakistan and there was condemnation of infiltration into Indian Kashmir but there 
was not any significant initiative by him to tilt to India. Democrat Clinton 
severely criticised India’s nuclear tests, applied sanctions and cut off humanitarian 
aid,183 but the outcome of his 2000 regional tour hinted at the prospect of a future 
tilt in that direction, particularly as Pakistan had reverted to military 
authoritarianism. 
The transactional pattern of the relationship continued to reinforce mistrust 
and the expectation of disappointment. The sense of betrayal over the 
reintroduction of the Pressler sanctions was not confined to the political elite and 
was strongly felt throughout Pakistan not just for cutting off aid but for appearing 
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to favour India. US abandonment of Afghanistan also strengthened expectations 
that its commitment to the region was temporary and that Pakistan had to look 
after its own longer term security. On the US side, Pakistan was considered to be 
the unreliable partner over the nuclear issue and over state sponsorship of 
terrorism. The notion of shared interests and values appeared to have been 
abandoned by both sides. Compliant behaviour from Pakistan was something the 
US either bought with aid and arms or achieved through threats. Both approaches 
would be used when the US next needed Pakistan’s co-operation, but previous 
experience of abandonment by the US would prompt Pakistan to hedge its bets 
with longer-term and contrary strategies of its own.  
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CHAPTER 5: AFGHANISTAN RE-MAKES AND RE-BREAKS 
                        THE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP, 2001-2012 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As in 1979, Pakistan-US relations were suddenly transformed by the 9/11 
incident and the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, but they deteriorated seriously as 
the extended war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban moved into Pakistan and 
divergent interests once again became apparent. This chapter examines how the 
partnership was reformed under conditions of stress and identifies the factors 
which then created the mutually exclusive goals which caused the relationship to 
decline into crisis. It looks at Musharraf’s decision to ally with the US on this 
occasion, in contrast to General Zia in 1981, and the costs incurred by Pakistan as 
a result. It also explores how mutual frustration, disappointment and suspicion led 
to US operations on Pakistani territory and to Pakistani support for the Afghan 
Taliban in its attacks on NATO and the Afghan regime. It concludes with a 
review of the relationship and examines the extent to which the relations during 
this period allowed the US and Pakistan to achieve their respective strategic aims.  
 
5.2 9/11: Musharraf, “a Leader of Courage and Vision” 
The election campaign of George W. Bush did not mark him out as a 
figure who was much interested in foreign policy or one with the knowledge and 
experience to deal with arguably the greatest threat to American security since the 
Cold War. Nevertheless, he became President in January 2001, albeit with a 
minority of the popular vote.  His lack of experience in foreign affairs, defence 
and security was offset by an influential team of mostly neo-conservative realists, 
in stark contrast to Clinton’s pragmatic internationalists. They believed in using 
their unrivalled power against challenges to US supremacy, unilaterally if 
necessary, which they saw mostly in the states of the Middle East, Russia and 
China. This meant they were focussed on traditional state threats and, discounting 
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the advice of their predecessors, they did not consider non-state terrorism to be an 
immediate danger.1 
General Musharraf, on the other hand, was a career soldier at the head of 
the Pakistani military with a great deal of collective experience and understanding 
of regional politics and security interests.2 The focus on India as the enduring 
threat had not changed and neither had Pakistan’s general policy towards its 
neighbour. Musharraf was determined to maintain military parity with India and 
use proxies where necessary to undermine India’s influence in Kashmir and 
Afghanistan. In effect, this meant the Musharraf administration was 
knowledgeable about, and supportive of, both state-sponsored and non-state 
terrorism in the region. 
Musharraf’s authoritarian regime was well known to, and barely tolerated 
by, the outgoing Clinton administration. Bush on the other hand appeared 
ignorant, but at the same time rather more optimistic than his predecessor, about 
the possibilities of forging positive relations with the Musharraf administration. 
When, on the presidential campaign trail, Bush was asked to name the President 
of Pakistan he failed to do so, but added, “the new Pakistani general, he’s just 
been elected - not elected, this guy took over office. It appears this guy is going to 
bring stability to the country and I think that’s good news for the sub-continent".3 
Although not too much should be read into an off-guard comment made over a 
year ahead of taking office it suggests a feature of Bush’s outlook, in addition to 
his ignorance, was that an unelected general is good news if he brings stability. 
Many in Pakistan had long suspected this to be a feature of US foreign policy and 
Bush would go on to perpetuate it and to admire Musharraf as a leader of courage 
and vision. 
On 6 August 2001, US intelligence warned the Bush team of a possible 
attack by bin Laden supporters inside the US. On 4 September his cabinet 
discussed the matter inconclusively, and seven days later the terrorist strike 
occurred, witnessed live by the world on television. Four hijacked airliners were 
flown as missiles by suicide crews - two into the World Trade Centre in New 
York, one into the Pentagon, and one which crashed en route to an unknown 
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target, apparently as a result of a fight between passengers and crew. Over 3,000 
people were killed and around $1 trillion damage was done.4 The implications for 
US foreign and security policy were transformational, particularly in relation to 
Pakistan and its activities in Afghanistan.  
The attacks deeply affected Bush personally and in his role as national 
leader.  On the night of the attacks he revealed in his diary how he viewed the 
historic situation he found himself in. “The Pearl Harbour of the 21st century took 
place today,” he wrote.5 The next day he told the country that the attacks were not 
just acts of terror, “They were acts of war.”6 By 15 September, his sense of 
outrage and determination appeared stronger than his clarity about what should be 
done. However, he was already signalling that retribution would be targeted on 
both non-state perpetrators and their state hosts: 
I’ve asked the highest levels of our government to come to discuss the current tragedy 
that has so deeply affected our nation. … I am going to describe to our leadership what I 
saw: the wreckage of New York City, the signs of the first battle of war. We’re going to 
meet and deliberate and discuss ... but there is no question about it, this act will not stand; 
we will find those who did it; we will smoke them out of their holes; we will get them 
running and we will bring them to justice. We will not only deal with those who dare 
attack America, we will deal with those who harbour them and feed them and house 
them.7 
 
By 20 September, he was making it clear that al-Qaeda was responsible 
and began framing them as a global threat in similar terms to the way his Cold 
War predecessors had framed communism. He also signalled that both al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban regime would be the first targets. 
The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist 
organisations known as Al-Qaeda … its goal is remaking the world – and imposing its 
radical beliefs on people everywhere …. The leadership of Al-Qaeda has great influence 
in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. In 
Afghanistan, we see Al-Qaeda’s vision for the world … The United States respects the 
people of Afghanistan but we condemn the Taliban regime … by sponsoring and 
sheltering and supplying terrorists. By aiding and abetting murder, the Taliban regime is 
committing murder.8 
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The Taliban were given an ultimatum with five specific demands: hand 
over al-Qaeda leaders; close all terrorist camps; give the US full verification 
access; release all detained foreigners; and guarantee protection for all foreign 
journalists and aid workers.9 Mullah Omar rejected the first of these saying, “I 
will not hand over a Muslim to an infidel”, and demanded proof of bin Laden’s 
involvement. On 7 October, the US launched attacks on Afghan territory to 
capture bin Laden, oust the Taliban, and prevent further use of Afghanistan as a 
terrorist haven.10 
The operation consisted of bombing and ground attacks by Special Forces, 
but much of the fighting was delegated to anti-Taliban factions which were still 
holding out in the north of Afghanistan. These former rivals had united as the 
Northern Alliance and were supported by India, Russia, Iran and Tajikistan. Now 
with full US support, the Northern Alliance swiftly took the capital of 
Afghanistan, Kabul, and the majority of the country by the end of the year.  
The Taliban leadership fled along with bin Laden. Their suspected refuge 
in the Tora Bora caves of the Eastern mountains was bombarded, but bin Laden 
and Mullah Omar evaded capture and, together with many of their followers, 
disappeared into the porous Afghan-Pakistan boundary areas, from where yet 
another long guerrilla campaign would be based, this time against the US-led 
coalition and the new government of Hamid Karzai. 
On 11 September 2001, Bush’s National Security Advisor, Condoleezza 
Rice, had planned to make a speech critical of Clinton for not confronting Russia 
as the main security threat to the US and for not developing missile defences.11 
Ironically, President Putin of Russia was one of the first foreign leaders to phone 
the White House after the 9/11 attack and offer support. This became important in 
arranging bases in Central Asia, physical access to Afghanistan from the north 
and for brokering contact with the Northern Alliance.   
The US also needed southern access to Afghanistan and the border areas 
through Pakistan. Pakistan’s ISI Director, General Mahmood Ahmed, was a 
frequent visitor to the US and was in Washington when the attacks occurred. As a 
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result, he became the centre of much media attention whilst in the United States. 
The following day, he, along with Pakistan’s US Ambassador, Maleeha Lodhi, 
met the US Deputy Defence Secretary, Richard Armitage, who offered Pakistan a 
simple and stark choice. “You are either 100% with us or 100% against us. There 
is no grey area.”12 Later that evening, US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, 
telephoned Musharraf asking for Pakistan’s full support. He made it clear that, 
“the American people would not understand if Pakistan did not cooperate with the 
United States in fighting terrorism.”13 
Armitage and Powell drew up a list of no less than seven explicit demands 
for Pakistan to agree to. First, the interception of al-Qaeda operatives and 
supplies; second, the granting of blanket over-flight and landing rights; third, 
territorial access for US and allied personnel; fourth, the sharing of intelligence 
and immigration data; fifth, public condemnation of anti-American terrorism and 
the curbing of domestic support for it; sixth, an end of supplies to the Taliban; and 
finally, stopping diplomatic support for the Taliban if they continued to harbour 
al-Qaeda.14 However, according to Musharraf, these demands were also 
accompanied by a crude threat from Armitage.  If Musharraf did not comply and 
support the Americans in their war on global terrorism, then Pakistan “should be 
prepared to be bombed back to the Stone Age.”15 
On 16 September 2001, Musharraf announced that Pakistan would indeed 
join the US-led coalition and two days later, he told the nation: 
We in Pakistan are facing a very critical situation, perhaps as critical as the events in 
1971. If we make the wrong decisions our vital interests will be harmed … Our critical 
concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets ... and 
fourth our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decision. We 
have to save our interests.16 
 
Compared with General Zia’s protracted negotiations in 1979-1981, 
Musharraf’s decision came very quickly. His decision was criticised for not 
consulting more widely as Zia had done, and for not negotiating more strongly in 
the interests of the country. Inevitably, this criticism grew when the US-Pakistan 
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partnership subsequently unravelled and Pakistan went on to suffer much internal 
violence and upheaval. Iftikhar Malik is also of the view that “Musharraf’s hasty 
Washington alliance quickly brought Pakistan into the whirlwind of political 
turmoil”.17 Ambassadors Fatemi and Naqvi, along with the journalist Syed Iqbal 
argued that this was a one-man decision and even Musharraf himself did not 
demur from this view.18 
…it is at times like these that a leader is confronted by his acute loneliness. He may listen 
to any amount of advice he chooses, but at the end of the day the decision has to be his 
alone. He realises that the buck really stops with him.19 
 
Although it is difficult to construct an unambiguous account of what 
would have been a hectic process, closer examination of events suggests that 
Pakistan’s responses may not have been quite as solitary and clear-cut as this. 
Deeper understanding of what happened provides insight into how America’s 
heavy-handed approach impacted on the Pakistani military, its interests and its 
subsequent behaviour, as well as on wider Pakistani society. The decision to co-
operate with the US occurred in stages. Powell’s first call to Musharraf was a 
general ultimatum, repeating Armitage’s ultimatum that Pakistan had to be either 
with the US or against it. Musharraf responded that he would be with the US 
against terrorism, but there was no negotiation over terms or obligations at this 
stage.20 However, the seven demands subsequently formulated by Armitage and 
Powell required a substantial revision of Pakistan’s fundamental strategy in the 
region, notably in abandoning the Taliban.  
Musharraf called a meeting of cabinet ministers and senior military leaders 
to discuss the demands on 14 September. Ahmad claims this was a “pro-forma 
meeting” to inform his colleagues of the decision he had already made.21 
However, other evidence points to a long and contested debate over six hours in 
which General Mahmood, General Usmani (Deputy Army Chief of Staff) and two 
others argued in favour of retaining their Afghan policy and against helping the 
US, or at least delaying a response to see what Washington would offer in return. 
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Mahmood and Usmani had been key allies of Musharraf in the 1999 coup, so their 
opposition represented a significant split in his clique. Musharraf appeared to have 
thought out his position carefully and his counter-argument seemed to have less 
concern for the fate of the Taliban, al-Qaeda or US security than for their own fate 
as a military regime and, of course, India. If Pakistan offered to help the US it 
would get a clean bill of health from its erstwhile critic, and if it failed to help 
then Washington would take its aid and regional alliance to India.22 Underlying 
this was also the fact that Pakistan was militarily and economically weak and was 
in no position to endure military confrontation with America.23 As a result, the 
terms were accepted but with certain alterations – the US was granted only a 
narrow corridor of air-space, instead of permission to fly over the whole country, 
and the use of two bases, instead of territorial access across all of Pakistan.24 No 
reciprocal claims were made of the US though Musharraf strongly hinted that 
Pakistan expected immediate economic relief and an end to sanctions in return.25 
The restricted nature of the decision-making group and the failure to 
negotiate with the US had consequences for the way the relationship developed in 
the long war that followed. Ambassador Fatemi explained how wider Pakistani 
society felt alienated from the war and from the US: 
There was no popular support for this adventure, none of the political parties were on 
board, none of the social, cultural, religious figures were brought on board and, therefore, 
a strong perception grew in Pakistan that this was America’s war. This is not our war, 
and this is war against Islam and war against Muslims, and the misfortune was that you 
had a bunch of people in power in Washington at that time who can only be considered 
as people with tunnel vision, who had no understanding of the wider implications of this 
war on the world of Islam. They had disdain and contempt for Islam and for Muslims 
globally which made the war extremely unpopular not only in Pakistan but in the other 
Muslim countries too.26 
 
Mauluna Khilji, Ainullah Shams and Brigadier Gul were even more 
critical of the US and they made claims that the 9/11 attacks were either 
orchestrated or allowed to happen by the US in order to provide a pretext to attack 
Muslims and invade Afghanistan in pursuit of geo-political interests in Central 
Asia. These conspiracy theories were stoked by the fact that none of the 9/11 
                                   
22
 Owen Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2002), p. 3; Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States and 
the Global Weapons Conspiracy, (London: Atlantic Books, 2007), pp. 311-312. 
23
 Musharraf, In the Line of Fire, p. 202. 
24
 Islam, “Pakistan, Afghanistan and the United States: A Triangle of Distrust”, p. 89. 
25
 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Central Asia, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 30-31. 
26
 Interview with Ambassador Tariq Fatemi, Islamabad, 20 July 2012.  
 173 
 
attackers came from either Afghanistan or Pakistan.27 Opposition to the military’s 
alliance with the US also led to widespread belief that its purpose was to 
consolidate the Musharraf’s position of power. Journalists Fasih Iqbal, Ashraf 
Malkham and Shaukat Piracha all interpreted Musharraf’s decision as a means to 
gain the legitimacy that his regime lacked. 
After the 9/11 incident, we joined the war, which was not because of Pakistan nor 
because of something that happened in Pakistan. In 1980, General Zia wanted legitimacy 
[for] his dictatorial regime which he acquired from the US by joining the Afghan war 
against USSR. This time, General Musharraf wanted legitimacy [for] his dictatorial rule 
in Pakistan and he got legitimacy from the US by joining the war on terror against al-
Qaeda and the Taliban.28 
 
Colonel Hanif, on the other hand, considered Musharraf’s decision to be 
correct and in the interests of Pakistan. The critical factor had been a statement by 
Indian Defence Minister Jaswant Singh that Pakistan was a state sponsor of 
terrorism and that Indian airbases would be made available to the US. Not to 
support the US would have thus benefited India, “I would never have taken a 
decision which would favour India’s national interest.” This view sees Pakistan’s 
relationship with India as a zero-sum game. Anything that benefited India was to 
Pakistan’s disadvantage. Hanif also pointed out that US action was authorised by 
a UN resolution which China backed, so any failure to move against the Taliban 
would also be likely to prejudice Beijing’s support for Pakistan.29  
For the majority of Pakistani society, however, this was the government’s 
war and its failure to gain popular support undermined the military and fermented 
anti-US sentiment as first the refugees and then the fighting spilled over into 
Pakistan itself. As General Duranni observed: 
I can ask this question of anyone: “if there is a war between the Afghans and the 
Americans where are our sympathies? With the Americans? No way. Even if there is a 
Taliban regime that we don’t like and an American regime which we love, our 
neighbours are the Afghans, our people’s sentiments are with the Afghans. The US is a 
foreign power, it is a distant power, they are here today and will go sometime soon.30  
 
Ambassador Fatemi’s criticism was that, by rushing the decision, 
Musharraf did not fully understand the implications of the reciprocal assurances 
and responsibilities he was entering into. Furthermore, he did not give himself 
time to negotiate better terms or a more suitable approach to the problem of al-
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Qaeda which could avoid the dangers of invasion and the uncertainties of regime 
change.31 Musharraf’s decision-making did indeed contrast starkly with that of 
General Zia in 1979 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, even though there 
were similarities in their aims. Like Musharraf, Zia had become isolated and 
needed legitimacy for his regime as well as an injection of aid and cover for the 
nuclear project. Unlike Musharraf, though, he refused America’s first approach, 
waiting months for a better offer and to give him time to build support at home. 
As Khan said, Zia was able to use the situation to his, and his country’s, 
advantage. He received both economic and military aid without forfeiting 
Pakistan’s independence. According to Khan, “General Zia had the courage to 
reject Carter’s first offer as ‘peanuts’ but Musharraf lacked that courage and in 
order to save his tenure he accepted the US demands unconditionally”.32 
In fact, the two situations are not directly comparable. In 1979, the US had 
not been attacked and President Carter was not considering any kind of military 
intervention in Afghanistan. Instead, there was a covert war against the Soviet 
occupation which allowed Zia to insist on control over the distribution of money 
and arms to the Mujahidin. The key difference, however, was that in 1979 
Pakistan was already supporting the anti-communist mujahidin, whereas in 2001 
it was supporting the Taliban regime even though it had minimal control over it.  
The pressure on Musharraf was, therefore, more intense and his options 
were more limited. Nevertheless he had two notable assets to negotiate with: geo-
strategic location and intelligence.33 In terms of location, Pakistan was once again 
the shortest and most politically viable over-land route into landlocked 
Afghanistan and the most obvious base from which to launch military attacks – 
most particularly on the southern mountain hide-outs of the Taliban. The other 
options looked less attractive to Washington. Iran also shared a border with 
Afghanistan, but relations with the US were bad at the time, and China, despite 
condemning the 9/11 attacks, was highly suspicious of an American presence in 
Central Asia. India did not look such a good option either since it did not share a 
border with Afghanistan. This made some believe that Musharraf’s concerns that 
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the US might switch allegiance look exaggerated.34 In terms of intelligence, 
Washington acknowledged that the Pakistan Army and ISI had a vast store of 
knowledge about Afghanistan which was considered vital in the war on terror.35 
Therefore, it would seem that Musharraf had a better negotiating hand than 
he thought at the time. Washington was surprised by Musharraf’s compliant 
response and never expected him to accept all their demands so swiftly.36 This 
suggests that either Musharraf had misread the situation or that Armitage’s 
bullying approach had obscured a willingness to negotiate. Either way, an 
opportunity was missed to negotiate and work through a more appropriate 
arrangement which more fully recognised Pakistan’s interests and usefulness to 
America, and could, at a minimum, have reduced the misunderstandings and 
double-dealing on both sides that followed. It has also been suggested that 
Musharraf missed an opportunity to get US support on Kashmir.37 It is difficult to 
imagine, though, that Armitage, Powell and Bush were willing to be side-tracked 
by Kashmir at that time and it is unlikely that any concession could have been 
more than a vague undertaking to do something in the future. 
Whilst Musharraf and the US failed to negotiate, the political scientist, 
Ishtiaq Ahmed claimed that the military leadership, in the lead-up to the invasion, 
did try to persuade the US on three points – first, the problem of al-Qaeda could 
be resolved without recourse to war; second, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were 
different and posed a different kind of threat; and third, the Northern Alliance 
should not be allowed to take over in Kabul. On the first point, diplomatic options 
were available through the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and possibly 
too through third party Muslim nations.38 However, it was clear from the start that 
the US leadership was keen to pursue a military solution. Nevertheless, General 
Mahmood did travel to the Afghanistan in a fruitless attempt to persuade Mullah 
Omar to hand over bin Laden as demanded by the Americans.39 Mahmood’s 
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efforts took place in parallel with war preparations. He met and phoned Armitage 
and US Ambassador Chamberlin to keep them informed and to persuade them that 
negotiation was highly preferable to invasion. At his last meeting with 
Chamberlin on 24 September, he told her the Taliban were ill-prepared and 
frightened. He implored the US not to act in anger, “reasoning with them to get rid 
of terrorism will be better than the use of brute force. If the strategic objective is 
al-Qaeda and UBL [Osama bin Laden] it is better for the Afghans to do it. We 
could avoid the fallout.”40  
Mahmood warned that Afghanistan would revert to warlordism if the 
Taliban was eliminated. He assured Chamberlin that Pakistan would not flinch 
from military efforts but, in what turned out to be an accurate prediction, he 
warned that, “a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men. It 
will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now.”41 
Chamberlin’s interpretation was that Mahmood’s eleventh hour mission was just 
so Musharraf could tell the Pakistani people peace had been sought right to the 
end.42 
There appeared to be little success too in the attempt to get the US to 
understand the differences between al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, as 
Ambassador Fatemi explained, “the Taliban [had] nothing to do with 9/11.”43 
Furthermore, the Taliban were only interested in Afghanistan. Unlike al-Qaeda, 
the Taliban did not have global concerns and did not pose a threat to anyone 
outside the country.44 Finally, the US had no intention of preventing the Northern 
Alliance from taking Kabul. The Northern Alliance was an important part of the 
US-led coalition and played a key role in the swift victory over the Taliban. 
However, the Northern Alliance’s march into Kabul caused consternation in 
Pakistan, and especially amongst the Pashtuns, the consequences of which are 
addressed later in this chapter.  
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Thus, it appears that decision-making on both sides suffered from the 
limited vision of a small group of key decision-makers. The US adopted a 
traditional, state-centric view of the crisis which did not fit the threat posed by al-
Qaeda. The US was able to overthrow the Taliban government in Afghanistan, but 
it was unable to catch either bin Laden or Mullah Omar and found that the 
militant Islamism survived its military defeat in Afghanistan. Pakistan, for its part, 
suffered from its continued obsession with India and a determination in the 
Musharraf administration to stay in power. Pakistan found itself committed to a 
cause which lacked support in the country and led to the government being unable 
to keep many of its promises to Washington.  
In the short term, however, both sides appeared to get some of what they 
wanted. The US military got bases from which they could bomb and raid 
Afghanistan and Bush made a speedy start on his War on Terror. Within a week 
Musharraf got his clean bill of health from Washington. Concerns over nuclear 
arms and human rights were shelved once more as Washington lifted all sanctions 
and provided $2.64 billion aid over the next three years.45 Where Clinton avoided 
a hand-shake in 2000, a succession of high-ranking US officials now chose to visit 
Pakistan. On 15 October, Powell paid an official visit to acknowledge 
Musharraf’s bold step against terrorism and to give an invitation to shake hands 
with Bush in the US. In Washington, on 13 February 2002, Bush warmly 
welcomed Musharraf as a leader of “great courage and vision.”46  As with the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, this new US campaign in Afghanistan 
appeared to come as a blessing in disguise once again to rescue the tenure of 
Pakistan’s military rulers.47 Just to be on the safe side, and to allay US concerns, 
Musharraf had removed both Mahmood and Usmani from their posts on 7 
October 2001 and took the ISI under his own direct control. 
 
5.3 Post 9/11: Disappointment and Double-Dealing  
In his State of the Union Address in January 2002, Bush made many 
claims of success in Afghanistan. In four months, America had “rallied a great 
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coalition, captured, arrested and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed 
Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation and freed a 
country from brutal oppression.”48 He then moved his country’s attention on to his 
next group of enemies including the “axis of evil” that was North Korea, Iran and 
Iraq.49 In Afghanistan, however, there was still much unfinished business. Despite 
Bush’s assurance that “even 7,000 miles away, across oceans and continents, on 
mountaintops and in caves, [enemies of the US] will not escape the justice of this 
nation”50, al-Qaeda and the Taliban were finding refuge in the Afghan-Pakistan 
border areas.  
In Pakistan, Bush’s triumph had received mixed reviews with thousands of 
Islamic radicals coming out on to the streets of major cities to demonstrate against 
the US armed intervention. It appears that many of the demonstrators were 
mobilised by the unsubstantiated reports that most of the Jews who normally 
worked at the World Trade Centre were absent on 11 September 2001. This led to 
conspiracy theories suggesting Jews had orchestrated the attacks. Unrest was 
further inflamed by General Hamid Gul, the former ISI Director who was also 
known as one of the founders of the Taliban, when he endorsed calls for a jihad 
against the US once it became clear that the intervention was also directed against 
his former protégés.51 Thus, while Musharraf had won friends abroad he had 
created enemies at home.  
At the same time, fall-out from the invasion was beginning to set the scene 
for greater troubles in the form of cross-border infiltration and home-grown 
terrorism which would be directed against him and his state as well as against 
Afghanistan and the US. This would draw the US into action on Pakistani 
territory. The installation of a non-Pashtun dominated regime in Afghanistan 
would also draw Musharraf and the ISI into allying with some terrorist factions 
which were fighting US forces. In this way, relations between Washington and 
Islamabad deteriorated steadily over the next ten years as the latest Afghan 
conflict dragged on longer than the Soviet occupation. 
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At the beginning, however, Pakistan’s contribution to the US-led invasion 
was significant. In line with the Powell-Armitage demands aerial space and 
landing rights were provided along with the use of air bases at Jacobabad, Shamsi 
and Dalbandin. The Pakistan navy also supported US and coalition forces in 
landing ships at Pasni and even curtailed its training operations in order to 
accommodate them.52 The Pakistani military’s willingness to co-operate can be 
seen from the fact that most of its logistic support was made available without any 
formal agreements and free of the user fees that would normally be required for 
such privileges.53 This included giving the US 100,000 gallons of fuel per day 
without any initial payment.  
As the Taliban faced defeat and Kabul fell on 13 November 2001, the US-
led forces set up a number of military bases in Afghanistan, notably at Bagram 
near Kabul. The peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), was established by the UN, but became more active under NATO 
command after the Taliban regrouped and began striking back. As ISAF grew to 
100,000 personnel, it became more and more dependent upon supply routes 
through Pakistan. These ran from the port of Karachi, through Pakistan and into 
Afghanistan either through the Chaman crossing near Quetta or through the 
Khyber Pass near Peshawar.54 Whilst it was the best option available, it was still 
vulnerable to logistical problems, environmental disruption and, as the insurgency 
increased, to terrorist attack. In addition it gave Pakistan a political strangle-hold, 
which it used on occasions, to pressure the US over disputes. This led the US to 
develop alternative supply routes through Russia and Central Asia, and 
Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, known as the Northern Distribution Network 
(NDN) (See Appendix 5 for Map). These were much slower, more expensive and 
complex than the Pakistani route.55 As a result most supplies still went by truck 
through Chaman and the Khyber Pass, but some supplies may have been diverted 
into the hands of the terrorists. General Duranni said 30,000 containers had not 
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reached their destination in Afghanistan after leaving the port of Karachi. He was 
unsure about the contents of the containers, but suspected they may have 
contained weapons and surveillance equipment which would have been of great 
value to terrorists in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.56  
Pakistan was initially highly active in capturing and killing militants 
fleeing across the border. 115,000 army and paramilitary troops were stationed 
along both the Afghan and Iranian borders and more than 3,500 suspects were 
arrested while trying to escape into Pakistan.57 In the first five years after 9/11, 
Pakistan handed over 369 suspected militants to the United States.58 However, the 
US still felt it necessary to buy loyalty with cash rewards for individual officers 
involved in capturing or killing militants. Despite such monetary rewards, a few 
ISI and army officers who were sympathetic to the jihadi cause defected to the 
militants and, with their high-level training and knowledge, went on to organise 
retaliatory attacks against the Pakistani state, including two assassination attempts 
on Musharraf in 2003.59 This is one of the most rugged frontiers in the world and 
has always been difficult to guard. As a result, there could never be enough troops 
on either side of the border to prevent many al-Qaeda and Taliban militants 
crossing and finding refuge in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) (later renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) and 
Balochistan, where they could regroup and recruit more radical Pakistanis to their 
cause.60  
 
5.4 Pakistan’s Problems with the Northern Alliance 
It did not take long for Pakistan’s co-operation with the US to be 
undermined by events in Afghanistan as the Taliban vacated Kabul and the 
Northern Alliance swept into the capital in November 2001. The Northern 
Alliance was made up of mostly non-Pashtun and wholly anti-Taliban ethnic 
groups, and was perceived to be hostile to Pakistan in part because of its support 
of India.  For this reason, Islamabad was opposed to the Northern Alliance taking 
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power in Afghanistan. This view had been communicated to Washington on many 
occasions. General Mahmood, whilst in Washington at the time of the 9/11 
attacks, urged the CIA Director, George Tenet, not to rely on the Northern 
Alliance.  This was reiterated by Musharraf on the day of the US intervention on 7 
October, when he warned the international community that Afghanistan would 
return to anarchy and the region would be destabilised if the Northern Alliance 
was allowed to take power in Kabul. “The Northern Alliance must not draw 
mileage out of this action and the post-action has to be balanced.”61 
 On his October visit to Islamabad, Powell tried to placate Pakistani fears 
by suggesting a “moderate Taliban” might be included in a future Afghan 
government. Although it was unclear what this might involve, it evoked outrage in 
elitist circles in the US, including from Powell’s predecessor as Secretary of State, 
Madeleine Albright.62 Just three days before the Northern Alliance took Kabul, 
Musharraf met Bush at a meeting of the UN General Assembly in New York. In 
the joint press conference that followed, Bush appeared to understand and be in 
full agreement with Musharraf’s position. 
Well, I think we share a common view that in order for there to be a country that is stable 
and peaceful on this good leader's western border, that any power arrangement must be 
shared with the different tribes within Afghanistan. And a key signal of that will be how 
the city of Kabul is treated. We will encourage our friends to head south, across the 
Shamali Plains, but not into the city of Kabul, itself. And we believe we can accomplish 
our military missions by that strategy.63 
 
Musharraf was obviously pleased with this and explained his reasoning for 
the agreed strategy: 
Well, I agree with the President totally. Why I have been recommending that Kabul 
should not be occupied by the Northern Alliance basically is because of the past 
experience that we've had when the various ethnic groups were in hold of Kabul after the 
Soviets left. There were atrocities, killings and mayhem within the city. And I think if the 
Northern Alliance enters Kabul, we'll see the same kind of atrocities being perpetuated 
against the people there.64  
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Later in the same press conference, Musharraf had said he saw a “new 
dawn” in US-Pakistan relations. However, the new dawn lasted only the three 
days before the Northern Alliance entered Kabul and crowds gathered in the city, 
shouting “death to Pakistan” and “death to the Taliban.”65 Pakistanis were indeed 
hunted down and shot along with many other foreigners in the capital. Some 
accounts claim the US had urged the Northern Alliance to stay out of the capital 
until a new, broad-based government could be formed, but the unexpected and 
sudden evacuation by the Taliban made it necessary for the Alliance to enter the 
city to maintain public order. Confronted with this fait accompli, US officials then 
welcomed it as victory for the coalition forces.66  
However, Woodward’s account of the US National Security Council 
meeting a month earlier, on 9 October 2001, claims that this was one of the major 
issues discussed at that stage of the war, and that taking control of Kabul was seen 
as an important symbolic victory. Vice-President Cheney had actually advocated 
encouraging the Northern Alliance to take the capital and CIA Director Tenet 
recognised it would not be possible to stop them doing so. Discussion about 
possible UN involvement in the final operation continued until the sudden Taliban 
retreat overtook events.67  
It is also clear that Washington was fully aware of the dangers the 
Northern Alliance posed for Pakistan since it had accepted Islamabad’s plea to be 
allowed to evacuate its military advisers and volunteers with the Taliban in 
Kunduz to avoid their being caught up in a repeat of the massacre of prisoners that 
took place at Mazar-e-Sharif.68 This suggests that, whilst the US may not have 
been expecting events to unfold as they did, Bush’s assurances to Musharraf were 
reckless. At the same time, knowledge that the US military was abetting the 
Northern Alliance on its rampage made Bush appear culpable. The result was that 
Musharraf was left looking weak and it greatly added to his troubles.  
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In frustration he called first for a demilitarised zone in Kabul and then for 
a multi-national Muslim force, including Pakistan, to intervene, which the US 
dismissed as not appropriate because they were already working to involve the 
UN in rebuilding the Afghan state. At home in Pakistan the episode was labelled a 
strategic debacle in the press and ISI officials were quoted as saying that 
Pakistan’s worst nightmare had come to pass.69 This perceived betrayal lay at the 
heart of much of Pakistan’s so-called double-dealing which undermined relations 
with Washington over the following years.70 
Although the Northern Alliance did not seize total power on their own 
they were highly influential in the Interim and Transitional Authorities which 
governed Afghanistan for the next two and a half years. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Taliban withdrawal there was a grave danger of a return to 
anarchy, so the UN and US moved quickly to organise some temporary state 
apparatus. A conference in Bonn established an Interim Authority to run the 
country for six-months and to convene a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) which 
would pick a Transitional Administration to govern for two more years leading up 
to national elections. Four traditionally hostile, but all anti-Taliban, factions 
attended the conference. These were the Northern Alliance and three exile groups 
– one with Iranian ties; one loyal to the former King; and another mainly Pashtun 
group based in Pakistan. Musharraf lobbied for the inclusion of moderate Taliban 
representatives but was unsuccessful, which meant that all delegates at the 
conference were opposed to his former ally and not well disposed to Pakistan. The 
resulting Interim Administration was led by Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun who 
had sided with the Northern Alliance. However non-Pashtun leaders of the 
Northern Alliance wielded the real power, occupying around half of posts in the 
29-member cabinet, and with a sub-set of Tajiks controlling key ministries and the 
secret police. Many ordinary Pashtuns, therefore, suspected that the interim 
government was a vehicle for minority ambition.71 The Loya Jirga of June 2002 
was then heavily manipulated, as the International Crisis Group reported: 
Subject to back-room deals and intimidation on the floor, delegates were unable to fulfil 
the duties mandated to them under the Bonn Agreement. For instance, President Karzai’s 
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main opponents withdrew their candidacies under pressure, making his election 
somewhat perfunctory. Other important votes, such as that to approve the structure of 
government, did not take place at all. Many left feeling that, rather than manifesting the 
sovereignty of the people, they had merely rubber-stamped the decisions of others.72 
 
Although the number of Pashtun office-holders increased, the key posts 
involved with defence, foreign affairs and security were held by Tajiks who had 
been leaders in the Northern Alliance. The Defence Minister, Mohammed Fahim, 
was the same commander who had taken Kabul and still retained his own private 
militia of around 10,000 heavily armed troops in the Panjshir Valley.73 Thus, at an 
early stage, the Afghan Administrations were dominated by anti-Pakistan and pro-
Indian elements. Even the Pashtun elements were drawn from those who had 
opposed the Taliban. 
 
5.5 Pakistan and Terrorism: Sponsor and Victim 
Whilst the rapid take-over of Kabul by the Northern Alliance was 
remarkable, its success had been greatly aided by the Taliban tactic of vacating 
the capital and retreating to the mountains in the south. The Northern Alliance 
found progress more difficult in this region not just because of the terrain but most 
particularly because they were in hostile Pashtun territory. Thus, in 2002, 
operations there were taken over by ISAF forces who soon found themselves 
facing guerrilla warfare. At the same time, leading members of both al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban fled across the Pakistan border to the Federally Administered Tribal 
Area (FATA), the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan.74 
 It is helpful to future understanding of events there to explain some of the 
unique features of these areas. FATA is a semi-autonomous region which consists 
of seven tribal agencies: Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajaur, North 
Waziristan and South Waziristan (See Appendix 4 for Map). It is sparsely 
populated with roughly three million inhabitants from about 60 Pashtun tribes. It 
                                   
72
 International Crisis Group, “The Afghan Transitional Administration: Pitfalls and Perils”, 
Afghanistan Briefing, 30 July 2002, p. 2, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/southasia 
/afghanistan/The%20Afghan%20Transitional%20Administration%20Prospects%20and%20Perils 
pdf> [Accessed 12 February 2014]. 
73
 Thomas H. Johnson, “Afghanistan’s past-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after 
war”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 25, Nos. 1-2, 2006, p. 7. 
74
 Zahid Ali Khan, “Military Operations in FATA and PATA: Implications for Pakistan”, Institute 
of Strategic Studies Islamabad, Strategic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2012, p. 130. 
 185 
 
is underdeveloped, with poor medical facilities and transport, and has limited 
access to clean water. At least 60 percent of the total population lives under the 
poverty line. Pakistan control over FATA was always limited. Central authorities 
never intended to govern the area as such, but, in an echo of British colonial rule, 
simply to try and manage tribal conflicts and contain potential rebellions. Limited 
administrative and judicial authority is exercised by a Political Agent, appointed 
by the central government, through the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). This 
regulation incorporates elements of local ethnic codes, several principles of which 
have been subsequently declared unconstitutional, including the use of collective 
punishment for misdemeanours.75 In north and central NWFP there are seven 
former princely states and tribal territories which are governed as Provincially 
Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), including Chitral, Swat, and Dir which were 
only assimilated into Pakistan in 1960 (See Appendix 4 for Map). National and 
provincial law was introduced gradually in these areas from 1970 but attempts in 
1994 to replace traditional justice with a system that conformed to the national 
constitution sparked a violent campaign for a return to sharia. Local elites of land 
owners, bureaucrats and clerics encouraged this campaign, since the constitutional 
system undercut their control, and they colluded with militant participation.76 In 
2010 NWFP was renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) in recognition of majority 
Pashtun identity but this led to violent protests from non-Pashtuns demanding a 
province of their own.77  
 Balochistan, where there was already an active separatist insurgency, also 
had eight districts bordering Afghanistan and five districts subject to PATA 
regulations. There was a history of tribesmen from FATA, NWFP and parts of 
Balochistan fighting with the Taliban in the Afghan civil war and of good 
relations with al-Qaeda. Some had even participated in the Taliban government, 
with other sympathisers from Punjab and Sindh. These tribal areas were, 
therefore, natural places for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to shelter in the aftermath of 
the US invasion. Thousands gained safe haven there along with foreign militants 
                                   
75
 Hassan Abbas, President Obama’s Policy Options in Pakistan’s Federally Administrated Tribal 
Areas (Michigan: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2009), p. 3; Lieven, Pakistan: A 
Hard Country, pp. 382-384. 
76
 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA”, Asia Report No. 242, 15 
January 2013, pp. 3-5, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/242-pak 
istan-countering-milit ancy-in-pata.pdf> [Accessed 4 February 2014]. 
77
 Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, p. 394. 
 186 
 
from the Arab countries, Chechnya, Uzbekistan, East Asia and Sudan. They 
reorganised and regrouped in these areas to start fighting back against the 
occupation force in Afghanistan. At the same time their militancy spread within 
the border provinces since it was also a natural recruiting ground for the jihad 
against the US.78 
Whilst militancy in the tribal areas was growing, it was Pakistan’s links to 
anti-Indian terrorism that brought the first rebuke from Bush. Groups linked to 
Kashmiri separatists had been operating in Indian controlled Kashmir since 1990 
in a complex struggle involving both Indian and Pakistani intelligence services 
and their respective proxies. On 13 December 2001, a well-televised suicide 
attack on the Indian Parliament was stopped from blowing up the entire building 
but killed 12 and injured 22 people. Blame was swiftly placed on Pakistan and 
two groups it was accused of supporting - Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammad. Half a million Indian troops massed on the Pakistan border in a tense 
stand-off which many feared could lead to a nuclear confrontation.79 With the US 
newly engaged in the region, both sides looked to Washington to make the other 
see sense. Islamabad banked on the fact that Washington would not tolerate an 
Indo-Pakistan war to jeopardize the hunt for al-Qaeda and so would press India 
for a favourable diplomatic settlement. However, Delhi banked on Bush’s wider 
anti-terror credentials and that its escalation of the conflict would put pressure on 
him to get Pakistan to shut down the offending militant groups.  
Bush went with India, first condemning the attacks and the murderous 
ways of the two groups and then calling on Musharraf to shut them down.80 Bush 
thus found himself drawn into regional politics beyond Afghanistan which not 
only showed him allied to a state sponsor of terrorism in his war on terror but also 
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involved him in supporting his ally’s enemy. However, his move did have positive 
effects. Musharraf banned the groups as demanded and promised to prevent 
further terrorism against India from Pakistani territory but, in a reference to what 
may have been behind the original attack, he demanded that India and the 
international community made efforts to solve the Kashmir issue. He went on to 
limit infiltration into Indian controlled Kashmir which led to a reduction in the 
violence there. In 2003 both sides declared a ceasefire along the Line of Control.81 
This suggests that, having failed to get US support on Kashmir through 
confrontation with India, Pakistan had opted for a more conciliatory approach, 
perhaps with recognition that resources would be needed on its Western border 
areas in the coming years.    
Next, US concerns turned to FATA and NWFP as the regrouped militants 
there started guerrilla attacks against ISAF forces trying to stabilise southern 
Afghanistan. Now, in addition to the al-Qaeda fighters, the Afghan Taliban was 
being augmented by a home-grown Pakistani Taliban recruited from the 
madrassas and the Pashtun tribes who identified with their cause. To add to this, 
seasoned militants from Kashmir went there to join the anti-US jihad when their 
operations against India were closed down. These groups were dominated by a 
network led by a former Taliban minister, Jalaluddin Haqqani, who had been 
close to the ISI and CIA during the 1980s before joining the Taliban in 1994 and 
developing links with al-Qaeda. Haqqani fled to North Waziristan and became the 
first anti-US commander in FATA. He would be blamed for many attacks on 
ISAF but, at the same time, he was pro-Pakistan and had helped their army in its 
dealings with the militant groups.82 
Musharraf’s policy towards these groups appeared ambiguous but there 
was a logic to it which related to the ever-present Indian threat and the unwelcome 
Northern Alliance dominated administration in Afghanistan. The assumptions 
were that the US would give increasing influence to India in Afghanistan through 
their favoured partners, the Northern Alliance, and then abandon the area while 
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discarding Pakistan just as it had done after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. This 
would leave a pro-Indian regime free to make trouble on the Western border.83 
These anxieties were given added weight by India’s activities in Afghanistan 
where it provided several hundred million dollars in financial assistance, 
including building the new parliament and funding its legislators. It also built 
roads near the Pakistani border which were run by its own state agency and 
opened consulates in several cities, including neighbouring Jalalabad and 
Kandahar, which Islamabad feared became bases for terrorist activities aimed at 
Pakistan and Balochistan in particular.84   
In order to counteract this, Ahmed Rashid claims Musharraf maintained 
the Taliban as a proxy against the Kabul regime and encouraged them to relaunch 
their insurgency in Afghanistan with funds, training and operational support.85 
These claims are brought into question, however, by Lieven, who argues that 
whilst the Taliban were given shelter and tolerated they were not supported by 
Pakistan in the way the Mujahidin had been. This is obvious, he claims, from their 
lack of sophisticated training and weaponry which would have been substantially 
better if the ISI were giving full support.86 Whichever version is correct it is clear 
that Pakistan’s handling of the Taliban was much more tolerant than of al-Qaeda. 
However, Khan suggests that this policy was in line with the limited role which 
the US expected of Pakistan at the beginning. He claimed that Washington only 
sought Pakistani assistance in catching al-Qaeda leaders and their foreign 
associates and did not ask them to target the Afghan Taliban and their associates, 
such as Haqqani and Hekmatyar.87 Both Rashid and Lieven agree that al-Qaeda 
and foreign militants were hunted with determination, at least in the heartland of 
Pakistan where hundreds were killed or captured, including “disappeared” people 
who, it was believed, were illegally handed to the Americans. Nevertheless, the 
military avoided intervening in FATA.  
This changed, however, when the US pressured Musharraf to take action 
against the militants in FATA. Persuasion included massive financial assistance 
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for the military establishment of over $2 billion a year to Pakistan’s key national 
security agencies, including the army, Frontier Corps, and ISI, to conduct 
operations against militants. Accordingly, the well-funded military launched 
Operation Al-Maizan in 2002 to clear South Waziristan of the foreign fighters 
which they suspected were being based there. The significance of this resonated 
beyond Afghanistan and the US-Pakistan relationship, as it was the first time that 
the military had ventured into FATA to exert the will of the Pakistani state on the 
traditionally independent tribesmen who were accustomed to making their own 
decisions and arrangements for their security. Khan explained that, “handling the 
tribal areas is not a joke. Using force against them will never work … it didn’t 
work during the British time and it will also not [be] workable now. We have to 
handle the situation very carefully.”88  
The operation started cautiously with the military setting up checkpoints 
and gaining the co-operation of local leaders to identify foreign militants and 
those that harboured them. However, when the army entered the region in 2003 to 
capture their targets the situation deteriorated. An operation aimed at rooting out 
foreign militants evolved into an insurgency in which local rebels joined forces 
with the non-Pakistanis. Al-Qaeda declared a fatwa calling for the death of 
Musharraf who subsequently survived two assassination attempts in quick 
succession in December 2003. By early 2004, the army was battling in several 
locations simultaneously and suffered significant losses despite the introduction of 
bombing by the air force. At the same time, the army employed scorched-earth 
tactics to destroy homes and villages which enraged the local population even 
further and brought in battle-hardened Chechens and Uzbeks to join the fight.  
In response, the US and Pakistan conducted targeted strikes against the 
militants, but Pakistani casualties mounted throughout 2004. This forced the 
military to conclude a less than advantageous peace deal in April that year which 
was interpreted as victory by the tribesmen. The deal involved the state paying 
compensation and making a guarantee of non-interference in the region. In return, 
the rebels agreed to stop attacking Pakistani forces and harbouring foreign 
fighters. The deal broke down, however, when the principal militant leader, Nek 
Mohammad Wazir, was killed in a US missile strike in June 2004. As a result, al-
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Qaeda and foreign militants remained in FATA, and gained almost total control 
over the region. This apparent victory empowered the militants and gave them 
greater confidence and legitimacy than ever before. The influence of the Taliban 
increased while the border areas remained a militant haven. It also meant that 
what had started as a purely Afghan jihad had now become a jihad against the 
Pakistani state whose security forces were considered as apostate by the militants 
in FATA. The unrest continued in the form of several local insurgencies each of 
which was punctuated with peace deals which were always subsequently broken. 
Nek Mohammed’s successor was Baitullah Mehsud, who, in early 2006, began 
orchestrating a suicide-bombing campaign in Pakistani cities.89  
While US attention and military resources were diverted to another 
invasion which was going wrong in Iraq, Pakistan was left with a heavy burden 
and was paying a high price militarily, politically, socially and economically. The 
politics in the border areas became a complex interaction of local insurgent groups 
with varying aims and loyalties, some of which conflicted. The state was 
unwilling to launch another general assault for fear of the domestic consequences 
and also because the military had been shown serious deficiencies in conducting 
counter-terrorist operations and holding territory. To compensate, the military 
used tribal rivalries and conflicting loyalties amongst the militants to divide and 
weaken them, including co-opting some groups to undermine others. This tactic 
was interpreted simplistically in the West as duplicity and weakness on the part of 
Pakistan.90 
In fact, the military did become involved in several more anti-terrorist 
campaigns, causing wholesale disruption in FATA and NWFP. The first occasion 
came in 2007 as the indirect result of Chinese, rather than American, pressure. An 
extremist group had taken occupation of the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in 
Islamabad from where it made vigilante raids against video and vice shops in the 
name of Sharia. Musharraf initially held off taking action for fear of the 
consequences of a bloody battle only two miles from his palace. His hand was 
forced, though, when the Chinese government demanded the release of some of its 
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nationals who had been working as masseurs and had been apprehended in the 
anti-vice raids. When the extremists refused to negotiate, the military stormed the 
mosque on 10 July 2007 killing 154 people. The public witnessed the bloody end 
to the standoff when it was televised widely throughout the country.91  
Musharraf was already in domestic difficulties. He had abandoned an 
attempt to impose emergency rule and had just failed to get rid of the Chief 
Justice who was pursuing him over his role in relation to the “disappeared 
people”. Clashes and demonstrations in Karachi back in May, which had left 41 
dead, compounded his troubles.92 In particular, these events galvanised the 
insurgents in FATA and NWFP. A ten month truce was called off in Waziristan 
and a wave of attacks on military and official targets followed, including a big 
increase in suicide bombings. Baitullah Mehsud also took the opportunity to co-
ordinate the various Taliban groups and in December 2007 he announced that they 
had united in a coalition under his leadership with the name Tehrik-e-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP).93 That same month the TTP was blamed by the government for 
the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to contest elections against 
Musharraf, although this was denied by them.  
In response, Musharraf launched several campaigns to clear these areas of 
anti-Pakistan militants in 2008 and 2009. They had mixed success. Many militants 
were killed and some areas cleared at least temporarily. However, the counter-
insurgency strategy also had the effect of alienating the local populations. In the 
Mehsud stronghold of South Wazirstan, for example, an estimated 4,000 houses 
were destroyed in a month and up to 200,000 inhabitants displaced. The 
antagonism such policies led to only increased the difficulties of the government 
in trying to maintain some kind of control over these areas. Even when Pakistan 
had support from the US military and the CIA, for example in the 2008 operations 
in Bajaur and the Mohmand Agencies, it had success in killing as many as 1,000 
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militants but was still unable to regain political control over these regions.94 The 
failure of these operations became apparent as the TTP escalated violence across 
Pakistan in 2008 with 2,148 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian attacks in that year 
alone. In terms of suicide bombings the trend was equally bleak with the numbers 
of incidents and casualties peaking in 2009, before dropping somewhat thereafter 
as table 6.1 shows: 
TABLE 6.1: SUICIDE ATTACKS IN PAKISTAN, 2000-2012 
Year 2000-5 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
No. of 
attacks 
17 9 57 61 90 58 44 32 
Deaths 260 161 842 940 1090 1153 625 243 
Injured 838 230 2008 2426 3492 2954 1386 705 
Source: Pakistan Body Count: Suicide Bombing Incidents in Pakistan, 1995-2014, 
<http://pakistanbodycount.org/analytics>, [Accessed 2 November 2014]. 
Apart from the deaths of insurgents, about 5,000 security personnel were 
killed in FATA and NWFP/KPK in 2001- 2011 but the civilian population 
suffered more severely with about 40,000 killed in the same period. The scale of 
the upheaval and misery caused by the military’s counter-insurgency strategy also 
became apparent in 2009 when nearly three million people from the affected areas 
were forced to leave their homes and became designated as internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). Administrative, educational and judicial structures became 
paralysed and criminal groups emerged along with increased theft, kidnapping 
and murder to add to the insecurity, poverty and sense of hopelessness which, in 
turn, fed the militancy further.  
Criminality spread to the rest of Pakistan where a 21 per cent rise was 
reported in the first six months of 2009. The number of women and children killed 
in this period rose by 83 per cent and 162 per cent respectively.95 In addition to 
the physical and social costs caused by the upheaval, the economic costs were also 
considerable. It was estimated that Pakistan’s war on terror had cost the country 
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an estimated $70 billion.96 Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s war on terror was not 
popular among the people. A survey conducted by Pakistan’s Institute of Peace 
Studies in 2009 showed 80 per cent of the public against the military operation in 
FATA and 20 per cent believing the counter-insurgency to be a direct result of 
their country’s participation in America’s global war on terror.  
The same survey also estimated that about 18 per cent of the country’s 
madrassas were affiliated with jihadi and sectarian organizations.97 Former ISI 
Director, General Duranni, considered these FATA interventions to be the biggest 
of Musharraf’s many mistakes. 
After joining the war on terror, Musharraf made many big mistakes but I consider that 
the most vital mistake was sending the armed forces into the tribal areas of Pakistan. One 
has to tell Musharraf that you may not know this area. Starting operation[s] in tribal areas 
would bring many problems to Pakistan. This will spread and we will not be able to 
control the situation for the next fifteen to twenty years. Even if we occupy those areas, 
who is going to save Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi and other cities of Pakistan from the 
attacks of those tribal people? 98 
 
Despite the terrible costs of the counter-insurgency strategy, the Afghan 
Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda remained in place as an active force 
in the region.  As soon as one area was cleared it was just a matter of time before 
the insurgents occupied another and the cycle continued. The Pakistani military 
was ill-equipped and unprepared for counter-insurgency warfare. It was primarily 
organised and trained for a major war with India, and the high command was 
reluctant to take the risk of diverting troops from the Indian border. This caused 
some to conclude that the military’s lack of success was down to the fact that it 
simply had insufficient troops to do the job of securing all seven agencies of 
FATA.99 However, this was unlikely as the US had supplied considerable aid to 
Pakistan for its fight against terrorism. A greater problem was the inability of the 
Pakistan government to win over the “hearts and minds” of the people in FATA 
whilst fighting a bloody counter-insurgency campaign.  
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 The issue of cross-border raids and shelter for the militants caused the US 
added concern since it escalated tensions between Musharraf and Hamid Karzai in 
Kabul. As early as 2003 problems arose when the US, jointly with Pakistan, tried 
to seal the Afghan border along the Durrand Line, which Karzai did not recognise. 
In the process, the Pakistani military advanced into the Afghan side to occupy 
what had previously been no-man’s land, leading to exchanges of artillery fire 
with the Afghans. Karzai protested and warned he would not back down, and 
added that Pakistan should also stop cross-border attacks by extremists.100 By 
March 2006, the Taliban were being blamed for an increase in violence in 
Afghanistan, including a surge in suicide bombings. Frustrated by Musharraf’s 
failure to restrain the militants sheltering in Pakistan, Karzai publicly sent him 
details of the whereabouts of 150 Taliban suspects sheltering in his country, 
including Mullah Omar. Musharraf dismissed the intelligence as nonsense and 
outdated and accused Karzai of not knowing what was happening in his own 
country. In particular, he accused the Afghan defence and intelligence 
establishments, which were headed by former Northern Alliance commanders, of 
conspiring against Pakistan.101  
By now, the US needed cooperation between Islamabad and Kabul in the 
ongoing hunt for al-Qaeda and in the deteriorating campaign against the Taliban, 
but the sniping between Karzai and Musharraf was growing steadily more public 
and intemperate. Bush refereed a working dinner between the two at the White 
House that September which was formally described afterwards as a “constructive 
exchange” but no new agreements or initiatives emerged.102 By 2007 the two were 
still blaming each other. Karzai said the madrassas were training camps for 
terrorists rather than religious schools. Musharraf, on the other hand claimed that 
whilst some terrorists might hide in Pakistan the real support they got was in 
Afghanistan itself.103 Although Karzai was not disappointed when Musharraf 
resigned in 2008 he continued to pin the blame for Taliban violence on Pakistan, 
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and the ISI in particular, with no acknowledgement of what might be happening in 
his own country: “The war against terrorism will not be won unless and until we 
go to the sanctuaries, to the training grounds, to the financiers, to the motivators 
of hatred that come across the border to kill us all.”104 After seven years of 
engagement with both governments Bush had been unable to reconcile the 
differences between them, adding another dimension to his problems there. 
Whilst Afghanistan and the militants in FATA and NWFP/KPK would 
dominate the next phase in relations, there were two other significant 
developments during the Bush-Musharraf period which shaped the perceptions 
and attitudes which their successors inherited - nuclear proliferation and India 
once again. 
 
5.6 The Issue of Nuclear Proliferation 
While Bush was preparing his attack on Afghanistan, Musharraf took 
precautions to protect his most valuable asset, not from al-Qaeda but from the US. 
He ordered the redeployment of his nuclear weapons to at least six different secret 
locations. This step was taken because of uncertainty over the future of the region 
and the Pakistan-US relationship. In particular, he feared that circumstances might 
cause the US to strip Pakistan of its nuclear assets.105 That this was one of his first 
thoughts demonstrated the importance of the nuclear deterrent in the military’s 
thinking and underlined how much of a priority this was in getting his “clean bill 
of health” from co-operating with the US.  
 However, he then came under pressure from the US over the nuclear issue 
from revelations about the activities of the nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan. Khan 
had been removed as head of the nuclear programme in March 2001, but the 
following year he became the subject of allegations in the press that Pakistan had 
been providing uranium enrichment materials and other nuclear technology to 
North Korea since the 1990s. These were first denied by the government, but a 
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second set of allegations in August 2003 claimed Pakistan had also been giving 
nuclear help to Libya and Iran. A military investigation was carried out and, in 
February 2004, Dr. Khan appeared on Pakistani television to confess that the 
allegations were true and that he, rather than the Pakistani government, was the 
culprit, though few believed the government did not know what he had been up to. 
He was placed under protective custody at his home but made a free citizen again 
five years later in recognition of his great achievements and contribution to his 
country. After his release he regretted that he had been persuaded to make the 
confession which he said had been prepared for him by friends who subsequently 
betrayed him, though he was characteristically ambiguous about why. He would 
not indulge in any further controversy other than to claim his innocence and that 
he was not part of any illegal or unauthorised deal.106 
There was natural concern that the US would invoke sanctions once more 
as a result of Khan’s revelations but, as in the past, a blind eye was turned so aid 
and co-operation continued. The American attitude was significant since the 
implications went well beyond Pakistan and involved proliferating nuclear 
technology amongst the enemies of the US and its allies in the Middle East. IAEA 
evidence showed Khan’s illicit operation to be a sophisticated network spread 
over more than 30 companies and 30 countries and there were allegations that he 
had given highly enriched uranium to the vehemently anti-US and anti-Israeli 
regime in Iran.107 Both US intelligence and IAEA investigators were keen to talk 
to Khan, but Pakistan refused requests to hand him over claiming the case was 
closed and that all relevant information had already been shared with the IAEA 
and the US in any case. The Pakistani foreign Minister, Khurshid Kasuri, was 
even defiant in his statement to the Senate in May 2006. “Yes, we are under a lot 
of pressure on the issue of Dr. A. Q. Khan, but we [will] not surrender. We are an 
ally of the US in the global war on terror, but we will not take dictation from 
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anybody on our national interests.”108 The statement suggests he was confident 
that America’s position would not change as long as Pakistan was its partner in 
the war on terror. It was also directed towards his domestic audience. Khan was, 
and still is, a popular national hero and pictures of him regularly appear as a 
patriotic symbol at demonstrations and celebrations. However, away from the 
public eye, the revelations and the possibility of retaliation would also have given 
the US a substantial lever with which to manoeuvre a reluctant Musharraf into 
starting his ill-fated actions in FATA in 2002 and 2003. 
 
5.7 India and the US  
If Bush had made Pakistan feel insecure over the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan, he now went to the root of its insecurities and formed a strategic 
alliance with India. This became clear when he visited India in March 2005 saying 
he had come as “a pilgrim and a friend.”109 In claims that could not be made of his 
relationship with Pakistan, he said India and the US were “global leaders” and that 
India's democratic record was an example for the rest of the world.110 In a 
reference to India’s remarkable economic progress, Bush pointed out that the 
partnership had a strategic business rationale as well as a political one: “All that 
separates a business in Bangalore from a business in Boston is an e-mail, a text 
message, a video conference.”111 
 The main purpose of the visit was to finalise the framework for a mutual 
defence agreement and a controversial deal on full civil nuclear co-operation, both 
of which would cause unease and resentment in Pakistan.112 The nuclear deal was 
controversial because it gave India access to US technology despite not having 
signed the non-proliferation treaty. Some safeguards were included which 
provided for international inspection of its civilian nuclear facilities, but these had 
little prospect of being effective since they excluded military installations and left 
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India free to decide which reactors were civilian or not. In this way, additional 
imported fuel could be used for the civilian programme, allowing home produced 
fuel to be diverted for weapons production.113 The joint Defence Framework 
Agreement was signed in July 2005 but it took three years to change US laws and 
negotiate international waivers to accommodate the Nuclear Agreement which 
was signed in August 2008. 
After visiting India, Bush went on to Pakistan where he reaffirmed a broad 
and lasting strategic partnership but showed no interest in offering a similar 
nuclear deal. “Pakistan and India are different countries with different needs and 
different histories. So, we proceed forward, our strategy will take in effect those 
well-known differences.”114 Pakistan was indeed different - economically under-
developed; run by a military dictator; at war with its own people in FATA and 
NWFP; and plagued by terrorists who had just blown up a US diplomat in a 
suicide attack. How far such differences influenced Bush’s approach to the region 
is unclear. There was no doubt, however, that the new US-India partnership was a 
grave concern and the nuclear deal was seen as a security threat to Pakistan.   
The basis of their complaint was, as before, that Pakistan was being 
discriminated against, as Prime Minister, Gilani, explained in July 2008, “there 
should be no discrimination. If they [US] want to give such nuclear status to India, 
we expect the same for Pakistan.”115 He also warned that the US-India deal would 
destabilize South Asia and would result in a nuclear arms race between India and 
Pakistan. However, the request was rejected by the US on the grounds that such a 
deal was specific to India and not for other countries.116 
Four years later this refusal is still seen as an injustice. 
The US must act responsibly, it has to make the smaller state, like Pakistan, feel 
important and make it feel like a friend. In this way, it can win the trust of Pakistan ... 
The US must also sign a civil nuclear [agreement] with Pakistan. If something has to be 
done with India, then why not with Pakistan? Right now, we [have] adequate anti-
proliferation networks in place.117  
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At the time, however, the A. Q. Khan case demonstrated that Pakistan’s 
anti-proliferation networks had been far from adequate and that US enemies had 
profited as a result. In these circumstances, it was clear the US felt the onus lay 
with Pakistan to rebuild trust on the issue of nuclear weapons. Also, with a long 
history of ignoring and subverting US demands over nuclear proliferation, it was 
highly unlikely that Congress, the IAEA or the Nuclear Suppliers Group would 
have agreed to a deal for Pakistan. Nevertheless, it must have appeared unjust 
from Islamabad’s perspective that India, which had started the regional nuclear 
arms race in the region and had sided with the USSR during the Cold War, was 
now being rewarded with international acceptance as a nuclear power and with 
US nuclear supplies under an agreement with significant non-proliferation 
loopholes. This would lead to claims that the US-India deal was anti-Muslim and 
escalated the regional arms race.  
Beyond the nuclear deal, however, the implications of the emerging Indo-
US nexus, as it was termed, were much deeper and the signs for Pakistan were 
ominous. While it was engaged on fulfilling its post-9/11 obligations, at great 
social, economic and political cost to itself, the US was busy developing a long-
term strategic partnership with its primary enemy in the region.118 
 
5.8 Obama and the “Af-Pak Strategy” 
At the start of 2009, the new civilian government with Yusuf Gilani as 
Prime Minister and Benazir Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zadari, as President, had 
been in office for ten months when Barack Obama became US President with 
Hilary Clinton as his Secretary of State. Bush had left office with his personal 
approval ratings at only 25 per cent,119 as the US got bogged down in the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. The American electorate was war-weary and deeply 
worried by the economic crisis of Bush’s final months in power. Obama won a 
large majority in the November 2008 elections speaking to the American people 
of hope and the need for change.  
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 In foreign policy, Obama’s prime concern was to find ways of ending the 
Iraqi war and finishing the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban so he could 
bring US troops home. In Pakistan, the electorate had similarly been motivated by 
hopes for democratic change and peace when they voted Musharraf out of office. 
However, beyond expressions of hope, the problems to be confronted had not 
changed and it would be no easier for Obama and Gilani to solve the complexities 
of Afghanistan and the Pakistan border areas than it had been for their 
predecessors. Thus, Washington continued to have the same level of concern over 
the roots of terrorism in the tribal areas, and Pakistan was seen as a problem rather 
than a solution to the war on terrorism.120 
 This led to the formulation of the America’s so-called, “Af-Pak” strategy, 
announced in March 2009, which treated Afghanistan and Pakistan as two fronts 
in the same war and, for the first time, differentiated clearly between al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban. Al-Qaeda was to be destroyed as an organisation, and the same 
resolute approach was to be taken against the most militant and uncompromising 
elements of the Taliban, but there was more room for compromise with the 
moderates who were more willing to renounce insurgency and give up the fight. 
To support this new strategy, there was a surge in US troop numbers in 
Afghanistan and an intensification of drone attacks in Pakistan. Extra finance was 
provided to build Pakistan’s capacity for counter-insurgency. $400 million was 
provided to train the Frontier corps and $3 billion over five years to train and 
equip the rest of the army.  
The strategy also put more emphasis on the political. More aid was 
provided for civilian development in both countries, including job creation, 
education, training and infrastructure projects. For Pakistan, the Kerry-Lugar-
Berman Act was proposed in September 2009 to provide $7.5 billion civilian 
assistance over five years. In addition there were to be regular rounds of a US-
Pakistan dialogue to co-ordinate action, build military-to-military ties and to help 
alleviate Pakistani concerns over abandonment.121 This constructive and multi-
dimensional approach was a long way from Armitage’s bullying threats and 
Bush’s simplistic attitude towards the war on terror. Even so, the level of distrust 
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on both sides which had built up since 2001 meant that not all features of the 
strategy were welcomed in Pakistan. For example, putting Pakistan in the same 
category as Afghanistan was perceived to be offensive in Islamabad and adopting 
the same counter-insurgency strategy in both countries was considered to be “a 
colossal mistake”.122 
More specifically, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act had conditions attached 
which were considered intrusive and demeaning. These included the requirement 
that the US Secretary of State had to certify that Pakistan was continuing to co-
operate in dismantling nuclear proliferation networks. Hillary Clinton visited 
Pakistan that October in the middle of the row over the Act. She had gone to turn 
a new page in the bilateral relationship and to start rebuilding it on the basis of 
mutual respect. However, getting this message across was difficult, despite her 
announcement of an additional $243 million to help improve a range of civilian 
projects in energy generation and higher education.123 The issue was only resolved 
with an assurance from Congress that there was no intention of compromising 
Pakistan’s sovereignty or security.  
Despite these problems, there was some optimism that the Strategic 
Dialogue could help move the two countries to a more stable, long-term 
relationship. At the third round of the dialogue in October 2010 progress was 
being made and Washington offered an additional $2.29 billion for security 
assistance as a gesture to the Pakistani military that it was not being overlooked in 
the renewed focus on civilian aid.124 However well-intentioned and sincere these 
initiatives were, Islamabad remained suspicious of Washington. The leaders felt 
they had been given empty promises before and remained concerned over the 
durability of the current relationship with Washington. Furthermore, there had 
been insufficient time to rebuild the trust that would be needed to hold the new 
relationship steady through the difficulties which were about to batter it. 
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5.9 The Issue of Nuclear Security 
In the last months of the Bush administration the instability in Pakistan started 
causing fears over the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and the possibility 
of them falling into the hands of terrorists or even an extreme Islamist 
government. In September 2008, the US Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral Mullen, reported, that whilst the weapons were secure, and had remained 
so through changes in the Pakistani government, there were still concerns in 
relation to terrorists. 
Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal about 
these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or 
potentially used. And so, control of ... those weapons is a key concern. And I think 
certainly the Pakistani leadership that I’ve spoken with on both the military and civilian 
side understand that.125 
 
By March the following year, US Central Commander, General Petraeus, 
revealed that concerns had spread to the possibility of regime collapse. “Pakistani 
state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and other extremist 
organisations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from 
which to plan and launch attacks.”126 Up until then though, US intelligence 
appeared relaxed on the issue. In November 2007, Deputy Secretary of State, John 
Negroponte, told Congress he was satisfied with the long term security of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons since he believed there was plenty of succession 
planning within the Pakistani military and that the weapons were under effective 
technical control.127 In May 2008, Donald Kerr, US Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence, judged that the military’s control of nuclear weapons was firmly 
institutionalised and withstood many political changes over the years. Pakistan 
made its own assurances in a May 2009 statement from its Foreign Ministry: 
“There is simply no question of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands. 
We have full confidence in our procedures, mechanisms and command and 
control systems.”128 
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However, Wikileaks cables revealed that, behind the public assurances, 
there was real worry and suspicion on both sides about this issue. The US 
ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, briefed special envoy, Richard 
Holbrooke, in February 2009 that her major concern was less the possibility that 
militants might steal an entire weapon than the chance that someone working in 
military facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually 
make a weapon.129 The record of a September 2009 meeting between UK Foreign 
Secretary, David Miliband, and US officials also revealed concerns in Britain over 
the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Miliband also expressed the 
view that “the Pakistanis worry that the US will drop in and take their nukes.”130 
These fears were given added weight a month later when the General 
Headquarters of the Pakistani Army in the heart of Rawalpindi came under 
terrorist attack over several hours. In May 2011, terrorists again entered a secure 
military base in Karachi where they destroyed three p-3C Orion maritime 
surveillance planes. Those two high profile incidents raised serious questions 
about the armed forces’ ability to protect their nuclear weapons from terrorist 
attacks.131 There was also criticism in Pakistan as Hamdullah explained:  
The terrorist attacks on Pakistan’s GHQ, and air and naval bases in Karachi is a matter of 
great disgrace for Pakistan’s armed forces. The question arises how those terrorists 
entered those sensitive places with such tight security and fought with our armed forces 
for many hours. After those incidents, what kind of message did Pakistan give to the 
world? How can Pakistan give assurances to the world, and most particularly to the US, 
that our nuclear weapons are safe from terrorist and extremist elements in Pakistan? In a 
nutshell, Pakistan gave a clear message to the world that it has insufficient security to 
protect its military installations, including its nuclear weapons from extremist 
elements.132 
 
However, it was not just the dangers posed by external terrorist attacks or 
the infiltration of military installations that worried the US and NATO, but also 
the prospect of a coup or mutiny by extremist elements within the army itself. 
This fear became more prominent as suspicions about Islamic sympathies of some 
groups within the military also grew. This fear was shared by Pakistan’s main 
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rival in the region, India.133 There were also concerns expressed over the rapid 
growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. A US/NATO intelligence briefing of 
December 2008 revealed that, despite its precarious economic situation, Pakistan 
was producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the 
world.134 
Pakistan’s own fears, expressed by David Miliband in his meeting with US 
officials, were given added weight by media reports that the US was making 
contingency plans which included sending in its own troops to secure the bombs. 
In response, Pakistan continued its public assurances and complained that 
Western fears were both exaggerated and unreasonable. There was also a 
perceived discriminatory and anti-Muslim edge to these concerns, it was claimed, 
since Pakistan’s weapons were no more at risk than India’s and no one ever spoke 
of a “Hindu Bomb” in the way they did of an “Islamic Bomb”.135 
Despite this, US intelligence was in no mood to take risks. In US National 
Security Agency documents, leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013, it was revealed 
that surveillance of Pakistan’s arsenal had been substantially increased. Fears 
about the security of its nuclear programme were so high that the budget for 
tracking the spread of illicit weapons divided the world into two categories - 
Pakistan and everybody else. These disclosures exposed new levels of US distrust 
in an already unsteady security partnership with Pakistan and revealed a more 
expansive effort to gather intelligence than had previously been disclosed.136 
Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, observed, “if the 
Americans are expanding their surveillance capabilities, it can only mean one 
thing: the mistrust now exceeds the trust.”137 
In fact, Musharraf had earlier given them every reason to be suspicious. 
When he suspended elections and declared emergency rule in November 2007, 
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one of his justifications was that that if elections were allowed to proceed in 
Pakistan’s disturbed environment it could bring in dangerous elements which 
might endanger Pakistan's “strategic assets” - a common euphemism for nuclear 
weapons.138 In contrast, by September 2011 he was assuring the American media 
that their fear over weapons getting into the wrong hands was being massively 
overstated.139  
 
5.10 Kashmir 
Obama appeared to understand that Kashmir lay at the centre of regional 
politics and that resolving this conflict would, in turn, help him succeed against 
the militants. In an eve of election interview, he said he would encourage India 
and Pakistan to resolve the issue so Islamabad could focus fully on the sources of 
Afghan instability rather than on India.140 In accordance with this policy, Obama 
proposed to appoint a special envoy to the region to cover Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and India with a wide-ranging brief to include Kashmir. His choice of envoy was 
Richard Holbrooke, a veteran negotiator with a proven record in the Balkans. This 
rekindled Pakistani hopes that Obama would now play a more pro-active role than 
his predecessors in seeking a negotiated settlement in Kashmir. However, India 
lobbied strongly against the proposal and made it plain it would not accept either 
Holbrooke or, indeed, any US mediation in the dispute.  
 A Wikileaks cable revealed that Indian External Affairs Minister, Pranab 
Mukherjee, told the US Ambassador on 9 January 2009 that the idea smacked of 
interference and was unacceptable. Mukherjee was keen that India’s relationship 
with the US should not be seen through the lens of regional crises. To drive the 
point home, the US was told that the Vice-President elect, Joe Biden, need not 
take the trouble to include India on his forthcoming regional tour.141 Kashmir was 
then taken out of Holbrooke’s brief and he was appointed as Special Envoy to 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan only. National Security Adviser, General James Jones, 
made it plain that the new administration would not get involved in the issue 
beyond helping both countries build more trust and confidence.142 In Pakistan, this 
was seen as yet another unfair concession to India.143  
 The US had put immense pressure on Pakistan over its support for terrorist 
groups in Kashmir but had backed away from pressuring India to reach a 
settlement.144 The political scientist, Dr. Mehmood Ali Shah and Ambassador 
Naqvi, pointed out in interviews that this also signalled how far the US position 
on Kashmir had changed.145 Originally Washington had justified what they 
claimed was a neutral stance by supporting the UN resolution, which was based 
on a plebiscite for Kashmiris to decide their own fate. Now it had abandoned this 
requirement and just called for the conflict to be resolved by the two sides without 
third party involvement, which had been the long-standing Indian position. Thus 
the US appeared to have abandoned the idea of Kashmiri self-determination in 
favour of a deal which supported India’s position on the issue.  
 
5.11 The Controversy over Drones 
The complex and covert nature of US-Pakistan relations is well illustrated 
by the issue of drones over Pakistan territory. The Islamabad government actually 
co-operated with the US military over the drone strikes, but tried to pretend it did 
not.  The use of these unmanned aircraft for bombing and missile attacks started 
in Pakistan in 2004 under the Bush administration. Launched from bases in the 
region, drones were operated remotely from a control centre in the US. They were 
used in more dangerous areas where piloted aircraft may come under enemy fire 
and be shot down. It was also claimed that drones could offer a better chance of 
precision strikes which would cause less collateral damage and fewer non-
combatant casualties than traditional bombing or shelling. Sohrab argues that their 
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use became so common in FATA that they greatly reduced the need for US 
ground forces. Despite these supposed advantages, the US drone programme led 
to problems with the Pakistani government and aggravated anti-US sentiment in 
the country. There were a number of reasons for this. The most prominent 
amongst them was the feeling that the drones violated Pakistani sovereignty and 
killed innocent lives. For despite their supposed accuracy, civilian casualties 
formed over 20 per cent of the total number of deaths from drone attacks.146 This 
concern was heightened by the thought that these lives had been lost at a click of a 
button pressed by an unknown American many thousands of miles away.  
TABLE 6.2: TOTAL NUMBER OF CASUALITIES DUE TO DRONE 
STRIKES EACH YEAR, 2004-2011 
Years Incidents Killed Militants Civilians 
2004 1 7 5 2 
2005 3 15 5 10 
2006 2 94 1 93 
2007 4 63 51 12 
2008 36 298 223 75 
2009 54 549 387 162 
2010 122 849 788 61 
2011 73 517 420 97 
Total 295 2392 1880 512 
Source: Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis, New America Foundation, Washington, 
<http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis?page=1> [Accessed 12 July 2014]. 
From 2008 onwards, Islamabad denounced the drone programme and 
requested the US to reconsider it. Prime Minister Gilani protested that action 
against terrorists inside Pakistan was the sovereign right and responsibility of his 
government. “If there are any militants in our country, it is our right to take action 
against them and we can do that. So we do not want anyone to interfere in our 
sovereignty.”147 The Chief of Pakistan’s Armed Forces, General Ashfaq Kayani 
reminded the US on 10 September 2008 that “their rules of engagement clearly 
defined operations against militants inside a country as the sole responsibility of 
that country’s armed forces”. He went on to elaborate that “there is no question of 
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any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are 
allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border.”148 
General Kayani’s statement seemed clear, but claims began to emerge of a 
secret agreement with the US under which the Pakistani authorities tacitly 
supported US drone strikes in Pakistan. The first public acknowledgement of 
Pakistan co-operation came in February 2009 when Senator Dianne Feinstein, 
Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, disclosed that the US used Pakistani 
airbases for drone attacks in FATA.149 This suggested a much deeper relationship 
with the United States on counter-terrorism matters than had been publicly 
acknowledged. Initially, the Pakistan government denied their bases were used in 
this way, but by December 2009 Defence Minister, Ahmed Mukhtar, admitted the 
US was using Pakistan’s Shamsi Airbase for drone operations.150  
Further evidence of Pakistani collusion was provided in a Wikileaks 
document revealing that Gilani had tacitly allowed the US to conduct the 
operations in FATA in August 2008, just a month before his public protests. The 
leaked cable revealed that Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, advised an un-named 
US official to suspend the “alleged Predator attacks until after the Bajaur 
operation”, suggesting that there was some co-ordination over the drone 
programme and Pakistan’s FATA operations at the time. Gilani is then reported as 
saying, “I don’t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest 
in the National Assembly and then ignore it.”151 Musharraf contributed to the 
controversy in a CNN interview in April 2012, when he rejected Gilani’s earlier 
statements that Pakistani leaders had no part in the operations. He went on to 
insist that the government of Pakistan signed a secret deal with the US that drones 
could be used “only on a few occasions, when a target was absolutely isolated and 
there was no chance of collateral damage.”152 Further evidence was obtained by 
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The Washington Post in October 2013 in CIA documents and Pakistani diplomatic 
memos which showed that Pakistani military officials, who had bitterly criticized 
the US strikes, had secretly been choosing some of the targets and also received 
regular briefing about the results.153 
The CIA declined to discuss these revelations but chose not to challenge 
their validity. Pakistan’s foreign office spokesman, Aizaz Chaudhry, also avoided 
commenting on them, though he did say the then government of Nawaz Sharif, 
was adamant that the drone strikes must be stopped.154 Whatever other difficulties 
the US and Pakistan governments had in co-operating, it seemed they could still 
find solidarity in denying their collusion. Bergen and Tiedemann observed that 
Pakistan benefitted substantially from this arrangement since the drones struck at 
the TTP but the blame was shifted onto the US. “For Pakistani politicians, the 
drone program is a dream come true. They get to posture to their constituents 
about the perfidious Americans even as they reap the benefits from the US 
strikes.”155  
The Commission set up in the wake of the US killing of Bin Laden also 
examined this issue and concluded that the Pakistani government had consented to 
the strikes. There had been no written agreement, according to the report, but 
there had been an informal, political understanding. This array of evidence 
strongly implicates successive Pakistani administrations in the drone operations 
and negates their claims that the US was violating sovereignty.156 It also 
implicates both military leaders and the civilian Prime Minister Gilani in the 
deception. Khan, in an interview, concluded that the collusion over drone strikes 
did indeed undermine Pakistani sovereignty, but not in the way the Pakistan 
leaders had suggested in public.   
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The US wanted to carry on their own agenda in Islamabad. They are very happy with the 
President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari, no matter what the people of Pakistan think about 
him. He has done and is doing exactly what the Americans wanted … So the result is that 
Pakistan is no longer independent. It has a rubber stamp parliament. It has a thoroughly 
corrupt Prime Minister and this type of arrangement in Pakistan suits him.157  
 
Notwithstanding Pakistan’s public criticism, the US defended their use of 
drone strikes against the militants in FATA. In April 2012, John Brenan, Obama’s 
counter-terrorism adviser, said: “As a matter of international law, the United 
States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, in 
response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use force consistent with our 
inherent right of national self-defence.”158 The following June, Hillary Clinton 
also defended their use: “We will always maintain our right to use force against 
groups such as al-Qaeda that have attacked us and still threaten us with imminent 
attack.”159 The UN appeared to back the US by stating that every state had the 
duty to prevent terrorist plots and actions on its territory.160 In certain 
interpretations of the law, it was claimed that Pakistan had not fulfilled its duty 
and the United States, therefore, had a right to intervene to protect itself from 
security threats emanating from Pakistan. The US drone strikes were, therefore, 
acts perpetrated in self-defence and did not constitute a violation of Pakistani 
sovereignty.  
The UN Special Rapporteur, Philips Alston, extended this argument to 
include targeted killings:     
A targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second State does not 
violate the second State’s sovereignty [where] . . . the first, targeting State has a right 
under international law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
[and if] the second State is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first 
State launched from its territory.161  
 
The other claim that sovereignty had not been violated also related to the 
fact that the consent of the Pakistan government had been acquired. However it is 
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not clear whether consent can be seen to have continued once Nawaz Sharif 
succeeded Gilani as Prime Minister in June 2013. While his predecessors had 
condemned the strikes at home they had all refrained from raising the issue at 
international level, but Sharif did so at the UN General Assembly on 27 
September 2013 in which he said that, the use of drone strikes could never be 
accepted as it was “a continued violation of our [Pakistan's] territorial 
integrity.”162 Also, on his visit to the US in October, 2013 he called directly for 
the strikes to stop:  
The use of drones is not only a continued violation of our territorial integrity but also 
detrimental to our efforts at eliminating terrorism from our country ... This issue has 
become a major irritant in our bilateral relationship as well. I would therefore stress the 
need to end drone attacks.163 
 
A few days later, on 4 November, he addressed his country’s army at a 
field exercise and reiterated that the drones violated Pakistan sovereignty and 
said: “Gone are the days when our national security policies were determined 
through telephone calls from abroad. We now have a democratically elected 
government, chosen by the people of Pakistan.”164 Retired General, Talat Masood, 
explained the change in policy:  
I think the intelligence agencies, the military and the civilian leadership were all party to 
it but they didn't want to say so in public because it would be a very bad public relations 
exercise, and it would show how weak Pakistan is ... But the new civilian government 
has taken a different position. It says, well we were not a party to that and we think that 
... the drones are doing much greater harm [than good].”165 
 
The attacks did indeed cause harm, not least in generating resentment and 
inflaming anti-US sentiment. A survey in June 2012 revealed that only 17 per cent 
of Pakistanis backed the drone strikes, even if they were conducted with the 
support of the Pakistani government.166 A series of polls showed the lack of 
support for America in Pakistan.  In 2010, only 17 per cent of Pakistanis held a 
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favourable view of the US, and Barack Obama’s personal rating fell from 13 per 
cent in 2009 to 8 per cent in 2010.167 In the same year, only 2 per cent of the 
Pakistan public favoured good relations with the US.168 To add to a feeling of 
crisis in US-Pakistan relations, a legal action for murder was launched in Pakistan 
against former CIA lawyer, John Rizzo, who claimed to have approved a monthly 
list of some 30 individuals to be targeted by drone strikes.169 
Public opinion in the tribal areas themselves is more difficult to pin down. 
An un-named 2009 poll quoted in The Economist found support for the strikes in 
these areas in contrast to the findings in the country as a whole. 52 per cent of 
respondents said they thought the strikes were accurate and 60 per cent said they 
weakened militant groups.170 However, another poll conducted in 2010 in the 
tribal areas by the New America Foundation found only 16 per cent believed the 
drone strikes were accurate. It is notoriously difficult to conduct polls in conflict 
areas and, no doubt, the discrepancy in results is due to a fear of the militants.171 It 
also might be the result of a genuine difference of opinion amongst those opposed 
to the militants. Drones have caused innocent lives to be lost, but they have 
proved to be more accurate than conventional bombing.  
Thus, the dispute over drones has been a mix of public condemnation and 
private collusion by the Pakistani political establishment. This duplicitous position 
has fuelled anti-Americanism even though the drone strikes may have been 
preferable to the alternatives for people in the affected areas. Gilani illustrated the 
hypocrisy of his government’s policy on drones. On the one hand, he condemned 
their use because it ran “counter to our strategy of segregating peace-loving tribal 
people and militants”. On the other, he declared that he had asked the US to 
provide Pakistan with the drones “so that in the case of credible intelligence we 
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can ourselves take action.”172 This shows that the real argument was less about the 
drones themselves and rather more about who was using them and who was 
choosing the targets. This may have seemed a lesser dispute in the eyes of many, 
but it still remained at the heart of much of the animosity which continued to grow 
between Washington and Islamabad.  
 
5.12 Duplicity and the Haqqani Network 
2011 was a particularly bad year for the US-Pakistan relationship when 
underlying tensions and suspicions broke out into public accusations, demands 
and unilateral retaliations. The main reason was US frustration over the resurgent 
Taliban who were seriously disrupting their plans for troop withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in 2014 with brazen attacks and mounting casualties on the allied 
side. In particular, Washington was angered by anti-US militants sheltering in 
Pakistan, notably the Haqqani Network, which it claimed were aided by the ISI. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, had long been frustrated by the perceived unreliability 
of the US and believed it necessary to retain its proxy influence in Afghanistan 
through these groups once the Americans had withdrawn.  
The Haqqani Network had already been blamed for a number of attacks on 
US and Afghan forces, including at the Kabul Serena Hotel in January 2008, a 
NATO convoy in May 2010, a truck bomb at an Outpost in Wardak on 11 
September 2011 and the US Embassy in Kabul the following day.173 The last two 
of these attacks brought US frustrations to the surface with accusations of ISI 
involvement. Admiral Mike Mullen, retiring Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, reported to the US Senate Armed Service Committee on 22 September 2011 
that the Haqqanis, the ISI and the Pakistani Government were all responsible for 
those attacks.   
the Haqqani network….act as a veritable hand of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence 
Agency… In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the 
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government of Pakistan – and most especially the Pakistani Army and the ISI – 
jeopardises not only the prospect of our strategic partnership, but also Pakistan’s 
opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence. By exporting 
violence, they have eroded their internal security and their position in the region. They 
have undermined their international credibility and threatened their economic well-
being.”174  
 
Anger was inflamed by a Guardian report that the US NATO Commander 
in Afghanistan had personally asked Pakistan’s army chief to halt the truck bomb 
attack that intelligence had warned him about. General Kayani was reported to 
have offered to make a phone call to stop the assault. Alarm came not just from 
Kayani’s failure to prevent the attack, but also from the fact that he had such a 
direct line of communication with the terrorists. When challenged over Haqqani 
involvement, a Pakistani military spokesman shifted the blame to NATO. “The 
main question is how did this truck travel to Wardak and explode without being 
checked by NATO? This is just a blame game.”175  
It appears that the US had understood the Pakistani position and strategy 
for some time. A WikiLeaks record of a November 2008 NATO briefing by US 
Intelligence Officer, Peter Lavoy, explained that Pakistan permitted the Taliban 
leadership council (the Quetta Shura) to operate in Balochistan while the ISI 
provided intelligence and financial support to insurgent groups, especially the 
Haqqani network,  to conduct attacks on Afghan, ISAF, and Indian targets. Lavoy 
suspected that the ISI did this for three reasons. First, the ISI did not want India to 
play such an active role in Afghanistan; second, it believed that the Taliban would 
prevail in the long term, at least in the Pashtun belt; and finally they believed that 
if militant groups were not attacking Afghanistan, they would seek out Pakistani 
targets. Lavoy’s analysis recognised that the Pakistani military had lost overall 
control of the border areas and could only target a few insurgent groups at a time, 
so it had little option other than to adopt a policy of appeasement with others.176  
The US intelligence services, however, were very suspicious of the ISI and 
Pakistan more generally. Documents for interrogators at Guantanamo Bay 
recommend they treat the ISI as a terrorist organisation, the same as al-Qaeda, 
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Hamas and Hezbollah. Thus, association with the ISI was assumed to be an 
indicator of a detainee’s likely support for militant Islamism and its war against 
US and coalition forces in Afghanistan.177 The political establishment, however, 
had to be more cautious. The important transit routes through Pakistan had 
already been closed to NATO traffic on two previous occasions in protest at the 
NATO killing of two Pakistani soldiers in September 2010 and the drone strikes 
in April 2011.178 By October, however, political caution had been overtaken by 
frustration when Hilary Clinton returned to Islamabad along with CIA Director 
David Petraeus, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin 
Dempesy. In a joint news conference with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Hina 
Rabbani Khar on 21 October 2011, Clinton made blunt accusations about 
Pakistan’s links with the Haqqani network and demanded greater cooperation to 
squeeze the network which, she asserted, was responsible for cross-border strikes 
in Afghanistan. Pointing out that the Haqqanis could eventually be dangerous to 
Pakistan itself. “It’s like that old story,” Clinton said, “you can’t keep snakes in 
your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours. Eventually those 
snakes are going to turn on whoever has them in the backyard.”179 General 
Kayani, however, turned the responsibility onto the US, saying it should focus on 
stabilising Afghanistan rather than pushing Pakistan to attack militant groups in 
the crucial border region.180  
Whilst this response might have been seen as provocative in the US, it 
reflected the view of many in Pakistan who saw the American reaction as 
hypocritical. Both Ishtiaq Ahmed and the journalist Ashraf Malkham pointed out 
that the Haqqani Network was the product of the Mujahidin which had been 
sponsored to fight the USSR in the 1980s with US money, technology and 
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training and that both the CIA and the ISI should accept blame.181 Former 
Minister for Foreign Affairs at the time, Nawabzada Amad Khan, agreed with this 
perspective. “It would be insane to assume that we are hand and glove with any 
such [terrorist] organisations, or the military or ISI support any such 
organisations. Pure and simple, it is a lack of capacity right now which stops us 
from going against everyone simultaneously.”182 Ambassador Naqvi also blamed 
a lack of military capacity as a reason for Pakistan failing to act. Even if this were 
not so, he argued that there was no long-term military solution to the problems in 
the border areas. “Suppose we finish off the Haqqani network, the problem will 
still not be solved because the militants of the Haqqani network will scatter and 
start their terrorism in every corner of Pakistan.”183 General Duranni was also 
exasperated over the US failure to appreciate the impossibility of sealing the 
Afghan-Pakistan border. “The Mexican border cannot be sealed which is much 
shorter, much simpler. Thus, if that cannot be done then Pakistan [cannot] be 
blamed [for its problems along the Pakistan-Afghan border].”184 A common theme 
of grievance was also that the US appeared not to appreciate the great costs and 
sacrifices that Pakistan had borne in supporting Washington’s war on terror.185 
This assessment was confirmed by the Assistant Secretary of State, Phillip 
Crowley, who said “there is no country that has suffered more significantly from 
terrorism than Pakistan itself.”186 As Khan said in an interview in 2012: “the war 
on terror is not confined only to Afghanistan and the tribal areas of Pakistan, but it 
has also spread to the secured areas of Pakistan such as, Quetta, Peshawar, 
Karachi, Bannu, Kohat etc. where the terrorists are targeting innocent 
civilians.”187 Pakistan’s support of the war on terror had significantly destabilised 
and radicalised the country.188 Interior Minister, Rehman Malik spoke for many 
when he said: 
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If the strategy is not right, all the stakeholders have to share responsibility. Pakistan has 
suffered unimaginably since the war on terror began. We are not just fighting for 
Pakistan; we are fighting for the whole world. If this country is destabilized, the whole 
region is destabilized … so please, stop the blame game. We are your partners. We are 
victims, not part of the terrorists.”189  
  
Just as the US accused Pakistan of playing a double game over its 
tolerance of the Haqqanis, many in Pakistan accused the US of double standards 
over peace talks with the Taliban. Realisation that the Taliban could not be 
eliminated led to US acceptance that a solution in Afghanistan would have to 
accommodate them in some way. In October 2008, US Defence Secretary Robert 
Gates said they would be ready to reconcile with the Taliban if they pursued talks 
with the Afghan Government. This policy was a major switch to the idea of 
reducing violence by empowering influential militias in areas beyond the reach of 
the Kabul regime. This kind of reconciliation with former adversaries had been 
used in Iraq and was seen as a possible solution to the Afghan problem.190  
The process proceeded in November 2011 with a meeting in Munich 
between US officials and Tayab Agha, a representative of Mullah Omar, followed 
by two rounds of preliminary talks about exchanging prisoners.191 For many in the 
West, this was seen as an inevitable compromise. In Pakistan, however, it was 
seen as an act of hypocrisy and betrayal. It was hypocritical because it showed the 
US following strategies which it had earlier condemned Pakistan for pursuing. It 
was a betrayal because Pakistan was being left out of the peace process, as Ishtiaq 
Ahmed pointed out: 
If [the Taliban] is a peace negotiator for the US then how [can] the US force Pakistan to 
go against the Haqqani network which is also [a] major section of the Taliban? 
Therefore, the argument of the US that Pakistan is providing a safe haven to the Taliban 
finished with the beginning of the US-Taliban talks and has no moral justification … the 
US [does not] involve Pakistan because the Indians and the Afghan Northern Alliance 
consistently mislead them.”192  
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Beyond these grievances, though, there were also strategic reasons why 
Kiyani was not prepared to bow to US demands at this stage. The Haqqani 
Network was perceived to be important in maintaining Pakistani influence in 
Afghanistan after the US had withdrawn. Pakistan was also becoming 
increasingly concerned, as Lavov had suggested, over the Indian presence in 
Afghanistan. India had spent $1.3 billion on reconstruction and infrastructure 
projects and by mid-2010 had stationed 4,000 of its own specialist advisors and 
security personnel in the country.193 Pakistan saw the Indian presence as a security 
threat and a deliberate attempt to prevent it from attaining strategic depth on its 
border. In addition, Pakistan long suspected India of covert intervention in the 
tribal areas and the province of Balochistan and of providing arms and funds to 
the TTP and the Baloch separatists.194 Pakistan was also suspicious of American 
support for India in Afghanistan.  
The US is supporting India and the Northern Alliance … It will never be in the national 
interest of Pakistan when people like them are sitting on the throne in Kabul after the 
Americans have left Afghanistan ... We have a porous border with Afghanistan and if 
there is a government in Afghanistan which is anti-Pakistan and pro-Indian like Northern 
Alliance, then they can cross the border and commit terrorism in Pakistan. Therefore, the 
US is supporting our enemy in Afghanistan.195    
 
General Duranni went further in claiming, “there are [a] number of people 
and insurgent groups which are paid by the US and India to attack Pakistan.”196 
These concerns were given added weight in October 2011 when India and the 
Karzai government in Kabul signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement under 
which India would help with education, energy requirements and integrating 
Afghanistan into the Indian economy. It was also understood that India would 
increase its training of Afghan security forces. Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan 
Singh, referred to the violence in Afghanistan, which he said was undermining 
security in South Asia and promised that India would stand by Afghanistan when 
foreign troops withdrew in 2014.197  
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In these circumstances it suited Islamabad to support the pro-Pakistani 
Haqqanis. Haqqani also performed another key function for Pakistan in providing 
access to, and brokering deals with, the complex web of insurgent groups in the 
tribal areas and in Afghanistan itself. This had been critical in negotiating the 
release of the Pakistani Ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Aziz Uddin, who had 
been kidnapped in 2008 by the TTP. In 2009 Musharraf explained how and why 
Haqqani was important. 
He is the man who has influence over Baitullah Mehsud, a dangerous terrorist, the 
fiercest commander in South Waziristan and the murderer of Benazir Bhutto as we know 
today. Mehsud kidnapped our ambassador in Kabul and our intelligence used Haqqani’s 
influence to get him released. Now, that does not mean that Haqqani is supported by us. 
The intelligence service is using certain enemies against our enemies. And it is better to 
tackle them one by one than making them all enemies.198  
 
Pakistan could not afford to lose Haqqani as a key strategic asset and, even 
more, they could not afford to make an enemy of him as General Duranni’s 
explained: 
I have no intention of making the Haqqani network my enemy. We have problems with 
God knows how many other factions. Therefore, we don’t want to create a problem with 
someone who is not against us and who is only trying to resist the US occupation.199  
 
Ishtiaq Ahmed’s analysis was that Pakistan’s counter-terrorism approach 
should be seen as “triangular”. 
We have been tough on domestic groups who were launching terrorism against Pakistani 
civilians, security institutions and establishments and have zero tolerance for them. But 
we have been lenient towards Afghan Talibans or the Haqqani network whose priorities 
are in Afghanistan … [since] they are no threat to Pakistan. We are also lenient towards 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and other groups because their priorities are also not in Pakistan; their 
priorities are in Kashmir and India.200 
 
Thus, with the two sides working to different strategies for different 
reasons and to different timetables there appeared little room for convergence on 
the issue of the Haqqani network. The best that Obama could hope for was an 
accommodation which would allow him to withdraw a sufficient number of troops 
to claim he had met his promises to the American people. The best that Pakistan 
could hope for was to maintain its triangular approach for as long as it could and 
hope it would not seriously endanger its core relationship with Washington. 
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5.13 The US-Pakistan Relationship Faces Crisis 
Emotions on both sides were inflamed by three other incidents in the crisis 
year of 2011 leading to an atmosphere of relationship breakdown - evidence of 
lethal unauthorised CIA activity in Pakistan; unilateral US intervention to kill 
Osama bin Laden under the noses of the Pakistani military; and the US attack on 
the Pakistani army post at Salala. Khan considered that these incidents left the 
relationship in an unprecedented state of crisis with the two countries accusing 
each other of betrayal. Given the recent history of relations, the crisis itself was 
not entirely unexpected. However, the suddenness of the deterioration did appear 
to take both sides by surprise.201 
On 27 January 2011, an American from the US Consulate in Lahore, 
Raymond Davis, shot two Pakistanis whom he thought were about to rob him. A 
third Pakistani was killed when an American vehicle rushing to Davis’s aid 
collided with a motorcycle and then fled the scene. The ruthless manner in which 
Davis conducted the killing and his aborted rescue alerted police that he was a 
CIA agent. He was, in fact, one of many contractors engaged by the CIA on 
unauthorised activities in Lahore, but the US immediately issued denials, claiming 
he was a bona fide diplomat with diplomatic immunity, and demanded his release. 
This denial was not only untrue, causing recrimination and public uproar, but it 
was also misguided, since it made a quiet diplomatic solution less likely.  
The Pakistani Court ruled against Davis’s claim for diplomatic status and 
refused to release him. The incident escalated and the US stuck to its claims that 
Davis was an administrative and technical official and, in calling for his release, 
even Obama referred to him as “our diplomat.”202 Senior US politicians started 
campaigning for aid to be suspended. In Pakistan there was outrage at the idea of 
armed Americans rampaging through their cities. Indignation stoked anti-US 
sentiment, which was already rife, and there were mass demonstrations calling for 
Davis to be executed.  
The US Embassy tried to pressure President Zadari to release Davis, but 
this just demonstrated their ignorance of Pakistani politics since the President had 
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little influence over either the courts or the police in the city of his political rival, 
Nawaz Sharif. After forty-seven days the immediate crisis was resolved with an 
admission by the US that Davis was a CIA contractor who was tracking militant 
groups in Pakistan, and the payment of $2.3 million in diyat (compensation 
payable under Islamic law as an alternative to retributive punishment) to the 
families of Davis’s victims.203 This allowed Davis to return home, but it left much 
resentment about covert US operations in Pakistan and the knowledge that they 
too were playing a double game.  
The incident exposed US arrogance and ineptitude and suggested their 
confidence in being able to stonewall denials was greater than their political skill 
in pulling it off. It also highlighted the volatile state of relations. Thus, when a 
drone strike killed dozens at a peaceful tribal gathering in North Waziristan, the 
day after Davis’s release, there were yet more accusations of US arrogance in 
acting precipitately on the basis of faulty intelligence.204 Kayani, called the action 
a violation of human rights, while Gillani described it as irrational.205 US 
Ambassador to Pakistan, Cameron Munter, was summoned to Pakistan’s Foreign 
Office to receive a strong official protest. Later, hundreds of US personnel, 
believed to work for the CIA, did not get their visas renewed and were effectively 
expelled from the country.206 These events increased mistrust between Pakistan 
and the US and put the alliance in danger, but more was to follow. 
US duplicity and incompetence had been revealed in the Davies case, but 
the tables were turned three months later. On 2 May 2011, US security forces 
completed a carefully planned assault on bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad 
where special forces shot him dead. This was a cause for celebration in the US, 
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nearly ten years after 9/11, but was a cause for embarrassment and more 
indignation in Pakistan. The Abbottabad compound which had been bin Laden’s 
refuge for five years was located only half a kilometre from Pakistan’s premier 
military academy and 35 kilometres from the capital city, Islamabad. This 
intensified US doubts about Pakistan’s duplicity and commitment to the war on 
terror and led to two likely conclusions - either Pakistan had protected Osama bin 
Laden by providing him with a safe refuge; or the ISI, had been unable to find 
him despite his proximity to a very sensitive military base. Either way, Pakistan’s 
credibility was shaken. There were official denials of collusion but many in the 
US had their doubts.  Ali Soufan, a former US counter-terrorism agent, pointed 
out that the town where bin Laden’s compound was located was full of former and 
current military officials and was remarkably free from any terrorist activities. 
“There’s no way he could have been sitting there without the knowledge of some 
people in the ISI and the Pakistani military.”207 The US Secretary of Defence, 
Leon Panetta, doubted Pakistan’s official claims of not knowing about bin 
Laden’s hideaway.   
I personally have always felt that somebody must have had some sense of what was 
happening at this compound. Don't forget, this compound had 18 foot walls around it. 
Twelve foot walls in some areas, 18 foot walls elsewhere, a seven foot wall on the third 
balcony of the house. It was the largest compound in the area. So you would have 
thought that somebody would have asked the question, “What the hell's going” on 
there?208  
 
General Duranni pointed out possible double standards on the US side 
over this. After all, American security agencies had been equally negligent in 
failing to detect the 9/11 hijackers who were living in the US for years. So, if the 
US condemned Pakistan for its complicity over bin Laden then the CIA should 
also be condemned for its complicity with the 9/11 terrorists.209  
Islamabad protested over the unilateral action taken by the US to kill bin 
Laden, which took place on Pakistani territory but the Pakistani authorities were 
not even informed. Panetta hinted that the reason for this was that the US did not 
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trust Pakistan not to warn bin Laden in advance. When asked if Pakistan had 
interfered in the operation in any way, Panetta laughed and replied that, “they 
didn’t know about our operation. That was the whole idea.”210 However, 
Pakistan’s sense of embarrassment and indignation was summarised by Musharraf 
in June 2011. “There is no way Pakistani authorities helped hide Osama bin Laden 
in their country … It is extremely embarrassing, Pakistan is not a banana republic. 
People coming in and out without the government knowing, that is bad from the 
government’s point of view.”211  
This incident also created severe internal tensions between the Pakistani 
military and the civilian government. This was revealed in the “Memogate” 
scandal which broke at the end of 2011 in which it was alleged that President 
Zardari feared the military was plotting a coup in the wake of the Abbottabad 
attack. In an attempt to thwart this, it was alleged Zardari sought help from the US 
military in restraining Pakistan’s generals. What is curious about this was the 
convoluted channel of communication. Zardari is said to have asked his 
Ambassador in the US to seek help from a wealthy American businessman of 
Pakistani origin, Mansoor Ijaz, in getting a memorandum to the Pentagon. Ijaz 
claims he drafted the memo with material supplied by the Ambassador and 
delivered it to a former security advisor, General Jones, who then passed it to 
Admiral Mullen (who then ignored it). This suggests two possible features of US-
Pakistan relations at the time. Firstly, it illustrates how weak the ties may have 
been between the civilian government and its US counterpart in that the President 
had no direct links with top military officials.212 A second possibility is that 
Zardari did not trust the normal chain of communication to maintain 
confidentiality any more than the US trusted the integrity of their communications 
with Pakistan over bin Laden.  
Next it was the turn of the US to make another misdirected attack to 
inflame tensions even further. On 26 November 2011, NATO helicopters attacked 
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a Pakistani check post at Salala in Mohmand agency on the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border. 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed and 12 more were injured. This attack 
drew a furious response from the Pakistan army, describing it as unprovoked and 
indiscriminate. Gilani called it outrageous and convened an emergency meeting of 
the cabinet. Border crossings for ISAF supply routes were closed within hours and 
trucks and tankers were turned back. Orders were issued to Pakistani soldiers to 
return fire if they came under attack again, raising the prospect of hostilities 
between forces of the two erstwhile partners.213 The Parliament of Pakistan then 
passed a joint resolution requiring the US to vacate Shamsi airbase.214  
Claims and counter-claims failed to assign responsibility and Pakistan 
insisted on a formal US apology as a condition for re-opening supply routes.215 
The NATO version of events claimed US-Afghan special forces in the area had 
been fired on first from a Pakistani position and had fired back, calling in air 
support. When the Pakistani side told the US they were under attack the level of 
mistrust was such that neither side would give precise location details to the other, 
so the incident was put down to an unfortunate miscommunication. Pakistan 
responded that the complete NATO chain of command knew their gunships were 
attacking Pakistani forces by 1:15a.m. that day, but continued knowingly for over 
an hour longer.216 The US State Department favoured an apology, but the US 
military resisted claiming that there was fault on both sides. The Obama 
administration issued a statement of regret, but this was not enough to satisfy the 
many Pakistanis who had once more come onto the streets in anti-American 
protests. In Washington, Senators called for a tough line to be taken on 
Pakistan,217 and, in what some criticised as a “stunt”, an Extraordinary 
Congressional Hearing in February 2012 heavily criticised human rights abuses in 
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Balochistan.218 Washington became further incensed when Pakistan proposed 
reopening the supply lines, but charging what they regarded as new and exorbitant 
charges.219 However, the continued closure of the supply routes was not only 
raising operational costs, but also complicated the Pentagon’s ability to efficiently 
move forces and equipment out of Afghanistan in preparation for American 
withdrawal. At the same time, the Pakistani military was becoming concerned 
about the possible loss of aid. Finally, a deal was made in which Hillary Clinton 
issued a carefully worded statement that the US was sorry for the losses suffered 
by the Pakistani military.220 This was sufficient to reopen the supply routes after a 
six-month stand-off, although not all in Pakistan were happy with the outcome. As 
Senator Hafiz Hamdullah said in an interview: 
The NATO supply route was opened by the decision of Pakistan’s army without taking 
into consideration the consent of Parliament which actually is the true representative of 
the people of Pakistan … The US didn’t apologise for [the] Salala incident properly ... 
Saying only sorry for that incident is not enough. The West use this word 100 times a 
day, even if they sneeze they say sorry.221  
 
The US-Pakistan relationship was at very low ebb once again in 2012. 
Phillip Crowley, former Assistant Secretary of State for Obama, thought that, 
given the complex and convoluted nature of the relationship, the apology and re-
opening of supply routes qualified as momentum.  “Yes, the bar is low. Turning 
things around will be a long process, but there is a basis to start.”222 Roedad 
Khan, however, offered a more pessimistic view. “Today we are the slaves of the 
Americans. We were allies of America; we were supporting the Americans 
through thick and thin. That is gone now.”223 Senator Hamdullah, however 
suggested this might be going too far.  
Despite the harsh statements, there is a resolve from the US side that they have to keep 
Pakistan on board. They can’t afford to ignore Pakistan which is strategically [a] very 
important country for the US in this region. From our side also, we know very well that 
we don’t want to be [an] enemy of the US. We are the friends of the US and we want to 
be friends of the US in future as well. To assume that [the] Pakistan-US relationship is 
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getting worse day by day is wrong. I am not assuming that. The relationship is a bit down 
now, but I am sure that it will change.224  
 
Hillary Clinton expressed a similar, but more concise, view that the 
relationship was “challenging but essential.”225  
 
5.14 Strategic Outcomes for the US and Pakistan 
A year after the shock of 9/11, the Bush administration adopted a National 
Security Strategy in September 2002 which set out their aims and objectives and 
serves as a yardstick to assess how this period of the relationship contributed to 
their successes and failures. This was an expansive strategy to use their 
unprecedented and unequalled strength and influence to make the whole world a 
safer and better place. First priority was to disrupt and destroy global terrorism, 
making no concessions or deals with terrorists, and making no distinction between 
terrorists and those who aided them. This priority was the pivot of relations with 
Pakistan but other parts of the strategy also related to Pakistan and South Asia. 
These included: strengthening non-proliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and 
terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; defusing the Indo-
Pakistani conflict; and promoting market-based democracy. With no mention of 
Pakistan, the strategy also aimed for a strong relationship with India in creating a 
strategically stable Asia.  
By the end of the Bush Presidency, the strategy as a whole looked 
hopelessly unachievable with the US bogged down in expensive, unpopular and 
stalemated insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Afghan conflict exposed the 
Durand Line as a conceptual frontier only which could not contain insurgents on 
either side of it, so the fighting spread to and from Pakistan itself. The enemy 
became not just al-Qaeda and the Taliban but a complex and multi-layered 
network of militant groups, some of which were considered allies by Pakistan but 
as enemies by the US. This generated a mixture of friction and co-operation in 
which the US continued to give billions of dollars to the Pakistani military for its 
selective co-operation. Nevertheless, the US could claim some success in that al-
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Qaeda was generally accepted as a shared enemy and had been considerably 
disrupted, if not destroyed. Despite a few scares, there had been no more 
successful terrorist attacks attributed to al-Qaeda on US territory but global 
terrorism was far from destroyed and had proliferated, notably in Pakistan.  
There are multiple explanations for US failure, including a gross over-
estimation of its strength and influence, but Bush’s determination to see al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban as one undifferentiated enemy, and to ignore the advice of the 
more experienced Pakistanis he was conscripting as allies, was clearly a factor in 
making the Afghan campaign bigger and more complicated than it needed to be. 
By 2008, the US finally acknowledged that it had to distinguish between the two 
and that accommodating the more moderate elements of the Taliban was 
necessary. The Bush circle had correctly identified the critical nature of Pakistan’s 
co-operation over Afghanistan, but appeared to assume they could get this with 
threats and inducements of aid. Given the extent to which they knew they would 
be heavily reliant on Pakistan it could be argued that they were negligent in not 
paying greater attention to their key ally and not being clearer about what it could, 
and could not, deliver. Whilst they may have been surprised by Musharraf’s 
instant agreement, it would have been wiser for them to be clearer about how far 
they could rely on it. Bush’s subsequent inability to control the Northern Alliance 
take-over of Kabul and the prominence of its leaders in the new government then 
undermined much of the strategic motivation for Pakistan to abandon the Taliban 
and increased its motivation for selective co-operation only.  
This left Bush’s strategy in a tangle and it fell to Obama to find a way of 
pulling out American troops. His “Af-Pak” strategy attempted to broaden US-
Pakistan co-operation with economic and partnership-building measures, in 
addition to military aid, but it degenerated into mutual recrimination under the 
strain of a string of crises. This left his target of troop withdrawal by 2014 looking 
uncertain and the prospects for subsequent stability in Afghanistan looking 
precarious as militant attacks continued and the Kabul government failed to 
control much of its national territory. 
There were failures on other parts of the Security Strategy too, in relation 
to nuclear proliferation, resolving Indo-Pakistani conflict and democracy 
promotion. As revelations over A. Q. Khan emerged, it became clear that Pakistan 
had not only established itself as a nuclear power but had helped Iran, Libya and 
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North Korea with their nuclear ambitions. At the same time, Pakistan was 
producing nuclear weapons faster than any other country whilst also becoming 
more unstable with associated fears for the security of that arsenal. New 
insecurities had been added to Indo-Pakistan hostility through the Afghan 
campaign. The US and the Kabul regime had encouraged Indian investment and 
presence in what Pakistan considered its space for strategic depth. This included 
Indian security and diplomatic personnel located near the Afghan-Pakistan border 
which aggravated Pakistani fears of interference in the Baloch separatist 
movement and created longer term concerns about Indian influence over future 
Afghan governments.  
Democracy promotion seemed out of the picture when Musharraf was 
being bullied and cajoled into abandoning the Taliban. Indeed, some of the 
demands placed on him, such as suppressing dissent against the US, could not be 
fulfilled by the kind of free, democratic society that Bush sought to promote. For 
seven years thereafter, the US maintained Musharraf’s military regime just as its 
predecessors had done with those of Ayub, Yahya and Zia. Some success could be 
claimed by Musharraf’s reforms, notably easing media restrictions, and the 
eventual elections which deposed the General himself but, even with a civilian 
government, non-military institutions were weak. The military, on the other hand, 
had been nurtured by decades of priority budgeting and aid, and was the only 
effective, meritocratic institution in the country. As such it was still the main force 
to be reckoned with, particularly in security and foreign affairs. 
There was, however, one apparent success for the US which was also a 
setback for Pakistan - strategic partnership with India. The agreements on defence 
and nuclear co-operation formed the potential for realising the long-held US 
ambition of making India its key regional ally. With a common rival in China, 
strategic interests appeared to converge along with strong economic, cultural and 
democratic ties to make an Indo-US nexus look durable. However, much of the 
early impetus built up by Bush drained away through India’s insistence on 
maintaining independence on issues like links with Iran, diversifying its arms 
 229 
 
suppliers, restricting commercial access, climate change and continued business 
with its biggest trade partner, China.226  
Washington’s relationship with Pakistan was another key factor holding 
back the Indo-US nexus, particularly Washington’s inability to control 
Islamabad’s support of Islamic militants. Obama then caused Indian resentment in 
his attempts to resolve Kashmir through his special envoy, Richard Holbrooke - 
the failure of which then caused resentment in Pakistan. Although the issue 
remained unresolved this created a growing acceptance in Pakistan that it was no 
longer possible to hang on to the idea that the US would help, as Ambassador 
Fatemi conceded. “To expect America, or to expect any major power, to use its 
influence on India to nudge in the direction of the resolution of Kashmir issue 
should not be expected by Pakistan. Those days are gone, they are history 
now.”227  
Beyond Kashmir, Shamshad Ahmad argued that the US-India relationship 
had far greater regional significance and deeper implications for Pakistan’s 
security and its relations with the US.228 Whilst this may be true on paper, in 
practice it had not actually produced any great changes. In regional terms there 
was potential for reconfiguration with the US and India balancing against China, 
and possibly Russia, and with Pakistan expanding its links with China in 
preference to the US. However, no substantial shifts had occurred. India was still 
ambivalent about the US, and its aim to access Iranian energy supplies, via a 
pipeline through Pakistan, was unwelcome in Washington. India did more trade 
with China than with the US –a relationship it would not put at risk with a pivot to 
America. The US was committed to Pakistan so long as it needed what co-
operation it could get for exiting Afghanistan with dignity and for containing 
terrorism thereafter. Pakistan had long recognised the US was leaving, so was 
taking aid while it could whilst pursuing its own longer term strategy of doing 
what it had always done - deterring Indian influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir. 
In this way, Pakistan’s security was more threatened by US encouragement for 
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India in Afghanistan but this had been the case since 2001 when the Northern 
Alliance took Kabul. In terms of Pakistan’s relations with the US, the Indo-US 
nexus was certainly viewed with concern but this was just one of many factors 
which had driven the relationship into crisis.  
In Pakistan itself, the consequences of this phase of the relationship were 
keenly felt in terms of refugees, mass upheaval, internal conflict with foreign and 
indigenous groups, terrorist attacks and drone strikes, all of which seemed to 
generate more blame for double-dealing than sympathy from Washington. 
Musharraf initially got a clean bill of health for his regime and his nuclear arsenal 
but as his country got more and more entangled with the prolonged Afghan 
campaign, his position weakened and he gave way to an elected civilian 
government which, whilst tolerated by the military, was in no position to seriously 
challenge the ultimate power of the generals. The military still had prime 
influence on security and foreign policy and, in particular, had complete control 
over the burgeoning nuclear arsenal. Despite this, they too had lost control over 
parts of their national territory and were losing initiative in Afghanistan to India. 
 
5.15 Implications for the Relationship 
The pressures of 9/11 and the Afghan campaign exposed the gulf in 
strategic interests between the US and Pakistan rather than bringing them 
together. After a period of relative regional neglect the US became interested in 
Afghanistan again; first, as a potential conduit for Central Asian resources and 
then as a hostile centre of al-Qaeda activity which turned into a primary threat to 
be eliminated along with the Taliban regime. Pakistan’s interests had remained 
constant against India and maintaining strategic depth in Afghanistan through 
supporting the Taliban. Thus, 9/11 found Pakistan on the wrong side as far as the 
US was concerned, so co-operation had to be conscripted. Musharraf’s early 
willingness to help indicated his eagerness to get the benefits of US partnership, in 
legitimacy and aid, rather than a dramatic re-orientation of his strategic interests.  
 The US side appeared not to appreciate the significance of this in three 
ways. First, in pressuring Musharraf for support, it was not necessary for 
Armitage to threaten him since the implied, and unfounded, fear of US aid going 
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to India seemed to have had the most effect. Second, it was Taliban regime 
change, rather than hunting al-Qaeda, that brought the two partners into conflict. 
Pakistan’s willingness to eliminate the foreign fighters of al-Qaeda suggests that 
there was a shared interest there which could have been pursued with clearer focus 
and co-operation without the gruelling complications of regime change. Third, 
once the Northern Alliance took Kabul and prominent positions in the Afghan 
government, it effectively meant Pakistan had to fight against its own interests to 
support those of the US.   The longer the campaign dragged on, the more this 
fundamental divergence became apparent. 
Another objective of the US Security Strategy suggested a shared interest 
in resolving Indo-Pakistan conflict but the accompanying objective of achieving 
strategic partnership with India did nothing to increase confidence that any 
resolution might be to Pakistan’s advantage. That India was still the preferred 
regional partner became obvious with the defence and nuclear agreements, 
followed by US acceptance of India’s refusal of third party interference in its 
disputes with Pakistan. Here, fundamentally, interests still diverged. 
Nuclear proliferation remained a conflicting interest, but Pakistan’s 
activities were given the customary blind eye along with the military dictatorship 
which presided over them. All sanctions were lifted and human rights were put 
back on the shelf once more. There were grounds to argue that American wilful 
blindness was not complete in this instance since efforts were made to encourage 
Musharraf to reform, but continued aid to the military meant they maintained their 
political pre-eminence. Obama’s “Af-Pak” strategy also acknowledged the need to 
go beyond military aid and aimed to help Pakistan with economic and social 
development, but this still took second place to strategic military support. 
However, both the Bush and Obama administrations can be accused of wilful 
blindness towards the wholesale abuse of rights that took place in Pakistan’s 
punitive campaigns in the tribal areas which, in other circumstances, would have 
prompted demands for restraint or humanitarian intervention. There are also 
grounds for arguing that the Bush administration was wilfully blind over the 
Northern Alliance take-over of Kabul since the evidence points to prior 
knowledge of the likelihood of this happening, though Bush gave Musharraf good 
reason to believe that it could and would be prevented. 
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Pakistan was also wilfully blind, notably over its own involvement in the 
deployment of drones, which it continued to deny even in the light of clear 
evidence to the contrary. There was also Pakistani wilful blindness over the 
activities of the militant groups linked to the Afghan Taliban which it tolerated in 
the border areas, though this amounted to deceit where the ISI actively 
encouraged them to attack NATO and Afghan targets. There is also a good case to 
argue that Musharraf had long been wilfully blind to A. Q. Khan’s nuclear 
proliferation network though he made claims to the contrary. 
The incidence of reverse influence in this episode of the relationship is 
curious because, in the beginning, Musharraf appeared not to use his geo-strategic 
location and intelligence assets to negotiate better terms but, at the end, the US 
appeared to have very little political leverage over Pakistan’s unwelcome 
activities. The reason was that once the US and NATO were heavily engaged in 
Afghanistan they became increasingly reliant on Pakistan’s co-operation. In 
evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons, 
Professor Shaun Gregory explained that whilst it was critical to NATO success for 
Pakistan to put serious pressure on the Afghan Taliban, it was not possible to 
force them to do so because of the “counter-leverage” they could apply. Up to 80 
per cent of NATO's main supply lines flowed through Pakistan and they were 
reliant on their host for bases and over-flights. In addition, the West relied on the 
ISI for intelligence, particularly on al-Qaeda, and on the army to keep 60-100 
nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands. Gregory concluded that the West had 
become too dependent on Pakistan in too many important security areas to 
seriously question the military or ISI, despite knowing they were duplicitous over 
the Afghan Taliban229 This illustrates the significance of the Bush circle’s failure 
to appreciate just how critical its relationship with Pakistan would be and how it 
was actually a key stakeholder in the enterprise rather than just a bullied conscript. 
It looked as though the earlier pattern of US political bias would re-emerge 
in this period when sanctions were removed and Musharraf was hailed as a 
courageous partner by the Republican administration. However, Bush’s 
agreements with India demonstrated a clear preference in that direction, 
particularly in his refusal to offer Pakistan the same kind of preferential nuclear 
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deal. Whilst the succeeding Democrat administration fell out with Pakistan, it had 
started off by trying to build a more constructive partnership with them. Relations 
with India had also cooled a little under Obama. Thus, it was not possible to 
detect any clear political bias for either Pakistan or India. 
The period started with a big “trust deficit” in the relationship and ended 
with a bigger one. From the Pakistani side, perceptions of US fickleness were 
reinforced by another exaggerated switch in standards and claims of valued 
partnership. Previous experience indicated this was likely to be a short term 
expedient followed by abandonment and a reversion to condemnation and 
sanctions. Betrayal followed over the Northern Alliance, and also the agreements 
with India, causing Pakistan to work towards a longer term strategy which 
excluded some key US interests. From the American perspective, previous 
experience predicted Pakistan would be unreliable, so co-operation was achieved 
through arm-twisting and aid, but this was insufficient to prevent co-operation 
becoming selective in relation to the Afghan Taliban. This led to accusations of 
Pakistan playing a double game which were all the more bitter for the inability of 
the US to stop it. Obama and Clinton made an attempt to put relations on a more 
constructive footing with the Af-Pak Strategic Dialogue, but mutual suspicions 
were too entrenched and were reinforced by the crises that followed. By 2012, it 
could be argued that both sides were in conflict whilst apparently co-operating 
with each other. The US was making unwanted attacks on its partner’s territory 
and Pakistan was abetting the Afghan Taliban in its attacks on NATO and the 
Afghan regime. Underlying this was the fault line of mismatched strategic 
interests which nearly sixty years of relations had failed to resolve. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The crisis of 2011 was not just a product of the incidents which occurred 
that year. Neither was it caused just by the tensions which had grown during the 
ten-year War on Terror leading up to it. It was the product of a 60 year-old 
unequal relationship marked by disenchantment, disappointment and distrust in 
which each side viewed the other as unreliable but irreplaceable. This thesis set 
out to explore the reasons why the relationship, which had six decades to mature, 
was so poor. It argues that the history of US-Pakistan relations is one of 
opportunism in which interests have not converged sufficiently for sustained co-
operation on the basis of shared aims. Instead, periods of co-operation depended 
on short-term wilful blindness by the US and on Pakistan’s ability to use its geo-
strategic location as reverse influence in the otherwise unequal relationship 
between the two countries.  The legacy of this is a mutual mistrust but neither side 
has seen any advantage in breaking off the relationship altogether. This 
concluding chapter reviews the evidence in the research in relation to key 
elements of the argument: diverging interests; opportunism; wilful blindness; 
trust-deficit; and reverse influence. It then reviews how far the relationship has 
successfully benefitted the US and Pakistan in their strategic aims and identifies 
areas where further research could deepen understanding of the subject. The 
chapter concludes with a short assessment of what the history can say about future 
relations. 
 
Interests 
Pakistan is still attempting to deal with the traumas of the 1947 Partition 
and to secure its independence and Islamic identity in opposition to what is still 
firmly held to be a hostile India. The Indian threat comes not just from its greater 
military capacity but also from its possession of key water supplies which, whilst 
under international supervision, could be deployed against Pakistan in the form of 
devastating floods or droughts. The war over Kashmir, and its disputed de facto 
division, created a further grievance with India, framed as a loss. Internally, the 
integrity of the state has been under pressure from separatism, particularly in 
Balochistan, with suspicions of Indian interference. Military parity with India is 
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seen as essential to being able to deter aggression and for negotiating from a 
position of strength on these issues. These concerns are all India-centric, and India 
is the reference point from which foreign policy, defence and security decisions 
are made. This has remained a constant feature for Pakistan through to the present 
day. 
Whilst Pakistan’s concerns are regional and ideologically Islamic, the US 
has a global position to defend and promotes its own free market capitalism and 
liberal democracy. While the primary object of Pakistan’s foreign policy has 
remained the same, in the shape of India, the primary objects of US foreign policy 
have altered. Up to 1989, this was communism as a whole, but China became 
partially excluded from 1970 and Iran was added as a new Islamic threat from 
1979. After the Soviet collapse, the US focussed on Iran, Iraq and other 
destabilising conflicts. After 2001 its focus was global terrorism and its 
supporters, with a more recent concern about China. At no time has the US shared 
Pakistan’s security interests against India. Although there were tensions between 
Delhi and Washington, particularly in the Cold War, the US favoured a regional 
partnership with India and in recent years has formed the basis for one. There 
were episodes when the US and Pakistan co-operated closely: the early Cold War 
up to 1962; US rapprochement with China; the proxy war of the Mujahidin 
against the USSR in Afghanistan; the War on Drugs; and the very early stages of 
the US Afghan campaign. Pakistan also showed a willingness to help the US to a 
lesser extent in the first Gulf War and with peacekeeping. However, whilst the 
two states shared shorter-term goals and targets in these episodes, their 
fundamental interests did not coincide. Indeed, with India being both Pakistan’s 
enduring foe and the US’s favoured regional partner there was always potential 
for conflict which surfaced in years leading up to the crises of 2011. Pakistan’s 
enduring but lower-key relationship with China was also contrary to US primary 
interests until the 1970s. Although it temporarily proved an asset in relations with 
Washington it still contains potential for conflict as China is increasingly seen as a 
rival to the West and it is unlikely to be so easy to persuade Islamabad to ditch 
China as it did the Taliban. 
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Opportunism, Wilful Blindness and Double Games 
With no shared fundamental strategy to cement relations, and with major 
shifts in US prime interests, it is helpful to view the relationship as episodic rather 
than continuous. At the start, the new Pakistan was under pressure to find a backer 
to help build its military almost from scratch as well as an ally to deter Indian 
aggression and help right the Kashmir grievance. What it got from the US, after 
Truman’s reluctance, was military and economic aid but no alliance against India. 
This became clear in 1962, when the West went to India’s help in the Sino-India 
border clash, and in 1965, when US even-handed suspension of aid gave the 
advantage to India in the war over Kashmir.  
Thereafter, fluctuating episodes were mostly determined by a basic 
equation: on the one side was Pakistan’s need for aid and international regime 
legitimacy; on the other was periodic US need for access to, and use of, Pakistan’s 
geo-strategic location, intelligence and contacts. However, the US was potentially 
restricted by the values it sought to promote in relation to human rights and 
nuclear proliferation, so giving aid and legitimacy to Pakistan required a 
suspension of these values in the form of wilful blindness. These features made 
episodes of co-operation largely a matter of opportunism in the sense that they 
were highly dependent upon circumstances and expediency. A prime instance of 
this was Nixon’s blind eye to the repression in East Pakistan in return for access 
to Yahya’s connections with Mao in 1971, but the recurring themes of wilful 
blindness were Pakistan’s nuclear programme and military dictatorships.  
Accommodating Pakistan in this way required some significant and swift 
policy changes. After putting the elected Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto under 
severe pressure over the nuclear programme, and only eighteen months after 
suspending aid altogether, the US gave the military dictator General Zia a six-year 
aid package worth $3.2 billion. This expediency was necessary to access Zia’s 
links to the Mujahidin in order to stoke the insurgency against the USSR in 
Afghanistan. Despite subsequent revelations about uranium enrichment, Reagan, 
Bush and the majority of the US political establishment were willing to suspend 
belief and an even bigger six-year aid package worth $4.2 billion was agreed in 
1987. That Zia refused Carter’s 1979 offer and was prepared to wait for better 
terms indicates he knew how the relationship now worked and was as 
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opportunistic as the US. Similarly, three years after sanctions were imposed over 
Pakistan’s nuclear tests, and only twenty months after further sanctions and 
condemnations over another military coup, General Musharraf was given a three-
year aid package of $2.6 billion and hailed as a leader of courage and vision. In 
this case the US needed access to Afghanistan along with bases, logistical 
facilities, intelligence and an undertaking to abandon the Taliban. Thus, the price 
the US had to pay for Pakistan’s co-operation was not just aid and recognition; it 
also included a large measure of wilful blindness. This was justified on the 
grounds that it would actually encourage Pakistan to abandon its nuclear ambition, 
as with the Pressler Certificates, or to embrace democracy, as with Ayub’s 1958 
coup. However the realisation of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent and the continual 
resort to military rule suggest this was, at best, wishful thinking. In addition 
Washington had to be wilfully blind to the consequences of its own directions to 
Pakistan to suppress insurgents in the Tribal Areas from 2004 onwards. 
By examining the history of the relationship as a chain of transactions it 
becomes clear how each episode of US expediency was followed by recrimination 
when circumstances no longer justified maintaining wilful blindness. This drew 
claims of betrayal and abandonment from Pakistan. When Nixon and Kissinger 
were no longer able to justify aid in 1971 they were accused of failing to protect 
East Pakistan when they clearly considered they had protected West Pakistan. 
When détente rendered Pakistan of less strategic value Bhutto felt obliged to 
pursue an independent foreign policy which included a nuclear deterrent and drew 
sanctions from the US again. After 1989 the US lost interest in the region and the 
re-imposition of sanctions against Nawaz Sharif’s elected government was 
interpreted as both unfair and discriminatory. This pattern established an 
expectation in Pakistan that episodes of US engagement would be temporary 
which in turn encouraged Islamabad to balance Washington’s requirements with 
longer term strategies of their own. This drew claims of Pakistani duplicity from 
the US. 
Pakistan first started hedging its bets in this way in the understanding it 
achieved with Chou-en-Lai that Pakistan would exempt China from its obligations 
under its Western alliances. The subsequent arms deals and development of links 
to help China, in contradiction to the Western alliances’ anti-communist purpose, 
was then a reaction to Western aid to India. However, it was the nuclear 
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programme that generated greater duplicity. Although the US was clearly 
indulging in wilful blindness over this, Pakistan made it possible with denials and 
assurances from General Zia, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif and General 
Musharraf. Later, as the US war in Afghanistan came to dominate relations, 
Pakistan exempted elements of the Afghan Taliban from its offensives against 
militants. This led to accusations of Pakistan playing a double game by supporting 
anti-US groups whilst claiming to be co-operating with the US campaign against 
them. 
The history of the relationship also demonstrates how past 
disappointments over abandonment and duplicity created mutual expectations of 
future disappointment and reinforced a declining cycle of trust. By the time of 
9/11 the Bush team felt it necessary to conscript Pakistan’s involvement without 
consultation over what was achievable and Musharraf felt it necessary to hide his 
nuclear arsenal from the US. From this unpromising start to the episode trust 
degenerated further when Bush failed to keep his word on the Northern Alliance 
and Pakistan began its double game in the Tribal Regions.  
 
Reverse Influence 
This assessment of the relationship raises the question as to why the US 
continued to engage with Pakistan and to give so much aid each time a new 
opportunity arose. At the start there were few other regional options for the US to 
contain the USSR once Nehru declared India to be non-aligned, and this choice 
became even narrower after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. During the Cold War, 
then, Pakistan offered a unique asset in its geo-strategic location and a willingness 
to side with the West. By the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
Pakistan had further assets in unique access to the Mujahidin insurgents and a 
porous border through which they and weapons could pass to attack the Red 
Army. Zia used these to successfully bargain with the US not just for large 
amounts of military aid but also for control of the distribution of support for the 
Mujahidin. This helped create two more assets: a well-resourced military; and an 
extensive intelligence service (ISI) with influence among the militant groups and 
in Afghanistan. The ISI was also experienced in working with the CIA. These 
assets made Pakistan indispensable to Bush in his hunt of al-Qaeda. Once this 
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became an invasion of Afghanistan he also became highly reliant on Pakistan for 
logistics and supply routes. This confirms that the reverse influence which 
Roger230 identified was an important part of the bilateral relationship during the 
Cold War and demonstrates that it continued to be a feature afterwards in the 
context of the US-Afghan campaign. In addition, though, this research suggests 
that reverse influence was attributable to much more than just geo-political 
location. By 2011 it included military and intelligence assets as well as a 
stranglehold on supply routes and it was these that appeared to restrain US ability 
to force Pakistan to suppress the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s ability to use this 
influence was temporary and could only be applied when Washington took the 
initiative for another episode of engagement. However, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal 
then became another factor for the US and it was important for this to be kept 
secure from terrorists or an extremist coup. Thus the US had added concern not to 
undermine political stability or the military establishment’s control of these 
weapons and it could be argued that they had become a deterrent against future 
abandonment. 
 
Strategic Utility of the Relationship 
In terms of Cold War strategy, the relationship was a considerable benefit 
to the US. Pakistan joined the alliance system which helped contain communism 
in the region for 25 years and allowed the US surveillance facilities. Although 
Johnson rebuked Ayub for developing links with China, Nixon opportunistically 
capitalised on them to outmanoeuvre the USSR in 1971. Bhutto’s foreign policy 
diversification had not lasted long enough to impede re-engagement once he had 
been removed, though there is no firm evidence that the US was instrumental in 
his death. After Brezhnev broke regional containment with his Afghan 
intervention in 1979, Reagan opportunistically capitalised on the counter-
insurgency which Zia was helping to orchestrate and claimed credit for the 
eventual Soviet retreat and collapse. Beyond the immediate Cold War, though, the 
emergence of two independent centres of nuclear capability in India and Pakistan 
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was a setback. Whilst India’s programme could help keep China in check, 
Pakistan’s could threaten US interests in Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East. 
By 1998, Pakistan’s deterrent was an acknowledged reality and the US had been 
unable to prevent it. Pakistan made small contributions to the Gulf War and 
peacekeeping, and helped with anti-narcotics operations, but it facilitated the rise 
of the Taliban who became hosts for al-Qaeda. Together, they became the new 
enemy which drew the US into its own protracted Afghan stalemate, in which 
Pakistan could only be compelled and rewarded into selective co-operation. 
However, through that co-operation the US was also able to establish a strategic 
presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan on the doorsteps of China, Central Asia and 
Iran. 
Compared to the US, Pakistan made no gains in strategic outcomes from 
its US relationship. India was still the prime threat and Kashmir was nowhere near 
resolution. The LOC was merely a ceasefire line but it continued to split the 
Province for decades longer than the Berlin Wall had split the German capital. 
The US approach had been largely to avoid getting too involved. Kennedy may 
have missed the best opportunity to encourage India towards the UN-agreed 
plebiscite in 1962 when Nehru needed western help to ward off China. In the 
event he not only backed away from pressuring Nehru but also restrained Pakistan 
from taking advantage of its best opportunity for a  military solution. Bush had 
restrained Musharraf’s use of proxy militants in Kashmir in 2001 and Obama’s 
attempt to mediate eight years later was firmly rejected by India. The water 
dispute was resolved through the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 but this had been 
brokered by the World Bank rather than through US mediation. In Afghanistan, 
Pakistan had protected its strategic depth by sponsoring the Taliban while left to 
its own devices in 1989–2001, but re-engagement with the US destroyed this and 
India gained influence there under the new regime. 
It is an indication of the ambiguity of the bilateral relationship that 
Pakistan’s gains in strategic military capability came through both conflict and co-
operation with the US. The US intermittently gave Pakistan military aid to build 
up its conventional forces but this failed to prevent it consistently falling behind 
India. Estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute show 
that in 1988 Pakistan’s military expenditure was 23% that of India, falling to 17% 
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in 2000 and to 15% in 2012.231 However this was offset by nuclear weapons in 
which Pakistan had a slight edge in numbers with 90–110 warheads compared 
with India’s 80–100 in 2012.232 In addition to providing mutually assured 
destruction these neutralised the possibility of large-scale conventional Indian 
attack, including the option of limited nuclear strikes against concentrations of 
tanks and troops preparing to invade. They also provided cover for Pakistan’s 
asymmetric warfare against India through proxies by deterring punitive action.233 
Whilst getting this nuclear capacity was sometimes openly discouraged by the US 
with sanctions and rebukes it was expediently ignored at others, and nine years of 
wilful blindness from 1981–1990 appears to have speeded its development at a 
critical stage. During the same period US resources also contributed to the 
empowerment of Pakistan’s proxy forces amongst the Mujahidin. Thus, the US 
had been both a help and a hindrance in helping the Pakistani military compensate 
for lack of conventional parity with nuclear and asymmetric capacities. All the 
same, this had not achieved any of Pakistan’s desired strategic outcomes. 
However, Pakistan’s internal security was seriously damaged as a result of 
re-engagement with the US in its operation for regime change in Afghanistan. As 
the conflict spread into FATA it destabilised the social fabric and political balance 
in those areas and created millions of internally displaced refugees on top of the 
Afghan refugees already there. It also brought brutal Pakistani military actions, 
US drone strikes and insurgent violence along with widespread retaliatory 
terrorism in mainland Pakistan.  
It is argued that the US stifled political development in Pakistan through 
its tolerance of, and support for, military dictatorships. Figures as diverse as 
Benazir Bhutto and General Duranni support this view. Benazir Bhutto claimed 
the West was at fault for, “allowing Pakistani military regimes to suppress the 
democratic aspirations of the people of Pakistan, as long as their dictators 
ostensibly support the political goals of the international community.”234 General 
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Duranni went further and claimed the US preferred military dictators: “The US 
would be happy if you have a one window operation particularly in an 
environment in which Pakistan has to play a particular role. So the military or a 
dictatorship provides you that. You don’t have to ask anyone. I am the big man 
called Musharraf and I’ll take the decision.”235 In the case of Musharraf the US 
got a quick decision, but Zia was much less compliant and the nature of his 
regime was a factor restraining Carter from making a better offer. This suggests 
that dictatorship was no guarantee of compliant partnership. The US gave aid to 
Zia’s regime in 1981-1988 but Bush Snr. appears, in part, to have continued it for 
a further two years to encourage Benazir Bhutto’s democratic government. 
Sanctions applied thereafter were clearly a consequence of the military’s 
intransigence over the nuclear programme and the inability or unwillingness of 
the civilian government to rein it in. They cut military aid to the generals making 
it difficult to argue that this was some kind of support for them. Further sanctions 
were later applied in response to Musharraf’s coup and Clinton publicly rebuked 
him with a refusal to shake hands. Even Bush Jnr. encouraged Musharraf towards 
democratic reforms and elections. Thus, there are indications that the US had not 
always encouraged military dictators. Nevertheless, the military have either been 
directly ruling the country or in a position of great influence, particularly in 
foreign and security policy, for most of Pakistan’s history. For much of that time 
it has been getting aid from the US and the most intense donations occurred 
during the Zia and Musharraf eras. However, these two episodes were prompted 
by external events suggesting that support for military dictators was a product of 
US expediency on the one hand and Pakistani opportunism on the other. The 
veteran civil servant, Roedad Khan, pointed out that it was a wider, corrupt 
political elite that benefitted from US aid: “what [does] the poor man in Pakistan 
get? He gets nothing. What is [the] advantage of the American aid to Pakistan? 
The Americans don’t mind if the corrupt politicians and Army [are] filling their 
pockets because they are helping the US.” He added that this was a principal 
reason for popular resentment of the US.236 A full examination of this topic is 
beyond the scope of this thesis but the evidence suggests that an effect of US 
expediency was to empower the military as the best resourced and most powerful 
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national institution at the expense of civilian institutions and wider economic 
development, but this was driven by external events rather than a primary 
preference. 
 
Further Research 
This research has examined the broad sweep of the history of the bilateral 
relationship in order to identify the tendencies, cycles and themes that have 
shaped it. In addition to examining key events, decisions and turning points, this 
approach has interpreted the relationship also as a cumulative process in which 
interactions created a legacy of expectation of future behaviour on both sides. 
This has exposed the cumulative way in which the deficit of trust built up and 
became self-reinforcing over time. It helps understand the reasons why each side 
feels as it does and helps explain why mutual suspicion is now so engrained in the 
present state of the relationship. However, this approach could be enriched by 
further research into specific decisions points and episodes of engagement which 
were particularly significant. It would help to understand the roots of Pakistan’s 
sense of betrayal to have a clearer understanding of Kennedy’s decision not to 
press India over Kashmir. The 1981-88 period was particularly important in 
establishing the pre-eminence of the Pakistani military and the ISI as well as the 
Mujahidin so it would help to have a deeper understanding of the roles played by 
each side in those processes.  
This research has focussed on relations between principal state actors and 
institutions in order to establish the basic pattern of events and interactions. This 
could usefully be augmented by examining the roles played by non-state agencies 
to assess how their activities contributed to the whole. In particular, understanding 
the role of the media in shaping and reflecting the view each nation had of the 
other might help explain how popular sentiment developed so strongly.  
The context for this thesis has been restricted to the US and Pakistan with 
other states appearing mainly in relation to the national interests of the two 
principals. Whilst this allows the features of the relationship to be clearly 
identified it provides no indication of how exceptional they are or whether they 
represent a more universal experience. Thus, comparative studies could help shed 
light on the extent to which Pakistan’s experience was similar to, or different 
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from, other former colonies emerging in the Cold War. They could also help 
identify how far American treatment of Pakistan was part of a broader pattern of 
behaviour, for example in the use of covert operations, or unique to that context. 
A comparison with Turkey, as another Islamic US ally with a strong army and 
conflicting regional interests, might be particularly instructive. 
 
Lessons from History 
The balance of gains from the relationship appears to strongly favour the 
US but there is little indication that Pakistan will give up on it in the foreseeable 
future. Despite American frustrations, the US would be unwise to abandon 
Pakistan as it did in the past since many of the circumstances favouring reverse 
influence will remain even after a partial withdrawal from Afghanistan. So, does 
the history of the relationship yield lessons for how this difficult but compelling 
relationship might develop? 
On the Pakistan side there were two different views. First, Ambassador 
Fatemi considered that, “This is not a strategic relationship. We should never 
claim that it is strategic ... it was primarily [a] transactional relationship.”237 As 
such he suggested a rational, open approach in which, “we must know what the 
expectations are. We must also seek to identify the areas where we can work 
together and try to isolate the areas where we cannot work together and promote 
those where understanding can [be] reached.” He also urged Pakistan to stop 
competing with the US-India relationship which, difficult though it might be to 
swallow, had actually now acquired a strategic dimension which was likely to be 
further intensified.238 Therefore, this view recognised the realities of diverging 
interests, accepted the realities of US regional strategy and advocated a negotiated 
approach to transactional co-operation within these limits. It is an approach which 
has not often been present in the relationship and would require a considerable re-
orientation of attitudes on both sides. 
The second view is that of former ISI Director, General Duranni, who 
agreed that there were no common objectives, but considered this required that 
“countries must play double, triple games …. Running with the hare and hunting 
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with the hounds is the norm. Double games, double cross and deception are what 
international relations are all about. Get the maximum advantage ... We should try 
and get the maximum out of the US and in return give the minimum.” The answer 
for Pakistan was, “whenever people say that we should not play a double game, I 
say we must play at least a double game but play it well.” And for the US: “My 
advice to the US is that the world is a circus and now that you have joined it, learn 
to ride two horses on which your one step is on one horse and [the other] on 
[another] horse.”239 This view advocated little change in what the relationship had 
become and, as such, was likely to reinforce the status quo. History shows, 
however, that the status quo had delivered little strategic benefit to Pakistan and 
more to the US, and raises doubts over how well Pakistan is able to benefit from 
such a game beyond consolidating the military dominated elite. This view also 
weakens portrayals of Pakistan as a victim of US attentions240 and suggests that 
the Pakistani establishment has contributed to shaping the current state of affairs. 
Whilst Ambassador Fatemi’s approach offers an optimistic alternative it relies on 
a reasonable level of trust for success which would be undermined by General 
Duranni’s double games.  
On the US side there have been two tensions in policy towards Pakistan 
which have bred instability in the relationship in addition to that caused by the 
underlying divergence of interests. First was the tension between wanting India as 
first choice for regional partner but needing Pakistan because of regional geo-
politics. This led to a double game in which the US kept its India options open 
whilst engaging Pakistan and ultimately facilitated greater Indian influence in 
Afghanistan. In the Cold War it appeared Democrats favoured India while 
Republicans favoured Pakistan, but as India grew in power and significance this 
became a general preference for India. However, Washington’s continued reliance 
on Pakistan will impede relations with India and its continued espousal of India 
will reinforce distrust in Pakistan. The second tension was between the promotion 
of liberal values and nuclear non-proliferation on the one hand, and support for 
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illiberal regimes and tolerance of nuclear proliferation in pursuit of realist power 
politics on the other. In the case of Pakistan this led to sharp oscillations of policy 
and an expectation of mistrust, as discussed above. Unless the US can find a way 
of at least smoothing the change from one policy phase to the next this will 
remain a problem for the relationship. However, the legacy of mistrust and of 
popular anti-US and anti-Pakistan sentiment in each nation makes this even more 
difficult. 
It would be rewarding to conclude that the history of US-Pakistan relations 
contains optimistic indications of how they might be put on a more constructive 
level. However, the pattern of relations has become well set over sixty-five years 
and shows little sign of changing. Based on fundamental interests which diverge 
and sometimes conflict, it has been formed and re-formed through expedient 
opportunism and wilful blindness with an accumulated deficit of trust and mutual 
antipathy. It is resentfully held together by mutual reliance for non-mutual ends. 
The military-dominated Pakistani elite relies on US money and arms to confront 
India and to maintain state integrity. The US relies on them for access to and use 
of their geo-strategic location and intelligence and for keeping their nuclear 
arsenal safe from American enemies. Thus, despite a massive power disparity 
between the two states, Pakistan has been able to exert considerable reverse 
influence on the US to keep the money and arms coming. To change this pattern 
would require considerable institutional and popular changes in attitudes which 
are well engrained. Obama’s failed attempt to turn a new page in 2008 illustrates 
how difficult such change was to make. This suggests more of the same, unless 
and until an external shock shakes regional relationships into a new configuration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 247 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Biographies of Interviewees  
Lt. Genral Asad Durrani (Ret.) 
General Durrani was Director General of the Pakistani Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI) from August 1990 to March 1992, having formerly been 
Director General of the Army’s Military Intelligence. He was also Commandant at 
the National Defence College and served as Pakistan's military attaché to 
Germany from 1980 to 1984. After retiring from the Army he became Pakistan's 
Ambassador to Germany from 1994 to 1997 and to Saudi Arabia from 2000 to 
2002. He is currently a commentator on intelligence and security issues on 
Pakistan. 
Professor Tahir Amin 
Prof. Amin is a political scientist, currently Chair of the National Institute 
of Pakistan Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and previously Iqbal 
Chair at the Centre for International Studies, University of Cambridge. He studied 
in Canada and the US, gaining his doctorate at MIT. He researched “Reactions of 
the Non-Western world to the Thesis of the Clash of Civilizations by Samuel 
Huntington”at Harvard as a Fulbright Scholar and was later Visiting Fellow there 
and at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, 
Providence. He has written on many aspects of Pakistani politics and foreign 
policy, particularly on the Kashmir conflict. 
Ambassador Tariq Fatemi 
Ambassador Fatemi is is a career diplomat currently serving as Special 
Assistant on Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister  since 8 June 2013. He held 
diplomatic assignments in Moscow, New York, Washington and Beijing. A 
delegate to the UN General Assembly from 1982 to 1986, he also attended Non-
Aligned and OIC Conferences, while also being a member of the UN sponsored 
Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan. He was High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, 
with concurrent accreditation to Angola, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia. Later, 
he served as Ambassador to the United States, Jordan, Belgium and Luxembourg 
and the European Union. He taught at the Foreign Service Academy, the National 
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Defence University and the Administrative Staff College. He is also a co-author 
of the Brookings Institution’s book: The Future of Pakistan. 
Brigadier Agha Ahmed Gul (Ret.) 
Brig.Gul is a former army officer who has served in various different 
departments of Pakistan’s army. He commanded the Joint Services Staff College 
and was instructor at military training institutions and has been influential in 
training future military leaders.  He has vast knowledge and experience and on the 
basis of his services he also served as the Vice Chancellor of the University of 
Balochistan, Quetta.    
Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed  
Dr. Ahmed is a political scientist, currently Quaid-i-Azam Fellow at St. 
Antony’s College, and Research Associate at Centre for International Studies, 
University of Oxford. He is also an Associate at the School of Politics and 
International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He has written 
widely on South Asian security, the conflict in Afghanistan and US-Pakistan 
relations. His publications include articles for Asian Affairs and Perceptions, 
chapters in edited volumes by Ashgate and Routledge, and books such as 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar: An Afghan Trail from Jihad to Terrorism. He reported on 
the conflict in Afghanistan as a journalist and is a commentator for Al-Jazeera, 
CNN, Al-Arabiya, and other international channels, newspapers and agencies. He 
researches on conflict resolution in Afghanistan, exploring prospects of 
reconciliation and regionalism. 
Senator Hafiz Hamdullah 
Hafiz Hamdullah is a politician, elected to the Senate of Pakistan 
representing the Jamait Ulema-e-Islam party in March 2012. He is chairperson of 
the Senate Committee on Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony and a member 
of the Committee on Government Assurances, Information Technology and 
Telecommunication and the Committee on Ports and Shipping. He was formerly 
elected as a Member of the Provincial Assembly in Balochistan and served as the 
Provisional Health Minister there from 2002 to 2005. 
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Colonel Muhammad Hanif (Ret.) 
Col. Hanif is Research Fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute 
(IPRI), having formerly been Director of the Research and Analysis Department 
of the Ministry of for ten years. His reteach focusses on security issues of South 
Asia, South East Asia and China and he specializes in Pakistan-India relations. 
His research papers have been published in the IPRI Journal and the IPRI Book on 
“Eighteenth Amendment Revisited”. He has also co- edited two IPRI books and 
he regularly contributes articles on current issues of national importance regularly 
in the media. 
Syed Fasih Iqbal 
Syed Iqbal was a well-known journalist as Chief Editor of the Balochistan 
Times and Zamana Quetta. He was a prominent and pioneering news editor and a 
former President of the All Pakistan News Paper Society the Council of Pakistan 
Newspaper Editors. He was also elected to the Senate of Pakistan for two 
consecutive terms in 1985-1988 and 1988-1994 and was credited with introducing 
the Parliamentary Committee system. He attended the UN General Assembly as a 
member of the President’s entourage and met George Bush Sr., Jimmy Carter and 
Ronald Reagan. He was also a human rights activist. Sadly he passed away on 13 
February 2014. 
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal 
Dr. Jaspal is Director and Assistant Professor at the School of Politics and 
International Relations, Quaid-I-Azam University, Islamabad, where he teaches 
Strategic Studies; International Security; Nuclear/Missile Proliferation; Terrorism 
and Countermeasures; Arms Control/Disarmament; Domestic and Foreign 
Policies of Pakistan. He is also a Lead Researcher/Convener of the Program in 
Domestic and International Security Communication at the university. He is 
advisor on Non-Proliferation to the South Asian Strategic Stability Unit in SASSI, 
Islamabad and London, and a Course Coordinator at Foreign Services Academy 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamabad. Prior to joining the University he had been 
a Research Fellow at ISSI, IPRI, Islamabad, Pakistan. He is widely published with 
over 85 research papers and an expert commentator on BBC, PTV, and Al 
Jazeera. 
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Nawabzada Amad Khan 
Nawabzada Khan is a former politician who was Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs and one of the youngest members of the Cabinet of Prime 
Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani from November 2008 to March 2013. 
Roedad Khan 
Roedad Khan, as a politician and senior civil servant, has been a Pakistani 
statesman since 1951 to the present day. He was Chief Secretary of Sindh and of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; Managing Director of the Pakistan Television Corporation; 
Secretary at Information & Broadcasting, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of 
Tourism, and Ministry of Interior; and an Advisor to Prime Ministers and 
Presidents. He got to know two Prime Ministers (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz 
Sharif) and six Presidents (Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Z. A. Bhutto, Zia ul Haq, 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari). He reflects that each one of them 
directly or indirectly contributed to his generation’s anguish, sense of betrayal, 
loss of confidence in its rulers, and the souring of the dream of Pakistan. He is 
now a senior member of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party. 
Maulana Abdullah Khilji 
Maulana Khilji is a religious scholar of national repute who was Advisor 
to President of Pakistan, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, on Religious Affairs. He was a member 
of the National Assembly and served on various Federal Committees. He was a 
member of the Council of Islamic Ideology, the Central Zakat Council and the 
Ulema Board of the Government of Pakistan, and was an Advisor and Minister in 
the government of Balochistan. He has thirty five years’ experience of teaching 
Arabic and Islamic studies and represented Pakistan on international delegations. 
He has published a number of articles and appears in the media as a debater and 
analyst. 
Professor Rasool Baksh Rais 
Prof. Rais is a political scientist having been Professor of Political Science 
at Lahore University of Management Sciences and Professor/Director of the Area 
Study Centre at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He was Quaid-i-Azam 
Distinguished Professor of Pakistan Studies at Columbia University, New York in 
1991-94. He gained a PhD at University of California, Santa Barbara and took 
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fellowships at Wake Forest University, Harvard, and Berkeley. He is widely 
published in books and journals on political and security issues pertaining to 
South Asia, Indian Ocean and Afghanistan. His current research is “Modernism, 
State and Challenge of Radical Islam in Pakistan". 
Ashraf Malkham 
Former Chief News Editor in Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV), 
Islamabad, which is a state-run broadcaster of Pakistan and is a public and 
commercial broadcasting television network. He was previously associated with 
number of other private channels in Pakistan such as, The News, Geo TV and 
Samaa TV where he served in various senior positions.   
Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi 
Ambassador Naqvi is a former diplomat and served as Ambassador to 
Austria and the IAEA. In 2006, he was appointed to the Chairman’s Advisory 
Council in the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) to advice on 
International Affairs, with particular focus on IAEA matters. He helped establish 
a center for research, study and analysis of all aspects of disarmament, arms 
control and current nuclear issues in PAEC. He is currently Associate Fellow at 
the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute and holds a Masters in International 
Public Policy from Johns Hopkins University, USA. 
Brigadier Dr. Syed Noor-Ul-Haq (Ret.) 
Brig. Noor ul-Haq has held several positions in training and education for 
the Pakistani military: Head of Modern Subjects at the Pakistani Military 
Academy; Director of Education Training and Religious Affairs for the Pakistan 
Army; Commandant of the Military College Jhelum, Principal of the Defence 
Authority College in Karachi, Professor at New Port University, and District 
Education Coordinator Attock, Government of the Punjab. He is an Associate 
Alumni of Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense 
University, Washington, DC, and has published research on education, security, 
international relations and history, with a focus on South Asian affairs, edits the 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute Journal and has authored seven books, 
including “Making of Pakistan: Military Perspective”.  
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Shaukat Piracha is a well-known Pakistani journalist, political analyst, and 
a special news correspondent of AAJ TV Pakistan.  
Professor Mehmood Ali Shah 
Prof. Shah is a political scientist, currently Professor Emeritus at the 
University of Balochistan, Quetta. Before this he was Head of the Departments of 
Political Science and International relations, Dean of Social Sciences, Director of 
the Pakistan Studies Centre and Pro-Vice Chancellor at the same University. He 
has authored many books on Pakistan and also published articles in various 
reputed journals.   
Ainullah Shams 
Ainullah Shams is a former Minister of Health in the Provincial Assembly 
of Balochistan, representing Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and is well-known 
member of that party.  
Ambassador Ayaz Wazir 
Ambassador Wazir served as a diplomat from 1975 with Pakistani 
missions to Vienna, Maputo, Dubai, Riyadh, Mazar-e-Sharif (Afghanistan), 
London, Manchester and Doha. As Director General (Afghanistan), he was a 
member of a Pakistani Mission engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Taliban and 
the Northern Alliance in 1977. He also represented Pakistan in a Pakistan-Iran 
Joint Mission for Afghanistan and was a member of the OIC Committee on 
Afghanistan. He is a member of the first Pakistan-Afghan Loya Jirga. He writes 
frequently for “The News” on FATA and Afghanistan and is a guest speaker at 
the National Management College in Lahore, the National Defence University in 
Islamabad, the Foreign Service Academy in Islamabad, the National Institute of 
Management in Peshawar, the Kashmir Institute of Management, and the Institute 
of Strategic Studies in Islamabad. 
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Appendix 2: Map of Pakistan Administrative Divisions 
Source: University of Texas Libraries, Pakistan (Administrative Divisions) 2010, <http://www.lib 
.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_admin-2010.jpg>, [Accessed 17 November 
2014]. 
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Appendix 3: Map of Ethnic Groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan / Iran / 
India border areas 
 
   Source: University of Texas Libraries, Pakistan (Major Ethnic Groups) 1980, <http://www.lib. 
    utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/pakistan_ethnic_80.jpg>, [Accessed 17 November 
    2014]. 
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Appendix 4: Map of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) and North 
West Frontier Province/Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP/KPK) 
 
 
Adapted from: Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-US Relations, Congressional Research Service, 6 
February 2009 
 
 256 
 
 
Appendix 5: Map of NATO Supply routes to Afghanistan form NDN and 
Pakistan  
 
Source: Minding Russia, November 16, 2012.  
 
Source: Minding Russia, November 16, 2012, <http://3dblogger.typepad.com/minding_russia/201 
2/ 11/chokehold.html> [Accessed 13 December 2013] 
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